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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ARAB INVESTMENT PATTERNS SHOWN TO BE CHANGING

Kuwait AL-QABAS in ARabic 7 Jul 82 p 13

[Article: "According to the OAPEC Secretary General's Annual Report 6 Arab Countries Have Surpluses Of \$78 Billion Available For Investment; the Dollar's Lower Share Of New Deposits Will Reduce Political Risks"]

[Text] OAPEC recently released its secretary general's eighth annual report for 1981 in which he reviewed many topics relating to oil and energy in general. We will review the section dealing with Arab investments, including their growth and their geographic distribution.

The official investable surplus accumulated by the six Arab countries--Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Libya--amounted to approximately \$250 billion during the period from 1974 to 1980. This surplus rose by about \$78 billion in 1980.

It should be pointed out that there is a difference between investable surpluses, or those that can be used for what are called fixed investments, and current account surpluses in the balance of payments.

This difference is because of the fact that these countries borrow from foreign countries, the fact there is direct foreign investment in them, the oil export credits they grant, and other unspecified influxes of capital. None of these factors is included in current accounts. Investable surpluses held by the above six countries in 1980 were estimated at about \$78 billion. Current account surpluses for the same year were estimated at about \$93 billion.

Because there is a lack of detailed information available about OAPEC investments in the various industrial countries we will discuss the investments of the OPEC nations as a whole. And because the investable surpluses of the Arab countries constitute a large portion of OPEC's surplus--about 77 percent--OPEC's investments can be considered an acceptable indication of OAPEC's investments.

Accumulated cash surpluses which were invested abroad by the oil-exporting countries and the members of OPEC during the period from 1974 to 1980 amounted to more than \$324 billion. Of this the United States and the United Kingdom

shared 41 percent, divided equally between the two. The other industrialized countries received 40 percent, while the developing countries received about 14 percent. The remaining portion went to international institutions and organizations.

The channels of investment in the United States and the United Kingdom are markedly different inasmuch as most of the money is concentrated in long-term investments in the former, while short-term investments predominate in the latter. In this connection it should be noted that most of the short-term investments in the United Kingdom are in the form of bank deposits in the European money market. As expected, all investments in the developing countries are long term since these countries do not have the same banking facilities as the industrial countries.

On the subject of the distribution of foreign deposits in the years 1979 and 1980 the report said the following:

The value of the OPEC nations' investable surpluses amounted to \$87 billion in 1980, compared with approximately \$61 billion in 1979.

In 1980 these funds were distributed almost evenly between long-term and short-term investments. This was the opposite of the previous year when short-term investments accounted for 71 percent.

The investments of 1980 were different from those of 1979 in other respects also. Long-term investments rose from about \$17 billion to nearly \$45 billion, while short-term investments were relatively stable. There was a noticeable change in the geographic distribution of these investments among the industrialized countries. While short-term investments in 1980 remained close to those of 1979 in the United Kingdom, and particularly in the European money market, they declined to a great extent in the United States. There was increased investment in the other industrial countries, particularly Japan, West Germany and Switzerland, in the form of bank deposits. These countries received almost 62 percent of all short-term investments in 1980, up from 43 percent in 1979.

Long-term investments in the United States rose sharply in 1980, and nearly doubled in the other industrial countries from \$8.7 billion in 1979 to \$16.7 billion in 1980. In the developing countries these investments declined from \$9.6 billion to \$6.6 billion.

There was a clear shift in the direction investable surpluses took in 1980 compared with 1979. There was a shift away from the United States and the United Kingdom in favor of the other industrial countries, from short-term investments to long-term investments, and from the dollar to other currencies such as the German mark, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. Despite the increase in the U.S. dollar's share of new deposits, in the European money markets during 1980 the total share of new deposits declined from 82 percent in 1979 to 96 percent in 1980 [sic].

These can be considered fundamentally healthy developments inasmuch as investment income can be expected to increase while the financial and political risks can be expected to decrease.

INVESTCORP ACTIVITIES OUTLINED

London ARAB BANKING & FINANCE in English No 2, Jul 82 pp 46, 48

[Text]

Arab Investment Banking Corporation (Investcorp) prides itself on being the first sizable Arab investment banking institution in the Gulf. The new corporation is being set up in Bahrain by US-educated Iraqi Nimir Kirdar, formerly of Chase Manhattan Bank, and has founder shareholders from all the Gulf Arab countries. Abdel-Rahman al-Azidi, former Kuwaiti finance minister, is Investcorp's chairman with Bahrain's Ahmed Ali Kanoo as vice-chairman. Kirdar is designated the group's president and chief executive.

Of its \$200 million paid-up capital, \$150 million has been raised from 335 founder shareholders: Arab investors, with few shareholders holding more than \$1 million — equivalent to 1% of the equity. In the Gulf, where single families and governments have so often been the founder shareholders of institutions, Investcorp's structure is said to be a new departure.

The list of Arab investors is particularly impressive. It includes many of the Gulf's most important business families: the Kanoo and Al-Zayani of Bahrain, Al-Muzaini, Al-Mutawa, Al-Saleh and Al-Babtain of Kuwait, Al-Sudairy, Shobokshy and Sharbatly of Saudi Arabia, Al-Farzan and Mannar of Qatar, Al-Mazrui and Galadari of the UAE, and the Zubair of Oman.

The ruling families of many of the Gulf states are also strongly represented in the list of shareholders published in early May. No fewer than five of the late King Abdel-Aziz's grandsons are shareholders. Shaikh Surour Bin-Muhammad al-Nahayan, chamberlain of the UAE Presidential Court and governor of the UAE central

bank, three members of Kuwait's ruling house, Bahrain's Shaikh Ali Bin-Khalifah Bin-Salman al-Khalifah, four members of Qatar's Al-Thani family, and Oman's Said Shaido Bin-Taimur and Said Hamid Bin-Hamoud are all named as shareholders. Other well-known founders are Saudi Petroleum & Minerals Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Al-Azqi. Some Gulf institutions — including nine commercial banks — have also taken shares.

The relative economic strengths of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Investcorp's Bahrain base are reflected in the division of founder shares: Saudi investors hold \$40 million, Bahrainis \$38 million, Kuwaitis \$31 million, UAE shareholders \$18 million, Qataris \$12 million, Omanis \$7 million and other investors \$13 million. Kirdar told ABF that \$7 million of this was held by Iraqi investors, with non-Gulf Arabs holding the remaining \$6 million of the founder shareholder capital.

Of the remaining \$41 million capital, \$26 million is being subscribed by public share offering and \$15 million is reserved for the bank's planned performance incentive programme. Under the latter, bank employees will be given the chance to acquire shares at the original issue price. The offer of equity participation for staff is also a new departure in the Gulf and means that Investcorp will be able to attract high-calibre personnel.

The credit for developing such a well-devised equity base for Investcorp goes to both Nimir Kirdar and the AMF. After six years at Chase Manhattan — during which time he built up the bank's regional office in Bahrain, Kirdar was seconded to AMF, where he worked on a blueprint for

an Arab Gulf investment bank while taking the post of adviser to the then president of the fund. Iraq's former planning minister Jawad Hasnani Hasnani, a founder shareholder in Investcorp and a board member, was keen to develop in the Gulf viable international investment banking and securities companies which would be Arab owned and Arab run.

Since Kirdar left the fund in mid-1981, Egyptian-born Omar al-Abd has been seconded from New York-based Salomon Brothers to look into the possibility of setting up a Gulf Arab securities house in Bahrain.

Following his year at AMF, Kirdar immediately set about putting the AMF blueprint into action. In August 1981 the project was launched. A temporary office was set up in Bahrain's Holiday Inn and the job of selling the structure to top Gulf investors began.

The large shareholder base was intended to give the company more stability and to establish a close relationship between Investcorp and as many as possible of its future customers — Gulf individuals with high net assets.

Investcorp will offer Gulf investors a range of opportunities tailored to their needs. Previously, western investment bankers have taken down proposals and hawked them round the hallways of wealthy investors in the area, but this situation will now change, Kirdar told ABF. Through a London office, which will have a staff of 35, Investcorp will be able to match deals with individual Gulf investor needs and channel them through to its Bahrain headquarters, where it has an investment banking licence.

The relatively large \$200 million capital base — which Kirdar says may be upped to \$500 million — will allow the bank to buy shares in the business it is offering to its clients and shareholders. "The investor will know that he is in something well studied and in which Investcorp has every confidence," explains Kirdar. "We will be putting our money where our mouths is."

The three types of international investment of most interest to Investcorp are

- Direct participation in companies. Kirdar stresses that these should be "meaningful holdings," as Investcorp will not be that interested in small deals.
- Portfolio investments in securities, options and commodities.
- Real estate.

In all these areas Kirdar will be looking at the size, rather than the quantity of transactions.

The bank will also be involved in providing regional investment banking services in the Gulf, such as mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, financial advice and investment in the Gulf share market. It will also participate in all types of foreign exchange business.

The bank will not become fully active until the beginning of 1983. Kirdar has already recruited two of his most important subordinates — Mike Merritt, formerly of Chase Manhattan, as his assistant in Bahrain, and ex-Bankers Trust Company's Cem Casmig. Kirdar will be spending a lot of the time between September and January on recruitment in order to bring Investcorp up to a total strength of 70, split equally between Bahrain and London.

At the first full board meeting, held in Bahrain on 20 June, Kirdar presented a three-year plan for the bank's strategy which received full board approval. As ABF went to press, Investcorp was still firming up arrangements for its London and Bahrain offices.

Kirdar is conscious of the size of the task ahead of him. "We've got to earn our stripes as time goes on," he says. He is well aware that many of the contacts necessary to top-flight investment merchant banking take years to cultivate. To fill that gap, it will be essential to recruit some top American investment bankers — rather than commercial bankers — and some British merchant banking talent. Time will tell if he is successful. Judging by the salaries on offer — from £100,000 (\$179,000) a year downwards — he should be able to find the right people. □

PREFABRICATED HOUSING PROJECTS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 14, 15, 16 Sep 82

[Article by Ammar Belhimer: 'Prefabricated Housing']

[14 Sep 82 p 12]

I. Critical Needs and Precarious System

[Text] "In public opinion, prefabricated housing is synonymous with barracks," M. Hamidi, director of the ONEP--the National Office for Promotion of Prefabricated-Housing Construction--begins by recognizing. The term seems pejorative to him. He prefers the term "industrialized structures."

Prefabricated housing. Here, then, is a subject that continually arouses all sorts of controversy, at all levels. The warning that this young Plan official gives us reflects the scope of these controversies well.

"The field is mined; you have to know where to put your feet." Actually, it is a matter of demystifying the question, Hamidi specifies.

Let us go back and review the genesis of the question. Recourse to this method of construction goes back, it seems to us, to an observation and to a certain experience. The observation is the objective inability of the construction sector to respond to the nation's needs for housing and socioeducational equipment. At the present rate, the sector's deficits are growing.

The observation: the costs of construction in our country are among the highest in the world; the quality is not entirely satisfactory; deliveries are low, and construction time is extremely slow.

The consequence: the crisis is not being contained; it is extending.

Another element of observation: directly or indirectly, 60 to 80 percent of the value of the materials involved in construction activity take the form of foreign exchange. The experience is Chlef and the spectacular results achieved as a result of an unprecedented mobilization of the national resources and inter-

national solidarity: 20,000 houses were delivered there in less than a year, along with 30 CEM's [intermediate schools], 7 lycees, 2 ITE's [expansion unknown], 7 hospitals and 1,700 classrooms. Total: 1.9 million m².

These are two major reasons why the Political Directorate takes this view: since outflow of foreign exchange is inevitable in any case, and since prefabricated housing costs less and saves time, why not use it on a larger scale? Thus it is that for 1982 it decreed a program for 5 million m².

Time makes life hard for those who want to kill it. This truth of Prevert's applies perfectly to the case of housing and construction. Prefabricated housing is rightly intended--in the expression of the secretary general of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning--"to buy a part of the time that has been lost."

Can Time Be Bought?

"In view of the sharpness of the housing problem, it has been said that we have found the means for getting out of it," Hamidi states. The assurance that the time lost could be regained has made this way of doing things a real political option.

In addition to fulfillment of the social needs that have built up, other objectives have devolved to it: it is also a matter of freeing up the construction resources, which are already overloaded, and reorganizing them and orienting them toward new programs.

"To get out of our rut, we should cancel the projects in progress, free up the construction resources, and at the same time, relieve the tension." Today there is a real phobia about prefabricated housing, so that even its enemies do not know how to feel about it. Everyone is given the opportunity to demonstrate, in a timely way, that the objectives have been achieved and that the balance-sheets are in the black. Lags in the Plan are translated into prefabricated housing: "The objectives of the Five-Year Plan are too ambitious in relation to the country's resources," it is asserted in the ONEP. Prefabricated housing is therefore the unexpected opportunity for getting out of this impasse, while at the same time keeping it in mind, by the way, that it is not a question of doing so at any price, but rather keeping three parameters in mind: the time schedules, quality, and costs. Let us consider these things a little more closely.

"We Do Not Have Time to Diddle-Daddle"

Quality first of all. The notion does not require unanimity.

"We are not delivering temporary housing," they stress in the ONEP. "If maintained well, the units will last for 50 years. But the problem of maintenance is a general one: even concrete does not resist our children."

And wood or sheet metal holds up even less well. Apart from the tenants' behavior, there is also the size of the households. The experience of the 1,500

Roslevs of Constantine proved that the cottages were suited rather to small families and required special care.

We are in a meeting at the highest level, devoted to the douars program.

"The quality of the products and of the system..." an architect of the prime contractor's begins. He does not complete his sentence. The reply by the ONEP's director takes an indisputable form: "The government has decided on the operation for one reason only: to move fast. We do not have the time to diddle-daddle, and prefabricated housing is inflexible. We have been told that the town built by Dragados at Gue de Constantine was a set of parallelepipeds."

"The balcony is not the sine-qua-non condition of good architecture," Mr Belkaid carries on. "In the ONEP, we are reminded of the control by the CTC [expansion unknown] (this control is exercised on the structures, the framework) and the 10-year insurance. One of the ONEP's officials, Mr Bendaoud, is less rigid, though: "I do not recommend prefabricated construction for collective housing. But on the other hand, the system is well-suited for socioeducational equipment." Others are less reassuring: "Algeria is not a test range for experimenting with new systems. New systems have to be in existence for at least 5 years. We also require certificates of warranty for the materials used."

In reality, it is incorrect to speak of control. It consists rather in visual evaluation of the value of the system on the basis of the plans and samples that fill up the ONEP's premises. The ONEP does not even have a laboratory yet.

At present, young Algerian cadres are striving to limit the wastage. Technical consultations are held with the suppliers to get them to make modifications of their initial proposals.

We were given the opportunity of attending one of these consultations. Two Algerian technicians dealt with three representatives of a French supplier for more than 2 hours.

"We have worked on the basis of your advice. I believe we have some good ideas," begins the oldest of the three, extending a pack of Dunhills. Moussa declines the offer. He prefers Hoggars.

Plans are laid out on the table, and people bend over them.

The supplier: "We've come back with an overhead plan, much denser for the southern zone, which gives us more shady areas. Your stubbornness has made us work. The new facades are of concrete, with very well-ventilated walls."

The technical details are discussed: "Is the panel shown imported or made on site?"

"On site. The authorities have assured us of a priority supply of cement and reinforcing rod, but that does not rule out importation of a part of the materials."

"The joints?"

"They are elastic joints with a 10-year warranty."

"It is not obvious that the coating will hold up on your joints."

"We have the two guarantees."

"Have you already used this system?"

"The weight of the elements is small so as to go faster and have the equipment necessary on site. The elements are transportable and mountable by two men and not by crane."

"Have you tested it out?" The answer does not come immediately.

The system has been gone over with a fine-tooth comb, but one of the two young Algerians says he does not have too many illusions about it: "It is as if they are making mistakes on purpose so as to orient us toward the corrections that suit them. The real deficiencies are far deeper and more difficult to correct."

One Hears Everything One's Neighbor Says

Where there's smoke, there's fire. The fact that the Prime Minister brings up the problem implies that it does indeed exist. In a memorandum of 23 May 1982, it is recalled that "this option should not be understood in the sense of a downgrading of safety measures."

The memorandum goes on:

"Now it seems that this is not always the case."

"The fact is the the minister of interior brings it to my attention that the opinion of the Civil Protection Services is not always taken into account and the prevention inspections made by the officials in this sector bring out serious deficiencies in certain cases, the repercussions of which, on the level of safety from fire risks, seriously compromise the objective to be achieved."

Now let us hear Mr Ali A., who lives in a prefabricated house put up by Italians in Abadla:

"The sandwich panels are no more than 10 cm thick. They consist of two pieces of sheet metal, one inside and the other outside, with simple insulation. The facade panels have also been used for the ceiling. Since huts right up against one another are involved, the insulation is like a veil. One hears everything one's neighbor says."

"At 44° in the shade, it was 75° inside. In winter, it's a refrigerator. The plumbing starts to give out, and the roof has practically no insulation space."

"The euphoria of Chlef presents the risk of turning the country into a shantytown," comments a Plan cadre who views prefabricated housing as a sort of "improved precarious habitat."

II. Exceptional Measures

[Text] "Prefabricated housing is an emergency solution. There is a need for austerity. Let us avoid the superfluous," the Plan representative warns at a meeting devoted to the customs program, which comprises the building of a national school with a continental scope.

"One does not invest to crash later," replies the director of customs. These remarks, on the whole, illustrate a dilemma. Should the urgency of the program necessarily prevent us from achieving something durable? No. The same dilemma runs through prefabricated housing. Financed on temporary aid, it has to be repaid, therefore amortized, in installments, through rental or immediately by sale. But rental does not seem to suit the builder, and the renters cannot buy houses that seem temporary to them.

On the other hand, the operators find themselves confronted with a space-occupancy problem. Prefabricated housing takes up a lot of land. It is poorly adapted to horizontal building, with R+3's at most, as at Gue de Constantine. Now that is where there is not much land, in the zones of heavy industrial and university construction, where one is supposed to put the most housing units. In terms of costs, prefabricated housing units cost quite a bit less than permanent concrete structures. It is more or less the equivalent of the foreign-exchange part that goes into the cost of a housing unit built in Algeria. The partisans of the system see this as a major reason for continuing along this way. Certain other reasons argue against the inability to make the public building-construction sector more productive because of considerations that are not intrinsic to it gives the operation the image of overhastiness, a facile solution, possible only because the manna of oil and gas provide relative financial comfort. Finally. [as published]

As regards time schedules, prefabricated construction effectively makes considerable time-saving possible: "The test operation in rehousing 1,600 families of the memorial enabled us to do the drainage and the platform in 3 months and to complete the assembly in 4 months," it is declared in the ONEP.

5 Million Square Meters

Despite a few difficulties, the prefabricated operation has definitely been decided on. The 1982 program involves 5 million m². Essentially, university hostels, technical schools, CFP's [occupation-training centers] and schools. But also 20,000 housing units, not to mention the housing accommodations attached to the socioeducational facilities. The wilayas benefiting from the major part of the program are those that have built up the biggest lags.

The French suppliers have by themselves captured a market of more than 800,000 m². They are followed by the Spanish and the Italians, with about 700,000 m² each. Next come the Danish and the Belgians, then the English, the Portuguese and the Swiss. Among the socialist countries, only Hungary has managed to get a contract, rather a symbolic one, involving 20,000 m². It is true that the

planning of their economic growth, being programmed over a period of several years, keeps them out of this kind of operation, with its urgent and exceptional character. The program is governed by exceptional importation and construction measures.

These measures are special as regards the procedures by which execution of the program is organized.

The ordinance of 6 March 1982, enacting provisions complementary to the 1982 finance act, exempts the contracts and riders made within the framework of implementation of the program from the formalities and procedures for the making of public contracts as well as from the certifications by the organs that do the preliminary checking. The procedure is therefore lightened considerably.

The operation consequently escapes the conventional rules for the making of public contracts and preliminary checking.

It also escapes the legislative and regulatory provisions relative to foreign trade and exchange control. Plus the need for AGI [Total Import Permit], transfer agreements or external-indebtedness authorizations.

The elimination of the administrative barriers is explained by the concern to move fast. These advantages are supplemented by others, aimed at stimulating a flow of suppliers. Thus, by the terms of the same law, the foreign firms are exempted from all imposts, duties and taxes both on the equipment, materials and prefabricated elements imported and on the activity carried out within the framework of the program, including the wages paid to their foreign personnel.

Flexible Procedures

Two structures govern the concrete realization of the objectives decreed in the matter of prefabricated construction.

An interministerial activation and coordination committee has been set up as a conceptual organ to implement the policy decreed by the government for definition and distribution of the needs, the orientation of the programs and the main lines of research. In order to do this, two principal missions have devolved to it: on the one hand, definition of the means for integration of prefabricated construction with economic development, and on the other hand, the working-out of the action program and its materialization.

The committee includes eight ministries (Housing and Urban Planning, Transportation and Fisheries, Planning and National Development, Finance, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Commerce, Energy and Petrochemical Industries), the secretary of state for foreign trade, and the ministers who are users of the projects under study.

The committee's decisions are implemented by the ONEP, created by decree of 6 March 1982. On this basis, the ONEP is responsible essentially for the studies and the prime contractorship of the program. It assists all the other promoting services and organisms on the technical level.

The ONEP's action in the matter of studies and prime contractorship, with a view to promotion of light prefabricated construction, is nonetheless based on a number of principles, without which the entire operation would be only a "graft" of pieces onto a disorganized fabric. That is why this new organism is expressly called on to achieve a veritable technology transfer, to gather, process and diffuse documentation, to undertake research that could improve performance. These are all tasks which, if tackled effectively, could help bring about all the conditions for the launching of a national prefabricated-construction industry. The experience of other operators, such as the SNLB [National Cork and Wood Industries Co], SN Metal [National Metal Construction Co] and the former DNC [expansion unknown], already constitute a valuable foundation, to be broadened and deepened in the direction of strengthening the national capacities in this area.

It is true that there is an excessive tendency today to import everything, including labor, on the unexpressed pretext that the national means are sapped by chronic inertia. This represents a danger of outer-directedness that runs the risk of doing serious harm not only to the sacred principles of economic independence but also to the progress achieved in that direction. It is needless to say that easy or systematic recourse to foreign resources plants the seeds of aggravation of the problems in the medium term. Such is neither the approach nor the desire of the housing officials.

[16 Sep 82 p 12]

III. An Additional Solution

[Text] Despite the considerable recovery efforts made in the housing sector, there is still a gap between supply and demand, and it is widening. Responsibility for this gap cannot be assigned to the sector alone, still less to its cadres or its workers. The sector is downstream from the other sectors of the national economy, and it suffers all their contradictions. Let there be a shortage of land, let the labor force not be trained in sufficient numbers, let construction materials not be available at all times and anywhere, let equipment be late in arriving, and so on, and it is building construction that suffers.

To these constraints have been added others, of a demographic nature. Frightful population growth and an uncontrollable exodus seriously complicate things. Responding to the needs of a city such as Algiers that has an annual birth rate of 7 percent amounts to juxtaposing veritable new cities to it.

This review is necessary in order to make it clear that a failure of the building-construction sector is not a necessary corollary of the recourse to prefabricated construction. The progress made in building construction is considerable, but not sufficient to meet the needs within the time schedules counted on.

The entire question is how the national effort to give the nation a powerful, because vital, sector, with action on all the elements that make it up, will be continued.

"The tragedy," an enterprise official tells us, "is that when one has a good architect, there is no mason available, and when you have both, you lack the materials."

It Is Not a Temporary Formula

While we wait for all the conditions to be achieved for meeting the needs of the population, in terms of quantity and quality, some /additional solutions/ are required. This is the case with prefabricated construction. They will help to reduce the tensions that find expression in sectors as sensitive as those of health, education and vocational training.

"The prefabricated operation," specifies Mr Belkaid, secretary general of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, "is intended to correct the imbalances and the inequalities that exist from one region to another in the areas of health, education, training, etc, while at the same time giving the sector an opportunity to 'breathe,' to organize itself better for heavier work loads. This, on the overall level, should help improve performance in achievement of the planned objectives that have been assigned to the sector." The first level of clarification is that prefabricated construction is an additional solution. This character is clearly apparent from the following observations:

--First: The 5-Year Plan calls for the construction of 450,000 housing units in the public program, with auxiliary equipment estimated at about 35 percent of this value, which represents a little more than 50 million m²;

--Second: Prefabricated construction covers 5 million m², which is less than 10 percent of the objectives.

It is thus a drop in the bucket, we are told at the Ministry.

It is added, though, that this is not a temporary formula. Two specific clarifications are added: "Prefabricated construction has nothing to do with the 'emergency towns' built after the Chlef earthquake. Thus there is a world of difference between the individual housing units and the auxiliary facilities."

"Let us speak briefly and to the point," someone else says; "we should avoid the prefabricated-housing myth and reserve the system for schools, CEM's, health infrastructure, training centers, so as to orient the construction resources more toward housing."

In parallel with delimitation of the "sectors of application," the setting-up of a national prefabricated-construction industry raises another question: definition of the system to be adopted.

The SNLB is producing "Saharan cabins" of wood, which are perfectly well-suited to the forest villages that were under discussion a few years ago, on the occasion of the debates on the fourth phase of the Agrarian Revolution.

Our country also has considerable capacities for production of metal structures. SN Metal, the ECSM [expansion unknown], the wilaya units and the priv-

ate firms can be the basis for a takeoff with a view to industrialization of building construction. The framework therefore exists. It remains to get ready by supplementary means, which, we are assured, do not require big investments or long periods of time; what is involved is the "fill-in" units (partitions, outside walls).

This is an important aspect of the economic integration, which also presupposes bold action at the level of supplies and of labor training, specialization of the skilled personnel or coordination.

The challenge remains to be taken up: "It calls for mobilization of everyone, so that those who are being led by the 'harness of development' will rather set themselves to pulling it."

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CSO: 4519/320

AGENCY TO FILL NEED FOR ECONOMIC INFORMATION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19 Sep 82 p 4

[Article by Muhammad Zalani: "Economic Information in the Battle for Development"]

[Text] Reliable and exhaustive economic information is a fundamental basis for any decision that is intended to have important consequences. The economic operators have had all the time they need to verify the soundness of this basic postulate. Twenty years of development efforts have demonstrated that the absence of reliable economic information constitutes not only a serious impediment to pursuit of the development effort but also a source of considerable excess cost. Lacking a solid system of homogeneous economic information, the operators are led to take decisions whose contradictory character emerges only in practice, at the risk of having to revise everything, with the resultant delays in projects and cost overruns. Thus a number of incoherencies arise at the level of fulfillment of the various national development plans.

It has seemed difficult to take advantage of this experience because the instrument for capitalizing on the experience has not existed. There is no information system that can take in charge all this invaluable experience of the country's economic development. At the level of the individual sectors, though, efforts have been made to develop information and to exploit it. But effort is in fact being wasted, because information at the level of one sector or another takes on its full significance only if placed in the setting of all the information relating to the national economy. In other words, the efforts made at the level of each sector are, for one thing, not systematic and permanent, and appear all the more ineffective if there is not a coordinating entity that could treat the information relating to the individual sectors to make it all the basis for a corpus of national economic information. Such coordination is all the more indispensable in that the development of the economy is being carried out within the framework of the National Development Plan.

The CNIDE, a Future Data Bank

Among the crucial problems with which the work of planning has been and continues to be confronted is the one that comes out most clearly in all phases, at all levels of preparation and execution of the Plan.

Indeed, economic decision-making is totally conditioned by economic information -- observation of the present, and the basis of analysis and forecasting. The

very quality of the decisions depends only on the information that underlies them. In the present state of affairs, the administration is just as poorly informed as are the economic operators. The periodicity as well as the content of the information available today are disparate. Each sector has, in a way, its own concept of information. This can only lead to a corpus of data in which overall coherence is often absent.

This information void at the national level enables the foreign media to wage their offensive that much more easily. The country's highest political bodies have rightly described information as one of the sectors that make up national sovereignty.

If on the political level the importance of the question is recognized in clear terms, on the practical level, the problem posed is to ensure coordination of all the efforts aimed at the gathering of information and the processing of it. Thus, the use by all economic operators and all the public organisms of data that are uniform in their terminology, their framework of formulation and their quantitative expression, is indispensable for ensuring coherence of the decisions, at whatever level they may be taken.

Assuring to all economic operators the use of uniform and coherent data is a basic condition for rational utilization of the studies and, generally speaking, the resources employed in the gathering and exploitation of information as well as the rigor that must be guaranteed to all the orientations and decisions that involve the national economy as a whole.

Who can ensure such homogeneity of economic information if not a national organism that would be responsible both for coordination of the efforts and for the key role of center for the processing and diffusion of information?

Going Beyond the Stage of Mere Conservation of Documents

Such an organism exists. It is the National Center for Economic Information and Documentation (CNIDE), created by decree No 81-389 of 26 December 1981. This center is responsible for implementing the desire to give the function of legal filing of economic studies an application that goes beyond the stage of mere conservation of these documents. Legal filing existed, of course, well before December 1981. But the problem posed today is to go beyond the stage of mere conservation of documents, to achieve dynamic and exhaustive exploitation of everything that constitutes economic information.

It should be recalled here that the question of information, its availability and its reliability, was posed as early as 1971. Indeed, awareness of the necessity of organizing stores of economic information was expressed concretely by the promulgation of decree No 71-133 of 13 May 1971, enacting organization of control of studies of an economic character and instituting the obligation of legal filing with the Ministry of Planning departments concerned. This decree was followed by a Ministry of Planning decree of 15 September 1971 establishing the modalities for application of the decree. A memorandum from the Prime Minister, circulated on 5 August 1979, was to draw the attention of the members of the government to the provisions of that decree.

Furthermore, this emphasis by the government on the importance of economic information is entirely justified. Indeed, it has been noted that the economic operators who need information do try to acquire it; they do so by conducting investigations and engaging the services of a consultant, or they launch a research program. But what they obtain in the last analysis is a document presenting some raw information bought at a high price. Once these documents are filed, it is difficult to find them again!

If the CNIDE has the indispensable human and material resources--and if it also benefits from awareness of economic awareness as regards the importance of the role that has fallen to it--it will certainly be able to make it possible to overcome the deficiencies that have characterized the economic-information sector.

The CNIDE will in effect be, for the economic operators and the administration, a framework for multiform assistance and a reservoir of economic information that relates to their study and research work. This will avoid duplication of effort and thereby reduction of costs [as published] and will ensure the homogeneity and coherence of the basic data generally used by the sectors as a whole. The CNIDE's action will have a positive impact on the organization and general development of economic information within all of the country's institutions. Thus it will be possible to achieve more fluid circulation of information, greater reliability of the data, better transparency of the institutions and more rational utilization of resources. In particular, the center's activity falls within the perspective of the indispensable deepening of national planning and improvement of the management of the national economy. The decentralization of the decision-making process, the growing complexity of the projects and the necessity of increasingly rigorous control make the center's activity a basic condition for pursuit of the development effort itself.

Production Efforts Clearly Defined for the CNIDE

The translation of the CNIDE's missions into production objectives for goods and services is already clearly specified. Thus, the first fundamental activity to be undertaken is the gathering and classification of economic studies that are required to be legally filed; this is for the purpose of setting up a store of documents that will serve as a basis for launching other activities. This is an ongoing and permanent activity of the center and one that seems off to a good start.

In a second phase, the center will move on to exploitation of the information gathered. This exploitation will generate a range of products and services such as summaries of studies, guideline schemes, memoranda relating to standards and methodology, reference catalogues, outlines of types of studies, the furnishing of copies and documents, supplying documents on a temporary basis, furnishing detail items of information, etc.

Other activities just as important for economic information will subsequently enrich the range of activities undertaken by the CNIDE. Thus there is the proposed creation of a periodical review specializing in the information sciences, the objective of which is to sensitize the economic operators to the indispensable role that information has to play in the building of the national economy.

Furthermore, the center will be responsible for setting up a reference system on national and foreign agencies that work in the field of economic studies. Such a system will be an effective support for all the data relative to the competence of these economic-studies agencies in the subject at hand, their specialties, their reputation and their accomplishments on the national scale.

As the activities and the experience acquired in the area of the information sciences develop, the center will strive to make all the identification, cataloging and indexing standards for documents of an economic nature available to the other documentation centers.

The center is called on to develop, in the longer term, a question-answer service with the role of replying to users' requests in the area of economic data. A service for assistance in the setting-up and organizing (within the limits of the CNIDE's assignments and resources) of any sectorial economic-documentation center is planned also; this is to be by the preparation of a guide for creation of information centers and the development and maintenance of documentary languages.

The fundamental objective of all these activities is to succeed in setting up an "economic data bank" open to consultation by the various users and contributing effectively to the organization and consolidation of planning work.

While guaranteeing equal access to all economic operators, the CNIDE's information system will in the long run have to be organized to respond to the information needs of the following users: the officials responsible for socioeconomic development; the planners responsible for formulation of the economic and social indicators and for forecast and preinvestment studies; the officials responsible for development activities and programs; the studies agencies, for their supply of stores of information; researchers and teachers in the fields relative to national socioeconomic development.

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ACTIVITIES OF ARAB BANKING CORPORATION PROFILED

Operations Outlined

London ARAB BANKING & FINANCE in English No 2, Jul 82 p 17

[Text]

Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) is expanding with a vengeance. The Bahrain-based Arab banking giant — jointly owned by Kuwait's Finance Ministry, Libya's Treasury Secretariat and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority — was only set up in January 1980. Yet by the end of this year it will have round the-world, 24-hour banking coverage.

ABC's London branch opened in January, in June its New York branch opened, and two further branches — Singapore and Milan — are to open later in 1982. As president and chief executive Abdullah A. Saudi pointed out to a London audience in June, the Singapore branch will give ABC 24-hour money market coverage, plugging the one time-zone gap in the London, Bahrain and New York network. Saudi cited the strength of the money markets in Singapore as the primary attraction for ABC and other Arab banks to set up there. Foreign bankers say it is closer to the Middle East, provides access to the rest of Southeast Asia and has a more open market than Hongkong.

The growing international coverage of ABC's network has provided it with a base for further diversification. Less emphasis is now placed on syndicated lending. In the second quarter of 1982, Gulf International Bank, the second largest Arab bank in the area of syndicated loans, was more active in syndicated lending (in terms of lead management) than ABC.

Saudi maintains that a big new international bank invariably starts off with syndicated lending. As its experience

grows in other areas — money markets, trade finance, guarantees and securities trading — so a bank can begin to diversify.

Saudi feels that Arab banks should now be concentrating on these areas. With the downturn — a best temporary — in current account surpluses, the importance of financial intermediation between Arab surplus funds and world-wide deficits has lessened. To survive and prosper, Arab international banks should now offer as wide a range of services as possible.

ABC is building up its mainstream banking services, including specialised investment. As is evident from the scheduled branch in Singapore, money market work is to be greatly expanded. Recent figures show how rapid this growth has been already. Total deposits grew from \$2,000 million in April 1981 to \$4,600 million at the beginning of April 1982 — a 130% increase.

In line with this policy of building up its investment banking capability, ABC has recently taken on Fred Fisher and Peter Earle, formerly with Orion Royal Bank's mergers and acquisitions team. The two bankers were lured to ABC by high salaries, ABF was told. Along with most of ABC's projected investment banking team, they will be based in London.

Although ABC has established itself in all the major world money markets, one of its most notable successes has been the Saudi rial market in Bahrain. As one Marhabasco European banker says: "Five years ago the five largest players in the Saudi rial market were all European

and American, now the Arab banks, and particularly ABC, are the big royal market makers."

Floating rate issues are another ABC speciality. In May the bank managed two FRN issues — a \$150 million issue for Credit Commercial de France and a \$100 million 10-year issue for Mortgage Bank of Denmark. Floating rate instruments have obvious attractions when interest rates are fluctuating but ABC has also been active in the fixed rate securities market. It recently managed a \$100 million issue for Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex).

Nevertheless ABC has not neglected its syndicated loan operations and will continue to rank as one of the top few Arab banks in the syndicated loan and guarantee market. The bank was recently involved in co-ordinating and providing a \$158 million syndicated guarantee facility

President Interviewed

London ARAB BANKING & FINANCE in English No 2, Jul 82 p 19

[Interview with Abdulla A Saudi, ABC president and chief executive; date and place not specified]

[Text]

● *ABC now seems to be placing less emphasis on the medium-term Euroloan market. Does this reflect disillusionment with the medium-term credit market, as well as a wish to diversify into other areas of banking?*

■ ABC is aiming for more diversification rather than concentrating on the Euroloan markets. With the building up of more qualified and professional teams, we are looking for more business in commercial banking, management of portfolios and investment banking.

● *How many staff does the bank have now, and what is the number projected for the end of 1982?*

■ ABC's total staff is now approaching 170. We still see this number increasing along with the expansion of business.

● *When will ABC open its Milan and Singapore branches?*

ABC's branch in Singapore will open before the end of September. As for the Milan branch, we are hoping to see it operative before the end of this year.

● *ABC seems keener to do more Middle East business, particularly in the Gulf.*

Will this trend continue?

■ ABC is looking to do business all over the world. Of course, we will be more than happy to finance projects in our region once they prove to be feasible and profitable.

● *Do you expect the further growth of Saudi banking to prejudice ABC's business projects in the Gulf?*

■ On the contrary, I feel an increase in business within the region will further contribute to ABC's business projects, as we have the means to share the risks and contribute to the finalisation of such deals.

● *Do you expect ABC to be active in post-war Iraq — and even perhaps in post-war Iran?*

■ ABC will look at countries as they present themselves to the market. Only at that time will we make a fair assessment of the situation.

● *Are you worried about volatility in the Gulf stock markets? Do you think such developments might affect ABC's Gulf operations?*

■ The market is gradually levelling off

and, what is more reassuring, the relevant authorities are taking a keen interest in ensuring that the market returns to normal.

● *You have several responsibilities as well as your job running ABC. What are these?*

■ At the moment I am president and chief executive of ABC, a full-time job. My other responsibilities are as follows: chairman, Banco Arabe Espanol (Aresbank), Madrid; deputy chairman, Arab International Bank, Cairo; first vice chairman, Arlabank, Lima, Peru, and director on the board of Iyeco, Amsterdam. I have already resigned from my other responsibilities.

● *How did you first come to work in banking?*

■ I worked as a teacher for a year and then, by pure coincidence, moved into banking.

● *How do you feel the banking system in Libya is facing up to the downturn in oil revenue?*

■ Banking in Libya has developed tremendously during the past decade and total assets have increased accordingly. Oil receipts can affect the year-to-year rate of growth but overall assets may still continue to grow.

● *ABC has made quite a name for itself in several specific areas — providing three and four-year standby facilities, the floating-rate securities market, and so on. What other areas would you like ABC to develop particular expertise in?*

■ ABC developed the standby facility for central banks and we have finalised two deals so far — with Central Bank of Brazil and Central Bank of Peru. Although the two countries tap the market on a

regular basis, it was the first time that both central banks had borrowed directly from the market. We anticipate that such facilities will be used by other central banks and central monetary agencies. As to the other areas that ABC intends to develop, we should like to fill the gap that exists in Arab banking by expanding beyond risk taking and extending a full range of services and advice.

● *ABC is said to have the largest exposure of an Arab bank to Argentina — perhaps \$250 million. It has also lent money to Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. How do you see such exposure to what might be termed "high-risk areas" of international lending?*

■ I do not understand what you mean by the term "large exposure." The relative size of any given exposure is a function of the particular bank's asset portfolio and capital base. Even the figure you quote of \$250 million may not represent more than 10% of the exposure of some banks already involved in Argentina. ABC's policy is to be very cautious, and therefore our investment in Argentina is within our adopted policy. I must, however, emphasise that areas such as Latin America and East Europe and some other individual countries are going through a very difficult time. Banks have to be very careful in tackling these matters.

● *Where do you see dollar interest rates going over the rest of this year?*

■ I am afraid I am not in a position to quote any figures, but what I can say is that the interest rate of the dollar will not come down dramatically. I think it will maintain its present level for the rest of the year.

DETERIORATING CONDITION OF HOUSING IN VILLAGES REPORTED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2829, 30 Aug 82 pp 25-27

[Article by Jamal al-Din Husayn and Mayisah Fawi: "Peasants' Homes in More Than 2,000 Villages Threatened"]

[Text] Water percolation has become a problem no less important than the problem of shortages of drinking water and here are the reasons.

Peasants' homes in more than half the villages of the republic are in danger of collapse, the cause being water percolation.

Agricultural land, already limited, is threatened by the rise in salinity and alkalinity and the consequent drop in fertility and production and the cause is water percolation.

The stones of the temples of Luxor, the greatest archeological grouping in the world, as well as the temples of King Khufu and Amenhotep III in al-Fayyum Governorate, have been affected and are in danger of collapse, the cause being water percolation.

The question is: Isn't this problem worth our stopping to get acquainted with its general outlines and ramifications and with how to deal with it?

On the Sideline

With regard to the request for information directed to the deputy prime minister for public services and the minister of local government about the fact that the homes in the village of al-Daljamun, Kafr al-Zayyat District, al-Gharbiyah Governorate, were in danger of collapsing because of water percolation, the report stated:

At least half the villages in the republic are experiencing the same circumstances as the village of al-Daljamun.

Projects for covered and open drainage networks have been implemented to reduce water percolation on agricultural land but, unfortunately, the villages have been overlooked and nothing has been done to reduce it there. (Report No 19 of the housing committee in the People's Assembly, dated 12 May 1982.)

Planning Defects

Dr Kamal Hafni, director of the Ground Water Institute, says:

"There has in fact been a rise in ground water pressure in levels of percolated water according to records of monitoring stations of the Ministry of Irrigation. The reason for the rising level of percolated water stems from the agricultural expansion in the Nile Valley and the Delta and the haste to use irrigation water after construction of the High Dam. From another angle, the infrastructure projects suffer from a lack of balance, lack of coordination and planning defects. For example, when we decide to provide villages with potable water systems, there should be parallel projects for sewers and proper drainage. Otherwise, lacking these proper drainage projects, where will the sewage and wastewater go after the villages are provided with potable water networks?

"Naturally, the answer is that this water will seep into the earth and cause the percolated water to rise. This is difficult to get rid of because it is in thick layers of impermeable clay which reach a thickness of 10 to 30 meters. This causes the water to accumulate until it reaches surface level and consequently damages soil and homes."

Dr Baligh Shindi, director of the Soil and Water Research Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture, points out the bad effect of the rising level of percolated water on soil and buildings, saying:

This rise causes salinity and alkalinity in the soil, hinders the spread of roots and also affects the reduction operations and fertilizers which are laid down for the plants. It also causes fungal diseases to spread among the plants.

Dr Baligh Shandi goes on to say: "The top meter of soil must be free of water so that we can get all possible productivity from the land. Unfortunately, however, there is such a great rush to use irrigation water that one study made by the American Michigan University, in cooperation with the Scientific Research Academy, stated that about 17 billion cubic meters run off into the sea each year. This shows how much rush there has been to use irrigation water."

Dr Hasan Farid Zaghlul, the UN environmental health adviser, says:

"In addition to the problem of the rush by farmers to use irrigation water, there is a problem in the location of villages. Many were built in low lying areas or near small lakes or above previously silted up lakes.

"Another cause for the rise in percolated water is the lack of capacity of the large drainage conduits and the lack of maintenance and, in addition, the public drainage systems are filled with reeds and weeds and this causes the water level to rise." Eng Wajih 'Abbas, head of the Irrigation Authority, agrees with Dr Hasan Farid Zaghlul, that the rise in the level of percolated water stems from a poor selection for the site of many villages. However, with regard to drainage, he says: "The machinery of the Ministry of Irrigation is constantly engaged in clearing the ditches and public drainage systems. Moreover, we are constantly implementing the big drainage project of all agricultural land. So

far, an area of 2 million feddans has been covered with covered drainage networks. At the end of the current 1982-1987 plan, covered drainage will be completed for all land, with the completion of the project, the relative seriousness of the water percolation problem will be reduced."

With regard to the rush to use irrigation water, I--Engineer Wajih 'Abbas is still speaking--think that the peasant himself is anxious to use irrigation water to the degree that the land needs it although there is some carelessness from a lack of interest in closing "the private irrigation canals" when he is finished irrigating. Education and awareness instilling activities are carried on by the Ministry of Agriculture to caution the farmers to avoid that.

Antiquities Threatened

With regard to the threat posed by water percolation to our antiquities, Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hamid Yusuf, director general of Egyptian Antiquity Registration, says: "The water percolation and ground water threat is now a danger to the Luxor area, the great archeological grouping in the world. The salt from this water has had a major effect on the stones of the temples, threatening to cause them to collapse. The same is true of the temples in al-Fayyum, such as the temple of Amenhotep III, as it also is threatened by water percolation. Moreover, the level of water percolation and ground water has risen to 2 meters from ground level at the Sphinx and has also reached a danger stage in the al-Ghuriyah area in the effect on the Islamic relics in the area.

"Preservation of the antiquities as a national heritage requires a halt in construction around the archeological areas and taking the necessary steps to lower the level of percolated and ground water, such as digging trenches or installing pumps to draw off the water. The important thing is that something ought to be done to save what can be saved of our archeological heritage before it is obliterated by water percolation.

The Solution?

After these statements outlining the parameters of the problem posed by water percolation to man and to the land, the source of our food, and to history and our heritage, what solution can there be for this problem?

The report of the housing committee in the People's Assembly reaffirms the impossibility of installing sewers in the villages at present, particularly since some major and smaller cities still lack proper drainage and since the state's budget cannot at present bear these fiscal burdens.

The deputy prime minister for public services and the minister of local government, within the framework of cooperation of the executive, popular and party machinery to find a solution to this problem, proposes that the people build [pumps] in their houses in conformity with technical specifications and then construct a primary sump in each street which would draw from the branch sumps and then construct a big sump which would draw from the whole village and drain into the main drains.

The deputy prime minister asserts that in this regard he has reached an understanding with the Minister of Irrigation who expressed willingness to help back the governorate's capabilities in addition to the sums that had been collected through individual efforts to carry out the task.

However, the question is whether this is the ideal solution or whether there are other views and solutions?

Dr Kamal Hafni says: "First the drainage projects on agricultural land should be completed as soon as possible, guiding the use of irrigation water through raising the awareness of the citizens.

"Then there should be healthful drainage projects compatible with the village environment, taking care not to pollute the potable water reservoirs as they are used for drinking water in most Egyptian villages. These reserves must be protected from all types of chemical, biological and radiological pollution as pure ground water is a strategic resource that must be preserved."

Dr Baligh Shandi feels that it is essential to take an interest in the tasks of cleaning the ditches and drains to make the water flow properly into the sea, as well as creating "sumps" to raise the water to raise the water on its way out and away from the villages.

Dr Hasan Farid Zaghlul believes that the remedy has to vary from village to village. There are villages on high ground that will require one remedy and villages on low lying ground that will need another. Likewise, there are villages on sandy soil and others on clay soil.

However, the fundamental factor in treating this problem is raising the awareness of the populace, along with the need to construct public water systems that will drain the water in the villages properly. Dr Hasan Farid Zaghlul proposes the use of septic tank tracks as a way to protect the people and the environment to collect waste water from the houses of the villagers after cautioning them not to dispose of it in the streets and alleys. Also one must stipulate that the peasants' houses have suitable waste disposal so that healthy drinking water can be brought into their homes.

Engineer Faruq Qasim, head of the projects design section of the National Authority for Drinking Water and Waste Disposal, feels that the problem of percolated water should be remedied by implementing a sewage system project, if only in the early stages. A start could be made in this by constructing collector purification units which would cut the heavy costs of the purification operation. In addition, attention must be paid to improve the capacity of the drains as an unavoidable way to reduce the percolated water level.

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DIFFICULTIES OF COURT OF CASSATION, COURT DELAYS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Aug 82 p 3

[Report on Interview with Dr Mustafa Kamal Kirah, New Chief of Court of Cassation by Rajab al-Banna: "New Chief of Court of Cassation Discusses People's Difficulties with the Courts; 'Justice Is Actually Delayed, but...' "]

[Text] "I need a computer in the court of cassation. The human mind cannot keep track of sentences issued over 52 years."
 "If we do not face up to 'the state within the courts,' which has been set up by court officers, thousands of cases will remain in limbo, bound to the curious complications set up by these officers of the court."

When the new chief of the court of cassation entered his office a few days ago to sit on the chair that was occupied for the first time 52 years ago by 'Abd-al-'Aziz Fahmi Pasha, the father of the Egyptian courts, there was a set of questions waiting for him. The questions were about the chronic problems that make it difficult for one to get his rights in the courts. These problems often cause significant delays in the delivery of justice. There is a long line of people in front of the courts; it includes more than 8 million citizens. Most of them doubt that they will get what is rightfully theirs before they die.

Dr Mustafa Kamal Kirah, chief of the court of cassation, now holds the highest position in the Egyptian judicial hierarchy. He has new ideas, and he prefers to confront the problem squarely without wasting time and beating about the bush. He thinks that every problem we do not solve now will become a more complicated problem for those who will come after us. The next generation will call us to task about the method we sometimes prefer of putting off problems.

How does this man think, and what solutions does he have?

The problem, as Dr Kirah sees it, must be that of giving priority to [the task] of establishing order in society's problems because the objectives that society has set for itself at this stage are related to the determination of justice in that society. It is not enough for people to be assured that justice exists; they must also be assured that they can have justice in a reasonable time, at an affordable cost and [by following] comprehensible measures.

The Judge Is not Alone

To Dr Kirah the solution does not lie in asking judges to issue more sentences, but the solution lies in helping judges do their work under better conditions and with less complications.

Litigation measures, [for example], are complicated and lengthy, and they require careful and meticulous review.

If court clerks and officers of the court are not chosen carefully, if they are not watched and called to account, many cases will remain in limbo of curious complications skillfully set up by some of those people to stifle a legal claim and a person's right to it.

Operating methods in the courts [are also difficult]. The world is using computers and microfilms, but we are still using hand presses to print the rulings of some courts. Recording devices are being used in courtrooms throughout the world because every word that is said in a courtroom is considered important when a ruling is subsequently appealed. We [however], rely on a clerk who transcribes what he can of the court proceedings.

The law provides guarantees for justice to adversaries in a lawsuit, but these guarantees are abused to delay the process whereby a person obtains the right to his legal claim.

It is at this point that Dr Mustafa Kirah, the new chief of the court of cassation thinks that a solution [to this problem] lies in giving a judge a positive role in dispatching a dispute by allowing him to interfere and to stop manipulation attempts.

Then there is the matter of writing the court's opinion for each case. Judges are now burdened by hundreds of judgments, and they must write opinions for each judgment in several pages, summarizing in each the facts of the case, the arguments of the litigants and their own responses to them. These detailed opinions, which [are required for] every slight misdemeanor or civil suit of little significance, delay the settlement of law suits.

Dr Kirah adds, "Don't think I am calling for the elimination of legal opinions. I am in favor of keeping them, but I think this practice should be reduced in some cases that are of little value and in slight misdemeanor cases that we can specify exhaustively. In other cases I think that legal opinions provide litigants with a basic and a crucial guarantee, on the one hand. On the other hand, legal opinions are the foundation upon which appeals are made to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation."

I Am Often Worried

Chief Justice Kamal Kirah spoke about the system of operations in the courts. He said, "I am often worried when I see court files with all the documents they contain sent to judges in their homes. I also become worried about the present system which allows opposing parties in a lawsuit to have access to a case file that contains crucial documents that represent matters of life or death for the

opposing parties. Why don't we protect these documents and place photocopies or microfilm copies in those files and keep the original documents in other files that would be kept in a special room? Only judges would have access to those originals. But the problem here is where is the equipment [for doing all this]?

"Our problem lies in the fact that modern equipment is still the subject of our conversation and has not become a part of our courts. If modern equipment were to become a part of our courts, we would save much time for those who are awarded favorable judgments by the courts. They have to waste a great deal of time after a judgment is made to obtain an official copy of that judgment, and they are preyed upon by court clerks.

"Court clerks are a real problem. In France they called this phenomenon "a monopoly of officers of the court." Here in Egypt it is sometimes called "the state within the court" or the "empire of officers of the court." Officers of the court are the ones who control the notification process, and proper notification is a condition without which lawsuits cannot proceed on their normal course.

"To me, the solution lies in having a balanced policy of reward, punishment and training, as well as a system of operations that cannot be tampered with. Naturally, some of these officers of the court are loyal and diligent. But the time has come to establish a police force for the court to help officers of the court in the notification process and in the execution of sentences."

A Step Forward

"A judge is a fundamental factor in the achievement of justice. He safeguards the dispensation of legal claims and laws. Therefore," says Dr Mustafa Kirah, "We must pay more attention to the new generation of judges. In order for them to represent a step forward, we must reconsider the method by which we prepare people to become judges, beginning with the College of Law. The courses of study at the College of Law are lengthy and discuss the details of tangential matters. I cannot hide my surprise when I see the textbooks which are assigned to students these days. Most of them are over 400 or 500 pages. Is this reasonable? We see the results of that in the committee that selects assistant district attorneys. When we ask a law school graduate who graduated with an overall rating of good simple questions, he cannot answer them. Thus, we have lengthy books, but the result of studying these lengthy books does not realize the objective.

"To me, the solution lies in reconsidering the curricula in the colleges of law so that students can study basic principles in depth and leave the study of details to graduate study. It is essential that judges and attorneys take part in modifying these curricula, and it would be best to apply a system whereby students can declare the area in which they intend to specialize in their second year. A student thereby would choose to specialize in administrative law, in criminal law, in civil law or in commercial law. This system of specializing in a certain area of the law is now followed in French colleges of law.

"We must also restore to colleges of law an interest in practical training. Can we imagine a student graduating from a college of law without ever having been in a courtroom, a prosecutor's office, a police station and without ever having heard a case argued in court between a judge, an attorney, witnesses, etc.? Why

is there no relationship between university education and professional life? The fact that there are large numbers [of students] is not enough to justify accepting graduates who lack an important part of a proper scholastic education.

"I am also asking that judges be trained. Training district attorneys is not enough. Judges must not sit on the bench unless they've had adequate training in the art of directing court sessions and deducing the main points in the subject of a case. They must know how to begin studying a case and how to write judgments. They must know the basic principles of court traditions and the conduct of a judge in court and in private life. In my opinion these are important matters in preparing a new generation of judges who would bring us hope."

We Need a Policy on Legislation

"But we are faced with a serious problem." This was how the chief judge answered my question. "The problem is that laws are enacted faster than our ability to keep up with them. Laws [are issued] every day that judges and attorneys know nothing about. We need legislative stability. Therefore, I've asked that a Supreme Legislative Council be established and that it consist of senior law makers, [such as] judges and legal experts who have studies and experiences [on their credits]. Laws, executive orders and cabinet decisions that are made in compliance with laws would be turned over to this council before they are issued. The function of this council would be to consider these laws and to coordinate them."

"It is the absence of a policy on legislation that is responsible for the numerous laws that have been needlessly issued. Some laws conflict with existing laws; some laws are difficult to apply; and in some laws loopholes became evident as soon as the laws were issued. Do you want examples? We have the contradictions that occurred in applying the provisions of the Law of Shame, and there was controversy between the public prosecutor and the socialist prosecutor over jurisdiction and overlapping functions. These matters must be considered and taken seriously. I believe that the time has come to repeal the Law of Shame and to restore all the jurisdictions of the socialist prosecutor to the public prosecutor who must have sole authority over prosecuting criminal cases and conducting related investigations. All the authorities of the socialist prosecutor--precautionary measures or sequestration of property--must be restored to the authorized public prosecutor."

The Traditions of the Court First

"You ask me what I think about judges' complaints about the fact that their tenure in their home towns is being revoked this year. This is a very important matter. It is important to a judge; it is important to litigants; and it is important for justice itself."

"The established principle in the courts is that it is not in the nature of his mission that a judge remain in one district. This is because such stability creates relations and ties that would make a judge shie away from taking on some disputes. Therefore, the tradition has been that a judge not stay in one district for too long."

"It may be said that the fact that a judge stay in one district for a long time makes him more knowledgeable about the nature of that district's problems but that that is not enough to justify a lengthy tenure. Being away from a home town district remains the basic principle. This does not mean, however, that we are to move a judge to a place very far from his family when we are well aware of the housing shortage we have. Revoking the tenure of a home town judge is acceptable, provided that we furnish that judge with the means for coping with the conditions of moving."

Justice Is Actually Delayed

"You also asked me about the Court of Cassation, which is the highest court in the country. You asked why it rendered its judgments years after [cases are filed]. This is a problem that bothers me. Therefore, I formed a committee consisting of a number of chief justice deputies and judges to modify these measures. This committee will draft new guidelines for the Court of Cassation, and these will be presented to the Supreme Council for Judicial Authorities this year, God willing.

"However, my preliminary investigation showed me a set of reasons which allows cases to remain pending in court for many years.

"I've found, for example, that most of the cases pending in front of the Court of Cassation are workers' lawsuits, and these are exempt from fees and security deposits. This matter requires reconsideration. Is it not enough to exempt workers from paying fees in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals? Workers should pay fees if they wish to turn to the Court of Cassation. These fees at any rate are not prohibitive. But the problem is that when we know something is free, we are tempted to overdo it. If we were to collect fees, we would ensure earnestness and, accordingly, we would only get those cases that deserve to be considered on this high level where cases are not reconsidered all over again. The Court of Cassation rather looks into the decision of the Court of Appeals to see if that decision was incompatible with the applications of the law and to determine whether or not an error was made in interpreting the law.

"Ever since its establishment the Court of Cassation has required petitioners to pay a security deposit of only 25 pounds. This is also a guarantee of petitioners' earnestness. Petitioners lose that sum if they lose their case. This sum used to make petitioners think twice before filing appeals with the Court of Cassation." That was 50 years ago, but is it so now? "In my opinion," said Dr Kirah, "the security deposit should be 100 pounds to ensure the earnestness of the appeals. This amount is much less than that one should pay for filing an unworthy lawsuit with the highest court in the land.

"We have another problem: every lawsuit that may be appealed may also be filed with the Court of Cassation. The lawsuits that may not be appealed are those where the subject of the dispute is no more than 500 pounds. If the disputed matter is worth more than 500 pounds, the lawsuit may be appealed and may get to the Court of Cassation. And yet, 500 pounds now are no longer a large sum of money for which nine judges would go to work. Why don't we raise that amount to 1,000 pounds? What matters is that only major lawsuits of some consequence that deserve the full-time attention of that number of judges are to be filed with the Court of Cassation."

Before the interview came to an end, the chief justice said in what sounded more like a cry for help, "I need a computer in the Court of Cassation, and I need it yesterday. The human mind cannot store all these principles that were issued over 52 years, and one cannot depend on one's memory. If you give us a computer, there will be many changes in operating methods. There will be an awakening; we will come into the age; and we will feel like the rest of the judges in the world. It will be the millions of citizens with lawsuits who will ultimately benefit."

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OPPOSITION PAPER DISCUSSES RECENT CABINET SHIFTS

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 7 Sep 82 p 9

/Article by Ibrahim Yunus: "Keeping Muhyi-al-Din Will Not Solve the Problem, but al-Nabawi Isma'il's Departure Is a Historic Event Which We Record in the President's Favor"/

/Text/ Every political phenomenon has its positive and negative sides. The latest ministerial change did not satisfy anyone and proved that the government is in one frame of mind while the people are in another. We had hoped that the government's view of important political matters would not be the same as its view in the past, in the era of the previous presidents.

When a campaign was launched in the Egyptian National Assembly, the first parliament in the revolutionary era, against Kamal-al-Din Husayn, in 1957, the government came out en masse to declare its confidence in Kamal-al-Din Husayn, by way of challenge. The government considered that it won the battle, which was not a battle but an exceptional parliamentary act and a broad discussion of educational policy, and opposition to that policy, by parliamentary and political means. The fact is that when the government imagines that it has triumphed over the people, that is not a triumph--it is a form of alienation from the people and from its trust. The people are in no way the losers.

In the era of the former president, all the people declared their anger with Mamduh Salim's rule. Statements were issued in support of Mamduh Salim and in support of his rule until the events of 18-19 January 1977 took place. That was enough to keep Mamduh Salim in power, with his men, who had created the crisis and made the country explode. However, higher authorities viewed all the activities of the people with suspicion and doubt, and the people did not have the right to think. The people did not have the right to complain or the right to present grievances. When the government pushed them into acting by violent measures such as price hikes, for instance, it closed its eyes to their action; they were to have remained like dumb rocks, devoid of emotions and feelings, and not move. Let the government carry out the measures it wants. If the people act out of anger--and a day will come when any people will become angry and act to defend itself--the ruler becomes angry and vigorously and tyrannically declares that he is standing alongside the hated man who is rejected by the people, and is keeping him in power, sitting on the people's chests and stifling them--then, 2 years later, the ruler considers

that the prime minister has outlived his usefulness, removes him from the seat of power and throws him into the street. Mamduh Salim's resignation was the strangest resignation in Egypt's political history.

The party, its leadership, and the ministers, people, men and even those around him were stripped from him. He remained alone for 3 months in the Council of Ministers, without anyone to meet with him, until he was allowed to go out in illness into harsh isolation with painful memories. The first people to shun him were the four journalists who along with others had pushed him into the crisis; they were the partisans of every ruler and the opponent of every opposition from the time they first took pen in hand. The important thing is that the prime minister never leaves when the people wish but just when the ruler wishes. Therefore, people were taken by surprise--all the people, except for the al-Sadatist party--when Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din was kept on, after everything he did and everything that was said about him, although, the day before the change, the last supplementary People's Assembly elections were rigged and the judiciary representative whom the government had chosen declared that the elections were invalid and had to be postponed. That episode alone, in a government that respects itself, would have been enough for the cabinet to resign and be changed completely. However, it seems that Egypt still is the land of wonders, its politicians are men of wonders, and its major journalists are the wonders themselves. Keeping Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din as prime minister, stifling the breath of the people with this /illegible/ in the cabinet, will not solve the problem. Rather, it will complicate everything. I can say that Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din's cabinet will not last long, because it will not be able to solve the masses' intractable, complex problems through his grades and the grace of his colleagues who preceded him in the heavy, long years of the past.

Keeping Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, with everything he represents--all his conceptions and positions, his views about power and policies, and his inability to achieve anything--is to be considered infuriating to the opposition and the people. Indeed, it is pushing events in an unhealthy direction. Let him sit crouched in the cabinet chair as he wishes. He may ultimately leave the cabinet--there is no ruler, premier or minister who can remain /illegible/. Some day people will say "Thank God, Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din has gone." Before then, people will say "When will Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din go?"

The positive feature of the situation, which the retention of Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din cannot make us forget, is the departure of Nabawi Isma'il, who for a long time sat on Egypt's chest. He was the man who created all the events of September and what is known as the factional strife and what preceded it. He created a party for himself from his own men and some journalists whom he invited to bless his forgeries in the case of the Bulgarian Embassy and so forth. One day he reviled the journalists in the People's Assembly, saying "I will throw them out of their houses at gunpoint." The level of political dialogue in this venerable nation declined. One day he said that he would pick up a machine gun and go into the streets to chase the members of the opposition. He continued to press falsified reports on the regime and its leader and praise the repudiation of the law and the constitution to him, until the events of September occurred and the incident of the podium took place.

His bravery lay in the fact that he destroyed the life of his leader, who continued to be protected by democracy and to have democracy protect him for decades, but fell when he abandoned it and fought against it. Nabawi fell a year later, on the anniversary of the arrests, 2 September 1982.

Nabawi Isma'il left the Ministry of the Interior, then left power for good, and a melancholy era ended in which every illegitimate method pervaded the regime, but a more melancholy era was in store for the people and the nation.

The important thing is that a man who boasted that he would bear a machine gun, but not words, has fallen. When he spoke words in the People's Assembly, they constituted an accusation against a group of people involved with opinions and ideas and people who were opposed to his belief that he would "drive them out" with arms-- in his exact words.

Nabawi Isma'il fell, and not just yesterday--he fell the day he said, boasting, in response to the president, "We have arrested 1,536 people, sir," in the People's Assembly, as he was buttoning up his jacket last 5 September at noon. He fell the day the law and the constitution were debased.

The people, whom he oppressed, remain and majestic Egypt remains. The opposition remains, proud, its leaders remain, as heroes, and Nabawi has gone. Before that, his master went. His senior journalist students have not yet gone, but they will. This is a positive feature for which we thank President Mubarak, although we oppose the recent cabinet change, from the standpoint of Egypt's national interests and the interests of our people and for the sake of its honor and its role throughout history.

I am writing these words as I am on my way out of the country for treatment, now that the events and goings-on in the country have exhausted me. Perhaps God will give me some good health that will enable me to perform my role until my last breath of life. Till we meet again soon.

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OPPOSITION PAPER DISCUSSES METHODS OF SELECTING VICE PRESIDENT

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 7 Sep 82 p 11

/Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus: "The Opposition View on the Choice of the Vice President"/

/Text/ One important subject preoccupying President Husni Mubarak bears on selection of a vice president. This journalistic report aims at acquainting the president with the opposition's view on this subject, and thus bringing important, distinctive things to light--first, helping the president determine the criteria for setting out the choice of his assistant and second establishing sound democratic bases by offering differing views and allowing the opposition to express its opinion on all issues without exception.

The Best System for Choosing a Vice President

Everybody I talked to in this journalistic report agreed that the best system for choosing a vice president, and one which the opposition hopes for, is to have him elected directly by the people at the same time the elections for president take place, rather than having him appointed by the president. Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim offers a number of recommendations which take stock of our present conditions and at the same time pave the way for changing the ways a vice president is selected from appointment to election. These recommendations are that President Husni Mubarak nominate more than one person to the position of vice president while the People's Assembly chooses one, the person the president chooses for vice president be put to a general referendum, or the choice of the vice president be temporary until this system is amended to one where he is elected along with the vice president.

Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim goes on to say that articles must be added to the constitution which show how the vice president is to be chosen and what his duties will be.

Advantages of the Election System

Ibrahim al-Ziyadi, vice chairman of the Labor Party, describes the advantages of choosing a vice president by election rather than appointment. He says that the election process requires that the candidate present himself to the people along with his life history, struggle, sacrifices and moral conduct; none of this will occur if he is chosen by the president alone.

Dr Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University, says "There is no doubt that getting the vice president elected by the people will be better than having him chosen by the president alone. The former method is founded on selection by the community, while the latter method is founded on selection by a single individual, the president--undoubtedly a historic gamble which only he can calculate."

Personal and Objective Characteristics of the Vice President

Whatever the method of choosing a vice president may be, extreme care must be observed in selecting him. The vice president generally becomes the next president.

Ibrahim al-Ziyadi, the vice chairman of the Labor Party, says that the mere fact that a person is competent and successful in his job is not enough for him to be nominated to the position of vice president. It must be made clear that he is acceptable to the people and that his personal life is not separate from his public life, because he will be in charge of a whole nation. His personal conduct must be studied thoroughly before he is nominated; one should not be content with the fact that he has succeeded in public life. That condition exists in the deepest-rooted democracies. The political future of a presidential candidate in America, Edward Kennedy, came to an end after an accident in a car that he was driving, when it became apparent that he was drunk and a woman was with him, because such personal conduct is not in keeping with upright behavior.

Dr Yahya al-Jamal, the vice chairman of the Labor Party, says that there is a personal side and an objective side to choosing a vice president. The personal side bears on the relationship between the president and his vice president. This is to a large extent a subjective matter, because the vice president will cooperate with the president on a direct daily basis. Therefore the subjective or personal element in this regard is an important one, especially since the position of vice president generally does not change over the period of the presidency; he is not like a minister, for example, who can be easily replaced.

Dr al-Jamal goes on to say, "I also imagine, as far as the personal side goes, that the private life of the new vice president must be the object of general acceptance by the masses, in accordance with their observed traditions and the values prevalent in the religion of the overwhelming majority of the people; one cannot imagine that a vice president would be a person who would speak publicly about breaking the fast during Ramadan, would take alcoholic beverages or would have relations with women."

The vice chairman of the Labor Party summarizes the objective aspect of the selection of the vice president in a number of points:

1. He should be acceptable to the masses generally.
2. He should have experience in political activity. Experience does not mean that he should have held specific positions but rather that he should have a real grasp of various problems and that he should have a good political sense and be able to feel the masses' pulse directly, without depending on agencies and reports which sometimes are correct but on many occasions are not.

3. Dr Yahya al-Jamal requests that if President Mubarak chooses his vice president by appointment, he not be a party figure; the party conditions in Egypt are still abnormal, it will take much review to eliminate the restrictions from them, although selecting a vice president from the majority party is normal in countries where democracy has become well established.

The President Must Embody the Values and Standards of the State

Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim says, "There is no doubt that in the coming stage Egypt will need a man of history. Therefore the task of choosing the vice president, who is normally the next president, will be a difficult one." He explains his position by stating, "Leadership qualities are not immutable. Rather, they are related to the historical era and they change as circumstances change. A historical president is one who emerges at a time when challenges become intensified and who is able to inflame the enthusiasm of the masses and organize them. He should also be a statesman. When all these qualities are combined in a single president, he will be a historic leader who can face grave challenges. There is no doubt that all the events in the region indicate that the Arab region will be going through a further tempest in the future, and it will take historic leaders to cope with that."

On the other requisite characteristics, Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim says "He must be good at reading, I mean reading history, especially the history of Egypt and the Arab region, because it is not conceivable that a future president of Egypt could be ignorant of history. He must also have an unambiguous faith in democracy and have a clear history of struggle and achievement which the people are familiar with."

The professor of sociology at the American University goes on to say, "The leader of the state must embody its exemplary values and standards, or be intimate with them. This applies to the composition of his personality, and attention must be given to this in choosing the vice president. He must be modest, not haughty. He must be close to his lord and perform religious obligations. He must be upright in his public and private life. He must not be a hypocrite and must loathe hypocrites. He must be social, not introverted or aloof. He must be decisive but a stranger to harshness and weakness, and strong in facing the truth. He must be a creative, innovative person, quick to act and have an ability to choose and motivate assistants. He must have strong nerves and not get easily agitated. All these and other characteristics are genuine traits in our people and they must be taken into account in the selection of Egypt's next president."

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BAKHTIAR'S GROUP CONDEMNS GANDHI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARD KHOMEYNI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 89, 16 Sep 82 p 7

[Text] The National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) led by Shahpour Bakhtiar, has strongly criticised the Indian government for its close cooperation with the Khomeini regime.

In a commentary broadcast over its radio station, Radio Iran, beamed into that country, the Indians' assistance to the mullahs was described as a betrayal of the ideals and principles for which India's great heroes, Gandhi and Nehru, had fought for and to which they had devoted their lives.

"How can the prime minister of the world's largest democracy shake hands with criminals who have turned Iran into a graveyard?" the radio asked. It said no amount of economic interest could justify support for Khomeini's criminal rule.

Mrs Gandhi could not hope to solve her country's economic problems by "tying its foreign policy to the corner of Khomeini's bloodstained robe," the broadcast continued in the strongest attack so far on India for hosting prominent Iranian official Hashemi Rafsanjani so effusively a few weeks ago.

The Indian government's overt efforts to vamp the Tehran mullahs into giving them business and contracts in Iran has shocked the opposition nationalist groups, who still preserved the whimsical illusion that some of the Third World leaders like Mrs Gandhi held moral principles in higher regard than did the western democracies. But NAMIR is the only group to have formally protested to India over its policy.

CSO: 4600/5

NEWS REPORTS FROM MEDIA, OTHER SOURCES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 7-8

[Text] Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani has told a group of "faithful hezbollahis" that God has insured Iran's Islamic revolution against every kind of danger. Addressing members of the families of martyrs he said: "Your faithful hezbollahis have immunised the revolution by irrigating this plant with the blood of your beloved ones," he said according to Kayhan.

President Ali Khamenei told a group of naval officers Iran would turn the Persian Gulf into a graveyard for Iraq and its imperialist masters. "You have succeeded in making Iran the master of the seas," he told them. "Your military exploits have made you the main factors in shaping the politics of the region."

Foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati has protested to the Turkish government over Turkish newspapers' hostile attitude to Khomeini and Iran's revolution, Tehran radio reported. IPS sources in Istanbul said that the main newspapers, especially Miliyet, have always been highly critical of Khomeini and his mullahs. But the government-controlled radio and television has adopted a "correct" attitude. The sources said they could not figure out why at this stage the mullahs' foreign minister had decided to take this issue up. They said since the very beginning of Khomeini's rule he has been described as a reactionary tyrant and bloodthirsty bigot. The Iranian consulate in Istanbul now has five mullahs on its staff who are listed as press attaches.

CSO: 4600/4

IRANO-IRAQI WAR OF WORDS CONTINUES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 5-7

[Text] Both Iran and Iraq are doing their best to woo the governments and Muslim communities of West Asia and the Far East. And both countries attach special importance to their relations with India.

However, while Iran's clerical rulers have usually resorted to unorthodox means to make their case known, the Iraqis try to make use of diplomatic skills and to conduct their activities through official channels.

Iranians invariably use front organisations such as students' Islamic Associations to carry out propaganda for Khomeini and his brand of Islam. They have also installed what they call Islamic cultural offices headed by fiery young mullahs in most Asian countries. These mullahs, who are attached to Montazeri's office in Qom, are usually sent to host countries as cultural attaches.

There is close cooperation between the students' Islamic Associations abroad and the Iranian embassies and legations. Big sums of money are spent by embassies in financing their activities. These cover a wide range of propaganda for Khomeini and against Iraq and the so-called "reactionary" Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Sudan and Egypt.

Students' Islamic Associations are not as a rule engaged in subversive activities, however. They carry out their propaganda openly. In some countries Shia mosques have been taken over by Khomeini's mullahs, who have turned them into propaganda offices for his regime.

Both the Islamic Associations and mosques controlled by Khomeini agents are fertile grounds for spotting "talented and committed" Muslims who can then be recruited and trained in Iran as agents provocateurs. It is interesting to observe that very few bona fide Iranian students are actually members of the students' Islamic Associations. In other words, the Khomeini regime uses Iran's money to finance non-Iranian students' so-called cultural affairs. The only Iranian "students" who are members of these Islamic Associations are those hezbollahis sent abroad by the regime, especially to India and the Philippines, on government grants.

Iran's diplomatic missions engage in espionage against Iranian exiles and other enemies, the exiles contend, but the newly recruited staff, mainly relatives of mullahs, have very little experience in any work, including this type of intelligence work. Moreover, because they are required to observe the strict rules of Khomeini's Islam, they are easily picked out.

By and large, Iran's subversive and propaganda activities abroad are aimed at Arab countries regarded as antagonistic and the governments of countries in which there are sizable Muslim communities. Occasionally, Israel and other regimes come under fire in the foreign propaganda of Iran's mullahs. But Israel is the main adversary in the domestic propaganda of the mullahs. America is the whipping boy in all the propaganda.

For their part the Arab regimes do very little to counter Khomeini's propaganda offensive. Saudi Arabia, which is the main target of Khomeini's ire, has kept such a low profile that to many observers it seems the Saudis do not understand the psychological advantage Khomeini has seized with the Persian Gulf communities. There is not even a well-managed radio programme in Persian beamed out from Riyadh.

Egypt, too, has adopted a policy of not replying to the mullahs' tirades. President Sadat used to occasionally criticise Khomeini but the Egyptian media has paid little if any attention to the verbal onslaught by the mullahs. Cairo Radio's Persian language service is poor.

Countries like Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Emirates prefer not only to stay away from the verbal war between Iran and the Arabs but also their television and radio give scanty coverage to the war between Iran-Iraq in an apparent effort to avoid annoying either Baghdad or Tehran.

Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Somalia are also targets of the mullahs but they do not feel threatened by the mullahs' brand of Islam. Jordan, in particular, is preoccupied by the Palestinian problem.

The Iraqis initially adopted a defensive position in their propaganda battle with Iran. In the early stages of the Islamic regime Iraqi officials and the media paid lip service to Khomeini and his Islamic revolution despite the fact that they knew Khomeini bore a personal grudge against president Saddam Hussain. He was also hoping to encourage his associate in Iraq, Ayatollah Bagher Sadr, to go for an Islamic theocracy to replace the Baathist regime.

When Sadr's move against the regime was met with tough measures, both he and the mullahs in Tehran began openly calling on Muslims in Iraq to rise against Saddam. The Iraqi regime thus was ready for a bloody encounter; Saddam, unlike the Shah, would not submit to religious blackmail. Reportedly Sadr and many of his close aides were killed. Khomeini's envoy to Iraq, Molla Mohammad Doai, flew back to Tehran and the two regimes were virtually at war.

It was then that the Iraqi propaganda effort became more assertive. In its Persian language broadcasts Baghdad Radio began to bring Khomeini personally under attack. He was called a rogue clad in clerical garb, and his regime was branded as anti-Islamic. But Baghdad Radio never enlisted the assistance of theologians to fight Khomeini on religious grounds.

After Iraq invaded Iran, the two regimes stepped up their propaganda warfare not only on their home ground but also through the international press. As far as the Western media is concerned neither regime seems to have come out very well.

But the Iraqis are doing better in Asia. In India the English and Hindi language papers tend to give more favourable coverage to the Iraqis than to the Iranians. The Muslim press in India has turned against Khomeini.

For instance, the Bombay daily "Urdu Times," in an attack on Iran's refusal to accept a United Nations Security Council call for a ceasefire, said recently: "Iran's rejection (of the U.N. Security Council resolution) clearly unveils the regime's belligerence." It continued, "Islam teaches us to love each other, to be forgiving and full of mercy; but Khomeini's actions are against Islam, and he uses Islam as a ploy to ruin Iran and attack Iraq." In Calcutta a leading daily "Rozana Hind" openly accused Khomeini of being "an agent of the Zionists."

Observers attribute these attacks by the Indian press on Khomeini to good work by Iraqi information officers. This is a good success for Iraq, because the papers widely read by India's sophisticated Muslims have been exposing Khomeini as a traitor to Islam.

Yet the same observers believe that the mass of uneducated Muslims of India are more prone to fall into Khomeini's net because he uses the mosque and religious gatherings to propagate his message.

CSO: 4600/4

EGYPTIAN DETERRENT FORCE SAID ESSENTIAL FOR PERSIAN GULF

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 89, 16 Sep 82 p 5

[Text] Egypt is directly concerned with the security of the Persian Gulf because it is obviously in her interests that stability prevails in the region and oil continues to flow to the western world, Egyptian Defence Minister Field Marshal Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala said this week.

In an interview which appeared in the Kuwaiti newspaper AL QABAS he emphasised that the disturbed balance of power in the Persian Gulf region necessitated the presence of an Egyptian deterrent force capable of action on more than one front.

The fact that oil would continue to be the main energy source in the foreseeable future meant the region was a stage for conflicting interests and ambitions, Abu Ghazala said.

He made it clear that Egypt is directly interested in the security of the Gulf because any disruption of oil supplies from the Gulf to the West would jeopardise the interests of Egypt, which heavily draws on aid and assistance from the United States and the western countries.

This is why Egypt is keen on ensuring the security of the Gulf region and seeks to put an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict and secure a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of just, durable and comprehensive peace, the minister added.

Abu Ghazala, who in a recent reshuffle was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister, said that the strategic and military imbalance is becoming a distinct feature of the Middle East region.

The minister noted that constant military build-up in Ethiopia, Israel, Libya, South Yemen and Syria affects Egypt's national security one way or another. He added that his country's strategy subsequently attaches special emphasis to maintaining the balance of power in the region.

On the Iran-Iraq conflict, Abu Ghazala said the latest developments had revealed that Iran became a threat to the security of the Gulf and that Khomeini wants to export his self-styled revolution to the Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia.

Reiterating Egypt's concern over Gulf stability, the minister said the continuity of the Gulf war is in the interest of foreign exporting countries, beside the fact that it deprives the two warring nations from their own wealth, which is utilised to activate the war machine.

Asked if there was a trend to normalise relations with the Soviet Union, he made it clear that there is no direct enmity between Egypt and the Soviet Union, but emphasised that Soviet activity in Africa endangers Egypt's national interests.

"Why did the Soviet Union seek to arrange an agreement between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen to form a belt surrounding the oil rich region?" the minister asked.

He said that the agreement obviously was not directed against the United States "which is not present in the region." The minister added that if the pact was meant to counter the United States, the Soviet Union had better go to the Indian Ocean to fight the Americans there and leave the Middle East in peace.

CSO: 4600/5

SAUDIS HANDLE MEDINA DEMONSTRATIONS FIRMLY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 89, 16 Sep 82 p 4

[Text] Saudi Arabia had expelled 18 Iranian pilgrims and 28 more were languishing in Saudi jails by midweek following successive demonstrations by the pilgrims in the holy city of Medina.

Security forces broke up a rally in front of the Iranian consulate in Medina which had been called by Hojatoleslam Mussavi Khoyinia, the personal representative of Ayatollah Khomeini, and which drew a big crowd of people.

A spokesman for the security forces said that the crowd carried banners not related to religion, and the portraits of Khomeini were "tantamount to idolatry." Those arrested would be returned to Iran "because they came here for a purpose other than the pilgrimage." He denied claims on Iran radio, which echoed those of last year after scuffles between police and Iranian pilgrims, that some of the Iranians had suffered injuries.

Khoyinia appeared fully prepared for the police action against a rally he held for Friday prayers last week. Reciting verses from the Koran and mouthing slogans in Arabic he responded to police protests by saying he was only trying to inform the Muslims of the world about Israel's atrocities in Lebanon and of America's plot to trick Muslims into betraying the Palestinians.

He added that if the Saudi authorities did not allow him to carry out his mission he would conclude that they were in league with Zionists and American imperialists.

Meanwhile a group of people around him vociferously chanted slogans and tried to arouse the feelings of watching pilgrims of different nationalities against the Saudi police. After a short while of this the police moved in and arrested several of the chanters and marched them away in a firm manner obviously designed to demonstrate to those watching that they really meant business.

This seemed to work, for the watching pilgrims quickly dispersed. Khoyinia was also pulled down from his stand and reportedly his loudspeaker was taken away. Some hours later posters attacking Israel, America and the

Soviet Union for atrocities in Lebanon and Afghanistan were distributed. But the whole affair had relatively little impact, observers said.

The Tehran mullahs had obviously expected a tough reaction from the Saudis and were ready with their anti-Riyadh propaganda. But it seemed surprisingly low key. The import was merely that the Saudis had refused to allow Khomeini's programme against the enemies of Islam to take place.

The non-Iranian pilgrims remained relatively indifferent to the Iranian demonstrations, according to on-the-spot observers. The stern action of the Saudi authorities undoubtedly encouraged them to avoid any involvement, it was felt.

But Khoyinla was still able to bring together an international crowd, they reported. There were young Lebanese, Palestinians, Filipinos, Indonesians and Afghans among it. Iranian opposition sources in Turkey and West Germany who have been watching Iran's Haj operation say that Afghan, Lebanese and some non-Arab pilgrims were travelling on Iranian passports and at the expense of the Tehran government. Efforts had also been made to involve war-wounded and war widows in demonstrations, they said, but the Saudis had remained cool in the face of this. Obviously pursuing a fairly cautious policy in view of the sanctity of the Haj and the possibility of offending pilgrims' feelings by too tough an attitude, the Saudi government has also avoided any propaganda against Iran or Khomeini's activists.

CSO: 4600/5

MUSSAVI ASSAILS U.S., FRANCE, PERSIAN GULF STATES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 p 5

[Text] Mir-Hossain Mussavi, Iran's prime minister, has accused France, the United States and regional countries of the Persian Gulf of providing the tools and facilities needed by Iraq to endanger Iran's interests in the region.

Speaking at a seminar on regional planning in Tehran this week Mussavi said, "Ever since the beginning of the Islamic revolution imperialism has laid siege to us. It is a miracle that we have achieved so much and succeeded so far despite the blockade. But now imperialism has moved to tighten the noose."

"This business of blockading our ports in the Persian Gulf is part of the overall American plan to breathe life into the dead corpse of Saddam. It was America who told the reactionary Arab regimes to provide Saddam with money. Then America told France to deliver missiles to Saddam and he has fired these missiles aimlessly in the direction of our ports.

"Of course, these missiles did not give us any headache. But it is the pleasure shown by the BBC and the Voice of America over the attacks which bothers us. Even before Saddam began to fire his French missiles the Zionist media reported our installations were hit."

Mussavi said Iran had the will and the strength and equipment to defend its interests in the area and to "cut the Iraqis to pieces."

He then boasted of the great successes of the Islamic republic in the field of planning. In Islam planning was essential to build proper human beings who would take courage in believing in God, he said. "It is our reliance on God which has made America afraid of the Islamic revolution and its appeal in the region," he said.

CSO: 4600/4

OPPOSITION PAPER ON IRAN POWER STRUGGLE

GF050739 London VOICE OF IRAN in English 2 Sep 82 p 5

[Analysis: "The Power Struggle in Iran" by the U.S. Chapter of the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance]

[Text] Prior to the revolution in Iran, Khomeyni and his supporters believed that once the cultural and economic influences of the West were eliminated a simple Islamic government could easily solve all the country's problems. But the past three years of the Islamic republic's rule has proven that blaming outsiders for the country's problems is an illusion. During this period the people of Iran have witnessed a steady deterioration of the country's economy, education, cultural activities and agricultural production. Lack of physical, judicial and financial security, high unemployment and inflation rates, shortages of various essentials, a state of terror and repression and a torturous war have brought immense suffering to the people of that unfortunate land. Yet, primarily because of Khomeyni's enormous power and popularity among the largely uneducated Iranian masses, the regime has withstood all these problems and challenges. Since no other clergyman has the charisma and loyalty that Khomeyni commands among these "true believers", his death will result in the most serious challenge thus far to the Islamic republic. Khomeyni's heir-apparent, Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, lacks the education, support and necessary respect among the prominent clergymen. Therefore, it is unlikely that Khomeyni will be able to impose him as the Velayat-e Faqih (the guardianship of the clergy) upon the nation. Consequently, the committee of experts, which consists of twelve theologians, will probably choose a group of three to five senior clergymen to form a council to replace Khomeyni.

The alleged plot to kill Khomeyni by the Islamic republic's former foreign minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who considered himself Khomeyni's most loyal spiritual son, was a part of this pre-succession power struggle aimed at discrediting Ayatollah Kazem Shari'atmadari and other moderate clergymen opposed to direct involvement of religion in politics. From a theological point of view, Shari'atmadari and a few of his colleagues are more prominent than Khomeyni; therefore, once he is gone, the views of these clergymen can no longer be ignored. It is for this reason that at this time the radicals have decided to eliminate them as serious contenders.

Certain similarities can be detected between Iran's pre-succession power struggle and that which preceded Mao Zedong's death in September 1976. At

that time the Chinese radicals, with Mao's blessing, tried to discredit Zhou Enlai and his associates. As long as Mao was alive, the armed forces remained neutral. But after his death, they put their weight behind the moderates, known as Zhou Enlai group. As was the case in China, the radicals in Iran have failed so far and will continue to fail in destroying the moderates image and popularity among their followers.

The staunchly pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, (the Iranian Communist Party) has wholeheartedly supported, if not helped to plan, the plot to eliminate the moderate clergymen. From the earliest days of the Islamic republic, Tudeh publications launched a relentless campaign against Shari-atomadari and his Muslim People's Party.

It is commonly known that the Tudeh considers the moderate brand of Islam as the major obstacle to the spread of communism in Iran. If not discredited now, it will attract massive Iranian support after Khomeyni's death. One should not overlook the similarities which exist between the radical clergymen's views and policies and those of the Tudeh. Both are totalitarian, repressive, anti-nationalist, anti-West and very much against private ownership. By supporting the campaign against the moderates, the Tudeh hopes to deal a heavy blow to the main bastion of religious opposition to communism and at the same time to strengthen the radical Marxist-orientated faction of the clergy. In the meantime, as the price for its support, the Tudeh seeks to put more of its agents into top positions of the government.

Moreover, President Khamene'i, known to be pro-Soviet, as the second most powerful leader in the country, will be in a position to consolidate his power even more if a group of clergymen instead of Montazeri is elected to lead the nation. For this reason Khamene'i has been trying to convince Khomeyni that a ruling council would be a more acceptable alternative to govern Iran than a single clergyman. President Khamene'i is well aware that Iranian psychology and tradition do not lend themselves to group leadership and that it would be unthinkable that three to five ayatollahs with conflicting views would work together harmoniously in leading the nation. He believes that since the president is elected by the people, he should logically absorb most powers held by Khomeyni after his departure.

In the final analysis, the future of the Islamic republic very much depends upon the following factors.

- a) The outcome of the Iraq-Iran war and the extent to which the emerging military heroes of the war are willing to take advantage of the in-fighting and confusion and move to take power;
- b) The ability of the communists and other leftist forces to consolidate their position before Khomeyni's death; and
- c) The capacity of the nationalist groups to put their differences aside and unite under an umbrella organization led by a respected nationalist.

Since Khomeyni's regime has directed greatest assault upon Iranian national heritage, culture, symbols and language, it is our view that a well-known nationalist leader with credibility and the right credentials (e.g. fighting dictatorship) can use Iranian nationalism as an effective means of mobilizing the masses against the regime once Khomeyni is gone. Supported by an effective organization inside Iran and with the cooperation of certain segments of the armed forces, the clergy and tribal forces, such a leader can dislodge the Islamic Republic soon after Khomeyni's departure.

CSO: 4600/28

TEHRAN ATTACKS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

GF051000 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 3 Oct 82

[Unattributed commentary: "On the Occasion of the UN Security Council Meeting To Discuss the War the Iraqi Ba'thist Regime Launched Against the Islamic Republic of Iran"]

[Excerpts] At a time when the successful Muslim ibn 'Aqil operation has been launched to deal a final blow to the infidel Saddam forces and to retrieve the lost rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran--a successful operation which has already resulted in the liberation of a large sector of the occupied territories of the Islamic Republic of Iran--and at a time when Saddam has arrived at the brink of yet another major defeat, and intensive activities have been embarked upon throughout the world aimed at halting the attacks of the Islamic army. The moderate and reactionary Arab regimes, which have remained indifferent to the advance of occupationist Zionist Israeli forces to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, organized the Fes summit with a view to recognizing the Zionist Israeli regime and legalizing its crimes, and have maintained silence in the face of the massacre of Muslim Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps, have panicked with the Zionist Iraqi Ba'thist regime's deteriorating situation and with the realization that this regime is faced with the danger of being overthrown. Thus, with the objective of finding a remedy to the situation, they have embarked upon intensive activities. The increasing talks among the Arab shahs, the issuing of communiques and declaration, one after another, the possibility of meetings in the future and the commencement of a widescale propaganda campaign to arouse fear in the Muslim peoples toward Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran, are indicative of the depth of the efforts and activities of the moderate and reactionary Arab regimes.

Meanwhile, within the world of the oppressors, imperialist and Zionist propaganda media organs are endeavoring to fulfill their inhuman obligations in the best possible way with regard to further supporting the already defeated Zionist Iraqi Ba'thist regime. Under the circumstances, another arm of imperialism rushing to the aid of Saddam is the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council will convene on Monday upon the call of Saddam to discuss the war the Iraqi Ba'thist regime has imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, it is not difficult to foretell the decisions this council will reach or the kind of resolutions it will adopt in its meeting tomorrow. A brief glance at the composition of the 15-member UN Security Council--whose five

members are representatives of the superpowers which enjoy a "Satanic veto right"—will make it easier to foretell now the kind of decision the council take. Apart from this, the fact that the UN Security Council is not meeting to discuss the Iran-Iraq war for the first time should not be ignored.

Yes, the UN Security Council will play a similar role in its meeting tomorrow. That is to say, the UN Security Council held its first meeting 22 months after the commencement of the war. It preferred to remain silent until then. Now, after the successful operation of the Islamic fighters, it has once again adopted the same view. Undoubtedly however, the draft resolution drawn up by the representative of the Jordanian regime, which, during the Black September of 1970, martyred thousands of Muslim Palestinians, will not be different from the previous resolution adopted by the UN Security Council. The resolution will be one in the direction of legalizing the crimes of the Ba'thist regime, just as in the case of the earlier resolution.

It is therefore our hope that the occasion will help the poor and oppressed people have a better understanding of the true identity of the UN Security Council.

CSO: 4600/28

NATIONAL FRONT CONDEMNS QASHQA'I EXECUTION

GF050546 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 4 Oct 82

[Text] The National Resistance Council in Paris, which was recently founded by Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedini-e Khalq, and Abolhasan Bani-sadr, the ousted president of the Khomeyni regime, has said in a statement that the execution of Khosrow Qashqa'i is the latest incident in the reign of terror and savagery which the Khomeyni regime has clamped on this country and through which it is trying to ensure its existence for sometime longer.

The national front has called the recent bomb incident in Tehran an act of the agents of the ruling regime.

According to the Free Voice of Iran correspondent, the national front, in a statement issued in Paris today, calls the claim by the regime that the opponents of the regime, by exploding the bomb last Friday, killed scores of people and wounded hundreds, unacceptable and has rejected it. The national front says in its statement that even if this impossible claim were true, it still does not absolve the leaders of the regime of its lack of strength and shortcomings with regard to the protection of the people.

The national front statement further says that those who want to perpetuate their illegal and oppressive rule by force and group executions over 40 million Iranians should be held responsible for their inability to protect the lives of innocent people. The national front, while stressing that no political party would undertake such actions as killing of innocent people, which would result in its own political decline among the people, says that the real cause of disarray and the present difficulties in Iran is the system of Velayat-e Faqih, and the only way out of this dilemma is the ouster of the so-called Islamic regime and the return to a national government.

According to the Free Voice of Iran correspondent, the National Resistance Front has also issued a statement in Paris regarding execution of Khosrow Qashqa'i. The statement says: The National Resistance Front strongly condemns the execution of Khosrow Qashqa'i, who was one of the followers of Dr Mossadeq and an old friend of the National Resistance Front. The National Resistance Front says in its statement: The executions of people like Qashqa'i and other such nationalists cannot save the regime from the fearsome end that is awaiting the mercenaries of the Khomeyni regime. If Khosrow Qashqa'i was

executed for nationalism and opposition to use Velayat-e Faqid "system," all Iranians deserve such an execution. The National Resistance Front in conclusion says: The mercenaries of the Islamic Khomeyni regime, instead of increasing executions of nationalists, should be planning their own suicide.

The Free Voice of Iran correspondent in France has also reported a statement by the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization regarding the execution of Khosrow Qashqa'i and quotes the Mojahedi-e Khalq organization as saying that the public execution of Khosrow Qashqa'i has once again exhibited the unlimited and unbounded savagery of the regime and reveals the low decadance and corruption of the regime that has no other weapon in hand except terror and strangulation of the people in general in order to overwhelm all opposition and resistance against it.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq organization says in its statement: No doubt, with all the widespread crushing which the Khomeyni regime is employing all over Iran and among all our tribes, the just resistance of our Qashqa'i compatriots will continue until Khomeyni is toppled.

Shapur Bakhtiar, leader of the National Resistance Front, in his message of condolence sent to the family and tribe of Khosrow Qashqa'i, said that the people of southern Iran and the entire Iranian nationals are fed up with the cruel executions by the Khomeyni regime and will 1 day take their revenge from the mullahs.

CSO: 4600/28

MESHKINI BLAMES ARAB LEADERS FOR LEBANON MASSACRE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Sep 82 p 1

[Text]

QOM - "From our point of view it is those twenty Arab leaders who gathered in Fez who are responsible for the Israeli massacre of the Lebanese people," announced Ayatollah Meshkini here on Friday.

The Ayatollah who was delivering the Friday prayer sermon here also said that the Iranian nation, its great leader and the Moslem masses considered the Fez resolution as "totally null and void"

Referring to the massacre of the people of Beirut by the Zionist forces, he emphasized that the blame lies on the Arab heads who most compromisingly recognized Israel in their Fez summit.

Ayatollah Meshkini devoted his first sermon to social matters and said that, in an Islamic society, relationships

are never supposed to overrule principles and criteria.

"In other words," he went on, "the law must govern all relationships. Therefore, the competent will always be given

priority over the incompetent despite all friendships and relations."

Speaking about those who sacrificed the law and criterion for the sake of their sectarian and private interests, he said that by doing such an unjust act, they were in fact committing "an act of treachery toward themselves, the nation and the law."

In regard to the resumption of the educational activities in the country, Ayatollah Meshkini later demanded that the teachers and all other educational officials "raise the Iranian youth in a solely Islamic manner."

CSO: 4600/20

ISLAMIC LEADERS' SUMMIT URGED ON JOINT STRATEGY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 29 Sep 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) President Seyyed Ali Khamenei, yesterday called for a meeting of the leaders of the Islamic countries, to discuss the important issues confronting Islam and Moslems.

Addressing a gathering of ambassadors and charge d'affaires from Islamic countries, the president stressed that the Islamic countries should set aside their political differences in order to combine efforts for ensuring the rights of the Moslems, despite their geographical and historical differences.

"At a time when the Islamic world lacks a unified and versatile position towards these aggressions and attacks (against the Moslems in Afghanistan and Lebanon) there is no hope of being able to defend our innocent brothers in Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon, and if we cannot defend them, history will never forgive us, that as Islamic countries we are engaged in our own issues, and permit the Moslems to be the object of

aggression by the aggressor powers," he said.

In the gathering, which was held on the occasion of the Islamic festival of Eid ul-Qorban the president added that events in Lebanon overshadowed the happiness of Moslems on this day.

"We emphasize once again that today is the day that the Islamic nations, and in the forefront the Islamic governments should act upon their historic responsibility against the occupiers and usurpers (of Islamic territories in Palestine and Afghanistan) so that at least history would speak well of them," Khamenei further said.

Then the president called for an all-out struggle against the Zionists and stressed that

oil as well as reserves of Moslem countries in American banks along with propaganda, should be used as a weapon against the Zionists while at the same time the Moslem masses should be mobilized against the primary agents of these aggressions.

"It is appropriate that we should clarify the main enemy meaning the defenders of Israel, the great satan, America, to the Islamic peoples, for this reason that without the support of this tyrannical Superpowers, the Zionists would never disregard close to one billion Moslems and launch an aggression against an Arab country, which is a part of the Islamic nation, in front of their eyes," Khamenei said.

CSO: 4600/23

TEHRAN WEEKLY REVIEWS INTERNAL, EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Ghotbzadeh's Legacy

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 21 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, one of the reputed individuals of the early days of the Revolution, was executed last week without any hubbub in the Evin Prison, and thus there came an end to the life of a political adventurer who considered himself to be among the elements effective in the downfall of the Shah and the victory of the Revolution, and who once was among the individuals close to Imam Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh, who was accused of hatching a plot to topple the Islamic regime in April this year, confessed, during the course of his interrogations and court trial, that he had intended to stage a coup, but pointed out that this coup didn't aim at killing the Imam and replacing the Islamic Republic regime. Rather, his goal was to rectify the course of the Revolution which, as put by him, "has, since long, deviated from its original path".

In order to stage the coup, Ghotbzadeh had brought together some elements from amongst the supporters of monarchy, clergymen opposed to the Imam, and the dissident militarymen from the Islamic Army, and had acted with a view to establishing contact with the hostile tribal chiefs, the capitalist communities in Europe whose interests in Iran have been endangered by the Islamic Revolution, and the conservative Arab leaders. His overall plan aimed at seizing the Jamaran and causing the Imam's exit from the scene, alive or dead; capturing power in his (Imam's) name to continue the Islamic Revolutionary Government; eliminating, with the help of the Army and other elements, the religious fundamentalists and the Tudeh Party; and establishing a moderate pro-west government in Iran. He was optimistic, in the light of his previous record of confronting the communists and his strong opposition to the Soviet Union, of easily securing the US and Arab governments' support, and of attracting, apart from the conservative Arab leaders, even the Arab Steadfastness Front (ASF) towards himself. However, all of his calculations went wrong from the very outset. There could be obtained no documents that could prove his link with CIA, Saddam Hossein or the Armed Guerillas.

Ghotbzadeh, who knew that he would not be able to have his life from the trial by the revolutionary courts, tried to rescue himself by inviting the Imam's attention through different means but he couldn't succeed in them. Rumours

were rife that some of his friends in the Syrian Government made efforts to get his sentence reduced, but were unsuccessful. Ghotbzadeh had stayed for many years in Syria, and possessed Syrian and Lebanese passports.

Revolution Guards in Place of Army

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 21 Sep 82 pp 3-4

[Text] The recent statement by Shamkhani, Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, (IRGC), on the expansion of the IRGC set up and activities strengthens the rumour that some of the IRI officials are inclined to gradually replace the Army with IRGC. In his recent interview (Sept. 12), Shamkhani had said that apart from the armoured force, the IRGC would also be having naval and air scope shortly.

Ali Shamkhani, in his interview, said: "IRGC possesses a number of military divisions. It, in any case, is duty-bound to set up the 20 million strong army, and the best way of doing the same is through the warfronts. Today, the IRGC is quantitatively endowed with a power dependent on the war, while qualitatively it is engaged in providing depth to the process of forming its various military divisions and brigades. Of course, we have secured the sophisticated weapons resources of various IRGC combat units solely from the enemy booty. We started the first training course of IRGC and Mobilisation naval forces in the country's sea waters and would soon be moving from the coast into oceans. In respect of pilot and parachute training, I must say that the related courses have been duly completed, and now the IRGC possesses a number of pilots capable of flying planes. As to parachuting, it has also been observed that IRGC parachuters have landed from aircraft during various celebrations and ceremonies" (ETTELA'AT, Sept.12).

He expressed the hope that the IRGC Ministry would start functioning in the near future. With regard to the functions of the Supreme IRGC Council & the IRGC Ministry, he noted: "The IRGC Ministry would, in the first instance, take up the task of bringing about coordination between IRGC and the Government without affecting, in any way, the supreme command of the Velayat-e-Faghih (Religious Leadership). In the next phase it would fulfil the logistical requirements of IRGC. The IRGC constitution has now been completed, and, after the issuance of the relevant notification, the government itself would, of course, specify the IRGC Ministry and the Minister concerned. I think this Ministry would start functioning in the near future. The IRGC Supreme Council has no role to play in the IRGC Ministry. This Council, which formulates the IRGC strategy, has no function in respect of guiding the Corps. It is possible that one of the Council members could become the IRGC Minister but it rests with the government to introduce a specific individual for this position. Imam Khomeini appoints the IRGC Supreme Council as well as the IRGC Commander, with the former adopting decisions related to various programs of this Corps" (same source).

It must be kept in mind that Shamkhani himself is one of the candidates for the post of the IRGC Minister. Studies have been underway, for quite some time, to name an incumbent to this office, and there is going on, an implicit rivalry among various IRGC groups in this regard.

Tudeh View of Imam's Line

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 21 Sep 82 pp 4-5

[Text] In recent weeks, the Tudeh Party has been questioned, within the Party and outside its framework, on the degree of its adherence to the line of Imam Khomeini. The Party members ask its leaders as to what extent they would advance in their adherence to the line of the Imam, and whether the difference in the viewpoints of the Islamic government and the Tudeh Party as well as the government pressure on the Party won't compel the Party to reconsider its policy on supporting the government. Meanwhile, the opponents of the Party have put the Party leaders under pressure asking them that in case they, as claimed by themselves, are adherents to the line of the Imam, why is it then that they criticise the government policy in domestic and foreign affairs? Nouredin Kianouri, First Secretary of the Tudeh Party Central Committee, responds to this question in the latest issue of the "Porsesh Va Pasokh" (Question & Answer), the weekly bulletin of the Party. He says that contrary to the rumours, the Tudeh Party has never claimed that it is one hundred percent adherent to the line of the Imam. Rather, it has always said that it accepts the Imam's line in some of its aspects. He says: "The thing that they say about the Tudeh Party of Iran that it wants to pace itself as adherent to the line of the Imam is another distortion of fact. The Tudeh Party of Iran has never said that it is 'an adherent to the Line of the Imam'. The line of the Imam has several philosophical, religious, political & social aspects. We support the line of the Imam in the anti-imperialist and popular aspects, and we outlined this posture of ours in relation to the views of Imam Khomeini in the very early days, and we re-state the same today. We observe five main, basic and important points in the Imam's line which are close to our objectives. Therefore, we are seriously in agreement with these five points, namely the anti-imperialist, the popular and the anti-tyrannical postures of the Imam; the Imam's commitments on provision of freedom to all & sundry, even to those with other thoughts in the society; and the struggle against the plundersome capitalism. We observed these basic points in the Imam's line, and due to this reason, we supported it and still do the same. So, the repetition of this fact that the Tudeh Party members, while being marxists say that 'we are the adherents of the Imam's line' is a distortion of facts. We are marxists but our support of the Imam's line is in respect of the aspects which we said earlier. Experience has shown that in cases where we have determined with the courage of a citizen, as incorrect & mistaken the policy of the IRI government which could often prove to be very costly for us and has actually happened to be so, but we have categorically expressed our views" (Porsesh Va Pasokh, Aug. 28).

There exist different views among the IRI officials on the policy which should be adopted towards the Tudeh Party. Some believe that the Tudeh Party cooperation in the issues of mutual agreement should be accepted, and the forces of this Party duly utilised in this cooperation without allowing it to politically exploit the same. Another group holds the view that any sort of contact with the Tudeh Party is dangerous since its members are not honest in their support of the government, and show themselves in favour of infiltrating into the Islamic system and sabotaging. This opposition is so strong in some of the officials that Hajjatol Islam Chera'ati, Head of the Literacy Education

Movement, recently announced: "A few days ago, there was received by the office of the Literacy Education Movement, an announcement from the Tudeh Party wherein it was said that the Party is ready to cooperate in the implementation of the 'urgent plan'. I felt grieved as to why the Tudeh Party announced its support prior to the Islamic associations. Having felt all this pain and grief, I would, in this respect, tell the Islamic associations to remain vigilant of the stage from where the popular tasks should be initiated in revolutionary institutions. They shouldn't allow them (the Tudeh Party) to present themselves on the scene first. Had the Islamic associations made an announcement putting their energies at the disposal of the Movement in order to impart education to the people, the Tudeh Party would have been embarrassed in saying this. But since the Islamic associations made no such offer through the newspapers, the Tudeh Party made its announcement....(same source).

The ongoing tussle between these two modes of thinking often culminates in the Tudeh Party enjoying relative freedom, and on other occasion, in its being brought under strong pressure as was the case in recent months. However, latest reports say that some of the top-ranking officials of the Party, who were under detention, have been released in recent weeks without any trial. The pressure on the Party has generally been eased, though the permission to reopen the party office and to resume the publication of the Party's organ has not yet been given.

Ties With the Soviet Union

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 21 Sep 82 pp 9-10

[Text] While the officials of the IRI Ministry of Roads & Transportation are engaged in useful parleys with the Soviet officials on starting joint shipping in the Caspian Sea, and the final plan in this regard is scheduled to be approved in early 1983 (ETTELA'AT, Sept. 13) the Iranian Press and political officials are severely criticising the Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Foz summit. They not only didn't welcome the Brezhnev Plan on the solution of the Palestine issue, but also considered it as an index of the East-West compromise against the Islamic aspirations. The Daily JONHOURI ISLAMI in its Sept. 18 issue writes in this connection: "The Soviet Union too, as it has acted in its silent diplomacy, wants to impose the Ghods-occupying regime upon the Middle East Muslims. It has come to like the occupier regime so much that it has not even denounced, either categorically or implicitly, the recent bloody aggressions of that regime. There is no more an ambiguity about the fact that the Palestinian aspiration has become a victim of the strategic collusion between the East & the West. In the same way that in the light of Brezhnev's analysis of the Foz summit or by taking a look at the Soviet weapons, ranging from MIG 25s to T-72 tanks which are constantly flooding Baghdad and are being used, along with the Western arms, against IRI, it leaves no doubt that 'confrontation against the Islamic Revolution' too is among the objectives which have been strategically agreed upon by the East & the West".

Meanwhile, the Western circles are concerned over the expansion of Soviet influence in Iran. Senator Edward Kennedy, in an article published in the Daily NEW YORK TIMES on Sept. 15, cautioned the Reagan Administration that US support

of Iraq would send Iran into the fold of USSR. He says that the Soviets are exploiting the US indifference towards Iran, and are trying to have access to the oil resources in the Persian Gulf. Kennedy suggests that the American government should act to set up ties with IRAN (VOA, Sept. 15).

Although the possibility of a danger from the Soviet Union also has supporters among some of the religious circles, the IRI officials totally reject this viewpoint. They believe that till the time there is in power an Islamic regime in Iran, there would be open no way for the Soviet influence here. At the same time, the Tudeh Party holds the view that the rumours on the Soviet danger are being spread by those individuals who are the agents of US imperialism so that they, in this way, could divert the attention of the Iranian people from the real danger which is that from America (Porsesh Va Pasokh, Aug. 28).

CSO: 4600/15

'CLANDESTINE RADIO' REVIEWS REGIME'S POSITION

GF061804 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 6 Oct 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots: A bomb explodes in Tehran's city center killing dozens and wounding hundreds; an aircraft escapes from the center of the country and a number of its passengers ask for asylum in neighbouring countries; forces of the "Army of Islam" numbering more than 50,000 according to the Voice of the Islamic Republic launch an attack on the western front and are disgracefully defeated; meanwhile Khomeyni, in the manner of mullahs, talks about the solidarity of a regime which is on the verge of the collapse.

The regime is collapsing because the masses have stopped supporting it, the regime is fooling itself by believing that the 20,000 or so that are still beating their chests in Tehran under Khomeyni's banner can replace the 2 million that one day covered the area between Zhaleh and Shayad squares in united lines. The regime is collapsing because the economic situation in the country is chaotic and the leaders of the regime think that now, with 4 million unemployed, a cobwebbed treasury and with exports of only 500,000 barrels of oil a day, they can still live in the same conditions they enjoyed at the beginning when there was not a single jobless person to be found in the entire country, when the treasury was full of gold, dollars and jewels and oil exports were over 6 million barrels a day.

The regime is collapsing because there is no discipline and order in any part of the government and the country has been immersed in such chaos that even the donkey does not recognize his master. The government officials think that by talk of sweets they can satisfy hungry mouths and cure the innumerable pains. They think that if Khomeyni says "We have defeated the enemy" the enemy is defeated, if Khamene'i says "We have destroyed the opposition" the opposition is destroyed and if Musavi says "The economy of the country has been saved," the economy is saved and no one will find out that the "Army of Islam" is receiving blow after blow on the fronts. They think that no one will find out that the activities of the opposition forces continue to expand and no one will realize that the economic situation has become (so chaotic) that it cannot even be saved by his holiness [name indistinct].

The regime is collapsing because it has blocked every possible venue of hope for the people and has turned the country which was supposed to be turned into God's heaven into a cemetery. We cannot find any family in Khomeyni's Iran which is not mourning for a dear one. We cannot find a family in Khomeyni's Iran which has not found itself responsible for a wounded, damaged, broken or crippled member.

The regime is collapsing because its lies are revealed one after the other and people realize that they lied when they said "we are reaching the boundaries of self-sufficiency." The level of self-sufficiency of Khomeyni's regime is the shortages which have become the blight of our people. They lied when they said "we are giving a home to all the homeless." No one but the mullahs, their relatives and friends have found a home. They lied when they said "We came to cloth the naked, feed the hungry and cure the ill." In Khomeyni's regime the naked have become more naked, the hungry are hungrier and the ill are more so.

In the country where the basic essentials of the people are found with difficulty who can be full? In a country where there is a shortage of clothing who can have enough clothes for himself and his family?

This is not the same Khomeyni who dared to come among the people and live with them. Khomeyni today is a refugee in the Jamaran castle to protect his life so that he does not suffer the same fate as the annihilated Beheshti, Bahrani and Raja'i, so that a selfless one does not come forward and get rid of him and others like Sadduqi, Madani, Hasheminezhad, Dastgheyb and others. Khomeyni today is in a state when he can be toppled at any moment since he no longer is the master of events and it is the events which drag him along. Khomeyni no longer controls the country, it is the opposition which chooses the direction of the events. Khomeyni no longer knows what to do, or how to save himself from the tide he has created. He no longer knows how to calm the people and public opinion.

The people have become restless. He is like a person who is drowning and grabs anything to save himself. Even though his cronies are trying to pretend that the "master" is as solid as a dam everything indicates that the regime is shaking under the "master" and soon this republic that Khomeyni created in the name of the Islamic Republic will collapse on the heads of its founders and the camel which never slept in front of [name indistinct] palace will lie in front of his "palace" in Jamaran.

Compatriots, the liberation forces are ready to deal the final blow against the shaky regime of Khomeyni. For the liberation of Iran and our people's life is the most valuable instrument in our hands. Long live Iran! Long live the Iranian nation! Down with the shaky and criminal regime of Khomeyni!

CSO: 4600/28

KHOEINIHA: WORLD MOSLEMS DETERMINED TO ERADICATE ZIONIST REGIME

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] MECCA, Sept. 25 (IRNA) Hojjatolislam Khomeiniha, Imam Khomeini's Hajj representative, said on Friday that although Moslems were determined to eradicate the cancerous tumor of the Zionist regime from the region, some Islamic heads believed that they should reach a truce of war that regime and that no one should oppose it.

But, he stressed, they should know that the Zionist regime would not suffice itself with Palestine and some parts of Lebanon alone, but it would attack their lands as well.

Khomeiniha noted that those government who should lead the fight against the Zionist regime were too scared even to speak about the regime occupying Qods. These heads of Islamic states should realize that if they did not permit their people to enter the scene, they would not only destroy their authorities but themselves too.

Condemning the atrocities of the Saudi police and security forces, the Imam's Hajj representative emphasized that such measures by the Saudi police not only please any Moslem but receive appreciation from the U.S. and the Zionist regimes.

Commenting on the attitude of the Saudi police towards the Iranian pilgrims under detention, Khomeiniha remarked that, in the beginning they wanted to exhibit their power but, when they realized that they were weak before the will of the people, they would apologize. Stressing that Iranians were fully aware of their responsibilities, he said that they only wanted to inform world's Moslems of their cry for the truth.

Khomeiniha said that they had told the Saudi officials that pilgrims had a religious duty which should be performed, but the Saudis would keep on to say that holding demonstrations was prohibited in their country.

The Imam's Hajj representative concluded by saying that the Islamic Republic deemed it its duty to embark on any appropriate measure on what had happened here to Iranian pilgrims.

CSO: 4600/20

JUSTICE MINISTER ON IMAM'S LINE, CONSTITUTION, INTERNAL SECURITY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Sep 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] In an interview with Kayhan, a Tehran daily, the Minister of Justice Mohammad Asghari explained his views on various matters such as the characteristics of the Imam's line, the implementation of Article 49 of the Constitutional law and internal security in the country.

Speaking about the characteristics of the line of Imam Khomeini, Asghari said that those qualities have clearly been defined in the past four years since the Islamic revolution. One of the outstandingly noteworthy features of the Imam's line, he said, was the constantly reiterated reference the Imam made to the oppressed and deprived in every single speech he made.

"The second of such characteristics," he went on to say "is that just as all other great leaders of Islam did, the Imam never compromises Islam. It is impossible to imagine that the Imam would yield pride of place to Islamic tenets in preference to this or that social demand. He never sacrifices truth for the sake of interest. If we bring all such characteristics together we will then be able to gain full knowledge of the Imam's line and be able to pattern our lives on such qualities.

Referring to Article 49 of the Constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic, he stressed that the cabinet was now taking steps for implementation of the article.

Article 49 reads, "The government shall confiscate all wealth amassed through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, larceny, gambling, misappropriation of endowed property, misappropriation of government contracts and deals disposal of waste land and property belonging to no particular person, running of brothels and other illegitimate activities and return such confiscated assets to their rightful owners and in case no such owner is found, delivered up to the State Treasury. The law falling under the purview of this article shall be effected by the government after adequate investigation of the various cases and after being proved legally."

He also confirmed that from his personal point view the said article should be put into effect as soon as possible, adding that the Islamic society of Iran today and the oppressed and deprived who were true supporters of the revolution could not tolerate the postponement of implementation of the article any longer.

In another part of the interview when asked to comment on internal security and the steps which he thought had to be taken by the government to counter the anti-revolutionary forces, he remarked that those who, due to a false understanding of issues, were now fighting the Islamic government were virtually serving the interests of the US and other colonial forces.

Asghari added that the anti-revolutionary elements had now resorted to terrorizing ordinary and common hezbollahi people through sheer frustration after realizing that terrorist attacks on each high official served only to increase the revolutionary zeal among people further.

"When they do not spare even simple shopkeepers whose only crime is to support the Islamic Revolution, from their terror lists, it becomes necessary that all faithful Moslems advocating the Islamic Revolution be armed to defend themselves," he said.

Asked to comment on the strong and weak points of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Hussein Musavi judging from its activities in the past year the Minister of Justice said that the Cabinet can be said to be "the best" in the context of the prevailing situation in the country.

CSO: 4600/22

MALAKUTI LOOKS FORWARD TO ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 29 Sep 82 p 2

[Text] TABRIZ - "We will soon celebrate the victory of an Islamic Revolution in Iraq under the leadership of Imam Khomeini" hoped Ayatollah Malakuti, the Imam's representative in East Azarbaijan Province and the Tabriz Friday Imam yesterday.

The Ayatollah who was talking to IRNA here on the occasion of the War Week also said that despite the will of the enemies of Islam the war had turned out to be a "blessing for the Islamic Republic since it evinced to the world Iran's firm socio-political and military policies."

Noting that the war had also increased the unity of Iranian Moslem people, Malakuti reiterated that it had as well nourished the Iraqi Islamic movement against the infidel regime of Saddam Hussein.

Speaking about the future of the Iraqi imposed war, the Tabriz Friday Imam said that since the Iranian Moslem nation had spared no effort in overcoming the enemies of Islam and the Quran, it was certain the victory would soon

be theirs.

Referring to the massacre of the Lebanese Moslems by the Zionists, Malakuti stressed that the whole episode was a step by the US to put off the flame of the Islamic Revolution in the region.

Meanwhile Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi the Friday Imam of Shiraz and the Imam's representative in Fars Province also said that the Iranian Armed Forces are now in a totally different situation as compared to any era in the history of the country.

"They are now all" noted the Ayatollah "fighting solely for Islam and thus do not fear martyrdom. That is why they could retake all the parts of the country from the occupying enemy which is backed by all forces opposing Islam."

As regard the economic situation, remarked Haeri Shirazi, "it must be noted that the wars are usually followed by famine while in most of the Iranian cities one could not even feel any shortage of food stuff and other commodities."

CSO: 4600/23

MULLAHS SAID BUILDING UP THEIR ANGER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 1-2

[Text] As Iraq announced new raids on Iran's main oil-loading port at Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf on Wednesday concern grew in Tehran that oil revenues could be cut altogether. There were also widespread fears that in the event of further raids the mullahs might order their forces into a new attack on land near Basra, with possibly disastrous results.

There was every sign that the patience of Khomeini and some of his hard-line cronies was wearing thin, not only with the Iraqis but with the Arabs in general. More abuse was heaped on the heads of those rulers who had failed to go to the help of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was one of the advocates of carrying the war into Iraq, issued new threats about closing the straits of Hormoz at the entrance to the Gulf as Iraq's raids threatened to swing public opinion yet more against the war, bringing him possible humiliation.

On Sunday Khomeini said: "The American plan for Palestine is a betrayal of Islam. We hear some Arab regimes have accepted it. If regimes in the region support the plan...then our army, our revolutionary guards will have to adopt a new attitude.

"Then it will present us with a new situation. It will be our religious duty to oppose it and to oppose the regional regimes for their acceptance of the American plan. We have a mandate to fight the American plan and to fight anybody who supports it."

These signs were read by many observers in Tehran as evidence that the public disquiet was now being shared in high places. Demands by Khomeini, too, that there should be more purges of those who had worked for the Shah--he said people need not have been seen photographed in the company of the former monarch to be regarded as part of his corrupt set-up--were also read as a sign that he was reacting to criticisms. The Ayatollah sounded more confused than usual in spite of his obvious anger.

Although some oil sources, mostly quoting Tehran officials, claimed that Kharg was loading "record" amounts of oil by midweek in spite of the Iraqi raids most Iranian observers were sceptical of the figures given. Firstly

they felt the exaggerated amounts were above the capability of supply, and secondly, they said, only a small number of tanker owners and crews were ready to risk being sunk by the Iraqis.

"It must also be remembered that there are a lot of people in oil and shipping circles who have been or are hoping to make a big killing out of trading in Iranian oil and it is in their interests to try to convince customers that they need have no fears that their oil will arrive," one former oilman told IPS. "Indeed these people have a vested interest in trying to paint a rosy picture even of the domestic situation in Iran to encourage more customers to see there is potential ahead.

"Added to this is the fact that the raids make their bargaining position with the Iranians even stronger than it has been for some time already and Tehran will drop its prices even further from the \$26 many of them are paying. They want to encourage the regime in Tehran not to lose its head and do something that will screw up their profits. Some of those oil trade wheeler-dealers are involved in trying to sell Iran all kinds of goods and services, working with exiled Iranian businessmen in the West who would make a buck out of the devil himself if they could feel they have an enormous amount at stake."

The attack on two Turkish ships which were leading a convoy of four or five to Bandar Shahpur, which Iraq claims as an exclusion zone because of the war, showed this week that the Iraqis meant business. Ankara announced three men had died on one of the ships and protested about the attack at midweek. But the new Iraqi air raid on Kharg the same day showed Baghdad was prepared to ride out that particular storm in its seemingly calculated policy to try to force the Iranians to the negotiating table.

Although confirmation of reports that the mullahs were now prepared to end the war if they were guaranteed their demand of \$150 billion in reparations has been unobtainable, it is known that Tehran officials involved in quiet negotiations still going on have softened their attitude perceptibly. There have also been reports that Riyadh and Tehran have been involved for some time in contacts over the question of Iranian pilgrims on the Haj and "some other matters"--a reference which is believed to have included the war and the question of relations between the two regimes.

Although the dangers of the present situation in the Persian Gulf are obvious to the Saudis, which is one reason why they are said to have been encouraged to try to mollify Khomeini through UAE and other intermediaries, if intelligence reports are to be believed, it is felt that Riyadh feels the mullahs have little to gain by precipitate action at present. Having set so much store by its campaign on behalf of the Palestinians and in support of the Arabs against Israel, Tehran, it is felt, could hardly risk any moves to flout ordinary Arab opinion when it was engrossed in the Palestine question. This could be counter-productive to Khomeini's pledged aim of getting the Arab masses on his side.

"With the war now going in Iraq's favour for the first time in many months the Saudis obviously feel they have a breathing space," a veteran Iranian diplomat said. "The Americans can be relied on to rebuff any Iranian moves to close the Gulf and Moscow would see this as a calamity for its own interests in the area. So the Saudi princes must feel that Iraq is now working for the benefit of all the Arab states in the region in trying to cool down Tehran's ardour."

Some Tehran sources were inclined to impute the bomb blast which killed more than 20 people in the Iranian capital on Monday to clandestine Iraqi agents. They contended it was one more bid to unnerve the mullahs. More overflights of Tehran by Iraqi jets were also reported.

Tehran officials hastened to assure the public that the raiders had all been driven off before they could reach any targets. They also continued to deny the raiders had caused any damage at Kharg and that attempted raids on other targets in the south-west had been prevented by anti-aircraft fire.

CSO: 4600/4

BAKERS, REGIME BRACE FOR CONFRONTATION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 p 4

[Text] Election of officers of the Tehran Bakers Guild is to be held by the end of Shahrivar (September 20) and the revolutionary committees have brought pressure on the guild members to vote for officially approved candidates.

However, the majority of bakery shop owners seen determined to elect those members to the governing body who can stand up to officials. In particular, the bakers want to make sure that the mullahs attached to the revolutionary bodies and Islamic Republican party do not continue to interfere with the distribution of flour and fuel.

One other point on which the bakers and the authorities are at odds is the price of bread. At the moment the ministry of commerce allocates subsidised flour to all bakers, including the major ones who operate chains of shops. Then these major concerns, which are either owned by Khomeini's close aides or have been taken over by so-called revolutionary institutions, sell their products at high prices, while traditional bakers are required to sell bread at the officially fixed prices.

Now the bakers hope that they can have their elected governing body to ensure fair practice. But the authorities, for their part, are determined to have their own men elected to the guild's governing body.

Bread is a sensitive question in Iranian politics. Before the Shah managed to consolidate his regime, many cabinets fell because of riots over bread. Once again, after 30 years of peace, a new confrontation between bakers and the regime seems on the cards.

CSO: 4600/4

KHAMENEI PREPARES FOR KHOMEYNI'S DEATH

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 9-10

[Text] Certain similarities can be detected between Iran's present power struggle and that which preceded Mao-Tse-Tung's death in September, 1976, says an analysis by American supporters of the National Resistance Movement of Iran.

"At that time the Chinese radicals, with Mao's blessing, tried to discredit Chou-En-Lai and his associates," it says. "As long as Mao was alive, the Armed Forces remained neutral. But after his death, they put their weight behind the moderates, known as the Chou-En-Lai group. As was the case in China, the radicals in Iran have failed so far and will continue to fail in destroying the moderates' image and popularity among their followers.

"The staunchly pro-Soviet Tudeh Party (the Iranian Communist Party) has wholeheartedly supported, if not helped to plan the plot to eliminate the moderate clergymen. From the earliest days of the Islamic Republic, Tudeh publications launched a relentless campaign against Shariat-Madari and his Moslem people's party.

"It is commonly known that the Tudeh considers the moderate brand of Islam as the major obstacle to the spread of Communism in Iran. If not discredited now, it will attract massive Iranian support after Khomeini's death. One should not overlook the similarities which exist between the radical clergymen's views and policies and those of the Tudeh. Both are totalitarian, repressive, anti-nationalist, anti-West and very much against private ownership. By supporting the campaign against the moderates, the Tudeh hopes to deal a heavy blow to the main bastion of religious opposition to Communism and at the same time to strengthen the radical Marxist-oriented faction of the clergy. In the meantime, as the price for its support, the Tudeh seeks to put more of its agents into top positions of government.

"Moreover, President Khamenei, known to be pro-Soviet, as the second most powerful leader in the country, will be in a position to consolidate his power even more if a group of clergymen instead of Montazeri is elected to lead the nation. For this reason, Khamenei has been trying to convince

Khomeini that a ruling council would be more acceptable as an alternative to govern Iran than a single clergyman. President Khamenei is well aware that Iranian psychology and tradition do not lend themselves to group leadership and that it would be unthinkable that three to five Ayatollahs with conflicting views would work together harmoniously in leading the nation. He believes that since the President is elected by the people, he should logically absorb most powers held by Khomeini after his departure.

"In the final analysis, the future of the Islamic Republic very much depends upon the following factors: a) the outcome of the Iraq-Iran war and the extent to which the emerging military heroes of the war are willing to take advantage of the in-fighting and confusion and move to take power; b) the ability of the Communists and other leftist forces to consolidate their position before Khomeini's death; and c) the capacity of the nationalist groups to put their differences aside and unite under an umbrella organisation led by a respected nationalist.

"Since Khomeini's regime has directed its greatest assault upon Iranian national heritage, culture, symbols and language, it is our view that a well-known nationalist leader with credibility and the right credentials (e.g. fighting dictatorship), can use Iranian nationalism as an effective means of mobilizing the masses against the regime once Khomeini is gone.

"Supported by an effective organisation inside Iran and with the cooperation of certain segments of the Armed Forces, the clergy and tribal forces, such a leader can dislodge the Islamic Republic soon after Khomeini's departure."

CSO: 4600/4

WOMEN'S SITUATION IN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC DISCUSSED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 8-9

[Text] In the past week two more women were executed in Iran for alleged illegal sexual activities. Their deaths coincide with the publication of the following article in the monthly Voice of Iran, the organ of Shahpour Bakhtiar's National Resistance Movement of Iran:

Shortly before Khomeini established his theocracy in February, 1979, voices were raised both inside and outside Iran condemning everything that had taken place during the Shah's regime. The dust raised by such propaganda blinded many people to the potential dangers of the future under men of obscurantist views and dubious character like Khomeini. To the cost of Iran and Iranians the warning of genuine liberals and democrats went unheeded. Among the casualties of this nihilistic propaganda were the women of Iran.

To better understand the humiliating and barbaric conditions imposed on women by the Islamic Republic, one needs to look at their achievements on the eve of the revolution. At that time women were employed in all walks of life and held jobs at all levels. There were women doctors, lawyers, engineers, civil servants, university professors, MPs, senators, and so on. The armed forces and police had opened their ranks to them. Private companies and an expanding industry absorbed many more at menial, clerical and managerial levels. In 1968 Iran had its first woman minister in Dr. Parsa. (Dr. Parsa was executed in 1980 by the Khomeini regime, after being placed in a sack so that her limbs, even after death, would not offend the Islamic eyes of her executioners.) In the fields of education, arts and sports, women also enjoyed widened opportunities. It is true more boys than girls were being educated in the villages and at university level. The figures for 1974 university students were 37 girls for every 100 boys, a discrepancy which was the result of social and cultural prejudices not easily overcome.

The Family Protection Law of 1967, despite grave shortcomings, was a further step towards the equality of women. They now had the right to initiate divorce, to appeal against unreasonable summary divorce or to obtain redress for it. Furthermore, a woman could veto her husband's taking a second wife, and was no longer automatically deprived of her children in

the event of a separation. Socially, women could dress as they pleased, mix freely in social life without fear of harrassment.

All this is not to say that, by 1978, women (especially in small provincial towns) had gained full equality; for that they had a long way to go. But their condition compared to that of years earlier was unrecognisably better. In the 1910s and 20s, the first modern girls' schools were vilified as places of vice. Mobs, incited by the mullahs, would attack the buildings and set lunatics free into the school grounds so as to terrify the girls. An all-women theatrical performance, at the house of an enlightened lady whose purpose was to raise funds for adult education, ended with the house being looted and the lady beaten up, again at the instigation of the local cleric. Even the wearing by a few brave women of a less sombre chador (enveloping veil) than the de rigueur black nearly caused a riot.

However, if in the early 20th century the situation of Iranian women was grim, it was nothing compared to the barbarities they experience now. Only the Islamic Republic has deemed it fit to execute women whom poverty and a hypocritical society had forced into prostitution. (Their charred bodies, burnt rather than buried since they would "defile" the ground, were dragged about by the mullahs' henchmen.)

It was again the Islamic Republic which, two years ago, first put adulterous women to death by stoning. In the three years that this regime has lasted many pregnant women and teen-age girls have been put to death; the teenagers are often raped first, to ensure that they do not go to heaven!

Nowadays, if a woman does not wear "Islamic" clothes, she is thrown out of her job, flogged, or sent to a mortuary to wash the dead. At the very least shopkeepers, intimidated by Islamic thugs, refuse their custom. An English-woman, who had lived in Iran for over 20 years, reported how her local baker had kept a motley of scarves to pass around his customers in case a militiaman should appear. It should be added that non-Islamic women are not exempt from these rules. A Zoroastrian girl, brought up in England since the age of six, had her passport photo rejected because a tiny patch of her hair was visible. At school, girls of seven are exhorted to cover every strand of hair, or in the next world they will be hung from that strand of hair while serpents crawl over them.

The Family Protection Law has been swept aside. Men can once again divorce their wives at will and take on extra wives without their existing wives' consent. The children of those emancipated women who initiated divorce and remarried have been declared illegitimate by Khomeini, no light matter in Iran.

The question asked by Iranians is, why is the Western media silent before such degradation? The tacit assumption seems to be that such laws and customs, being Islamic, are acceptable to Iranians. But the role of women in Islam has been much sentimentalised. As recently as July 25th, the Sunday Times carried a most misleading article. It claimed, for example,

that the Prophet forbade the beating of women. In fact the Koran says that a recalcitrant woman should be first chided, then beaten, and finally denied her husband's bed.

The same article implied that, in the case of divorce, a woman could keep her children. Not so: she loses her son at the age of five and her daughter at seven. And, divorced, married or single, a woman's life is literally worth half that of a man's, for this is the blood-money they get.

This is not to deny that Islam has a gentle face to show to women; it is Khomeini's version which is harsh. Nor can it be denied that 1400 years ago in the Arabian peninsula the laws of Islam were enlightened. But how many of these Western women who are cynical about Islam would be content to live by the laws and customs of 1400 years ago?

Indeed, Iranian women have not been content to do so. Shortly after the revolution women organised rallies and went on strike, temporarily bringing to a halt the wearing of Islamic head-gear. But by mid-1980 the mullahs had organised their club-wielding thugs sufficiently to intimidate serious opposition. When the women tried to petition President Bani-Sadr he refused to receive them and came up with the notorious remark: "There is an emanation from women's hair which excites men." If we recall how an increasing number of Iranian women were leading emancipated and dignified lives before the revolution, and how there are young girls who had never seen their grandmothers wrapped in the black shroud, let alone heard of floggings or stonings to death, then the tragedy of the present situation becomes apparent—and silence in the face of it appalling.

CSO: 4600'4

UNIVERSITY REOPENING LIKELY TO BE DELAYED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 88, 9 Sep 82 pp 2-3

[Text] There was little sign in the past week that the reopening of engineering, medical and agricultural faculties at Iran's universities will take place on time later this month. Disputes between the Cultural Revolution Headquarters and officials of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education over the conditions for registration have not yet been resolved, in spite of Majlis calls for relaxation of the arduous regulations laid down by the cultural revolution hardliners.

Besides personal qualifications the CRH, as it is known, insists that 30 per cent of all places go to candidates from the Islamic revolutionary institutions, including a proportion to those from the Martyrs Foundation. Regional quotas were also fixed to ensure Tehran-based students obtain fewer places. All students must give an undertaking to serve the government in any part of the country officials decide for five years after completing their studies. Those whose studies were interrupted by call-up for the war cannot obtain places until they have completed their prescribed terms of service with the forces, it was announced.

The hue and cry which greeted the announcement of these conditions prompted the ministry to announce that they were not final decisions. But the Cultural Revolution Headquarters published a statement that it was the duty of the ministry and its own executive officials to see the regulations were implemented as announced.

Majlis deputies also put down a motion demanding that first-year classes in medicine and related fields should be started without delay in view of the desperate health care situation in Iran at present. Officials quoted in the press in Tehran recently said the country was short of nearly 40,000 doctors.

Along with 14,000 Iranians several thousand doctors from India, Pakistan, the Philippines and western countries worked in Iran before the revolution. Although the system was far from perfect and people in rural areas found local auxiliary staff were not always reliable in opening clinics on time and service was often haphazard, care of some kind was available to the vast majority of the population. After the revolution not only were most

of the foreign doctors expelled but around half of the Iranian doctors also left the country.

The result has been a recurrence of endemic diseases which were virtually eradicated during the last decade of the late Shah's reign, when cooperation with the World Health Organisation and foreign medical and educational institutions was at its maximum. Universities were also experimenting with large-scale experimental rural health projects, and a special development university with much stress on health and related rural development problems was already in its early stages of work. A number of hospitals were staffed largely by foreign doctors.

The closure of the universities over the past two years has meant that the country has fallen further behind and it will now face a severe problem for years ahead. Many of the 14,000 original doctors have left the country. Some foreign doctors have been brought in from India and Pakistan once again, but the security situation inside the country, together with the unsavoury reputation of the regime, means that few practitioners are prepared to take jobs. The official excuse for the small numbers so far recruited is that the doctors abroad fail the "stiff" exams laid down by Iranian officials, but this is widely regarded as a joke in Iran.

In recent weeks officials have begun to approach Iranians in western countries with inducements to return. High salaries and special privileges, such as freedom to travel to visit their children at schools abroad, have been offered. But the executions and imprisonment of doctors and nurses who treated wounded and dying Mojahedin fighters after the street battles of last year, together with the absence of any guarantee of security in present conditions in Iran, have meant there has so far been no response.

But Ministry of Health officials plan to make further visits abroad to talk to the doctors once more. Enormous salaries have been mentioned at preliminary talks, but there is no evidence that the government will have the cash to pay these. Government doctors in Iran today are paid 6,000 toman a month, a sum which a leading medical official recently told the press was hardly enough to cover a man's rent in the provinces, never mind Tehran.

CSO: 4600/4

IRAN, MALTA EXPLORE TRADE POSSIBILITIES

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Sep 82 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) - In a meeting with the Maltese Foreign Minister, Prime Minister Musavi emphasized on the strategic position, of this Mediterranean island and the importance of the two countries relations with each other.

Musavi said that the Islamic Republic had broken the hand of the U.S. in the region and he added that the government believed that true security would not be obtained without the U.S. being uprooted from the region.

In relation to the recent events in Lebanon, the Prime Minister said that whatever catastrophe the U.S. created contributed to the awareness of the people and thus ultimately to the U.S. destruction in the Mid-East.

Then the Maltese Foreign Minister, Alexander Josef Eacabras Trigona, while thanking the Iranian officials for their hospitality, called for the expansion of relations between the two countries.

Also, in a meeting on Tuesday between Trigona and Iranian Commerce Minister Habibollah Asgar-Owadi, the Iranian government announced that it was ready to purchase a number of goods from Malta.

In addition the Maltese Foreign Minister proposed that Iran become a partner with Malta in the latter's ship building company.

Libya and Algeria have already purchased shares from this company.

In this meeting the officials decided that delegations from both countries would undertake reciprocal visits and study their needs, during next month.

Asgar-Owadi said that Malta could provide Iran with foodstuffs, metals, chemical products, and machinery.

Also, the two parties agreed that an Iranian delegation pay a visit to Malta's ship building industry and representatives from Malta pay a visit to Iran in order to help in repairing Iranian ships.

CSO: 4600/17

BRAZIL, IRAN CONCLUDE \$160 MILLION CONTRACT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Sep 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) - A \$160-million contract for the purchase of various commodities from Brazil was signed between the Islamic Republic and Brazil, announced the Managing Director of the State Commercial Organization, Mostafa Movahedizadeh Tuesday.

Also, Brazil's oil purchases from Iran are to be more than the commodities it was to export to Iran.

Movahedizadeh said that 90 per cent of commodities were purchased from the United States and the remaining ten per cent from the American middlemen or the multinational companies before the Revolution, but presently commodities were being bought from the following countries:

Wheat from Australia, Turkey, Argentina, Pakistan, Canada and sometimes from Greece. Barley from Turkey, Pakistan and Syria. Corn from Canada, Argentina. Soya cake oil (for livestock) from Brazil, Argentina and more or less from Spain. Soya oil from Brazil, Spain. Rice from Thailand, Uruguay and Pakistan. Sugar from Turkey, Brazil,

Common Wealth, and the Soviet Union. Meat from Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, East Europe, France, Argentina and Uruguay. Frozen chicken from Turkey, East Europe, The Netherlands, Germany, more or less from France and Brazil. Eggs from The Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany. Cement from the Soviet Union and Turkey. Fish powder (for chicken breeding centers) from Peru, and agricultural seeds from East Europe, Italy, France.

He stressed that sufficient amount of the said commodities had been stored.

He continued that the Islamic Republic paid attention to political issues in its commercial and economic relations with various countries and would not have any trade exchanges with the countries which were the enemies of the Islamic Republic and did not share similar views with Iran.

Priority was given to friendly countries, Movahedizadeh emphasized.

He said that the organization imported an annual amount of 6 to 7 million tons of goods to the country and one freight ship was unloaded

daily. He said that commodities would be carried by the Iranian shipping organization and in case of shortages, they would utilize charter ships.

He said that through the implementation of this plan, the Iranian fleet had become more active and also the shipping organization acquired more prestige.

Talking about expansion of commercial and economic relations between Iran and Brazil, he said that an Iranian

commercial-economic delegation travelled to Brazil in April to investigate the expansion of relations between the two countries.

Brazil could provide Iran with commodities such as soya cake oil, corn, vegetable oil, and industrial and plastic machinery.

Also it is to provide Iran with diesel fuelled refrigerators for villages which do not enjoy electricity.

In this connection, a Brazilian delegation arrived here recently and a \$130-million contract was signed.

Also, another \$30-million contract was signed between the two countries.

Speaking about the purchase of Iranian oil by Brazil, he said that Brazil was one of the major purchasers of Iranian oil previously but after the Islamic Revolution it refrained from buying it.

Yet, following negotiations, Brazil had decided that Iran would supply its daily oil needs rather than the Persian

Gulf states.

He said that the contracts signed would not be carried out as a barter-exchanges but each of the purchases would be performed separately and in cash.

He concluded by saying that negotiations had been held about the export of goods such as dates, pistachio, nuts, and mineral ores to Brazil and the results would be announced later.

CSO: 4600/18

FOREIGN MINISTRY DENOUNCES 'SUPPRESSIVE' SAUDI ACTIONS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] Tehran (IRNA)—The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic in a statement released last night strongly denounced yesterday's suppressive tactics employed by the Saudi Arabian police against Iranian pilgrims in Mecca.

"Once again the intimidating and suppressive forces of the Saudi Arabian government disrupted the atmosphere of unity among the orderly ranks of the Hajis (Hajj pilgrims)," the statement said, adding that the brutal treatment by the Saudi police was an effort to silence the "anti-arrogance and anti-Zionist cries" of the pilgrims. It said that the large number of pilgrims who had been injured in yesterday incident in Mecca had tried to air their complaints along with other Moslems against "all these crimes and all this treachery" committed against the Palestinian refugees.

"The Foreign Ministry condemns the constant harassment of the Saudi Arabian government of the pilgrims and Iranian officials, and the exercising of such suppressive policies and it believes that the House of God belongs to all Moslems and is the stronghold and coordinating center of assault for the Moslems of the world against the foundations of world arrogance.

While expressing concern over the possibility of similar actions by the police in the future, the statement further called on the Saudi government to permit the Moslems to continue to reveal the crimes of the Western and Eastern imperialists and the Zionists and to provide suitable conditions for the Moslems so that they could observe the "spiritual-political Hajj ceremonies in a manner which is accepted by the Merciful God."

CSO: 4600/19

PRESIDENT URGES STUDENTS TO VITAL ROLES THROUGH KNOWLEDGE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] Tehran (IRNA)--President Seyyed Ali Khamenei Wednesday urged the 10 million Iranian students to play a vital role in their struggle against the enemies of the Islamic Republic through their ever increased knowledge.

Addressing the students through radio, Khamenei said that the students, with comprehensive knowledge about the affairs of the country, would be able to neutralize the enemy plot to keep the nation culturally backward.

He said that the Islamic Revolution would become permanent if the Moslem nation of Iran obtained knowledge with the same belief as they had in the Islamic Revolution.

Reaffirming Iran's policy based on neither East nor West, the president said that the Islamic Republic would always support the oppressed people in Iran as well as across the world.

"Our duty is to fight against oppression and exploitation all over the world," Khamenei reminded the school students.

Meanwhile, on Thursday morning, hundreds of thousands of students and teachers chanting anti-U. S. and anti-Zionist slogans set the U. S. flag on fire in front of the den of spies, the former U. S. Embassy, here, to mark the first day of the academic year and the second day of the "War Week."

The students and teachers, after attending special opening ceremonies in schools which began with the message of Imam Khomeini, marched towards the U. S. den of espionage while dragging the torn flag of the U. S. as an expression of their firm condemnation of the U. S. government.

The second day of the War Week, which started Wednesday is marked as the day of "Death to America and Death to Israel." The demonstrators, accompanied by groups of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Mobilization of the Oppressed, gathered in front of the former U. S. Embassy and expressed their determination that, in addition to attending school, they would continue their presence in the political scene of the country.

Similar ceremonies were held throughout the country in which millions of people took part.

CSO: 4600/19

KHOEINIHA, JANNATI, KHATAMI, OTHERS FREED AFTER LONG DETENTION BY SAUDI POLICE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] MECCA, (IRNA) - Hojatoleslam Khoenih, the representative of Imam Khomeini to Mecca, Ayatollah Jannati, a member of the Council of Guardians, and Hojatoleslam Khatami, the Majlis Deputy from Ardakan in (in Yazd Province), were released after several hours of detention by the Saudi police.

The arrests occurred after the police and the security forces rushed into the gathering site of Iranian pilgrims and tore flag along with other written slogans.

The Iranian pilgrims along with many other pilgrims from Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, the UAE, and Palestine, had mostly left the site and were marching to the Sacred Mosque here, to observe Friday prayers, shouting anti-Zionist and anti-American slogans but were later told to abandon their slogans in order to avoid police harassment.

However, the Iranian pilgrims did distribute Imam Khomeini's translated message on the occasion of Hajj as they

were being assaulted by police using batons, tear-gas and water cannons all along their route towards the Sacred Mosque.

In spite of the treatment by the police against the pilgrims, the marchers tried to maintain their orderly manner. However, cameras and tape-recorders of Iranian reporters were confiscated along the way and Saudi helicopters were seen flying over the scene of the march.

Before the release of the detained Iranians, the Iranian pilgrims had threatened to stage a sit-in at the Sacred Mosque until all of the detainees were released.

In yesterday's incident 30 Iranian pilgrims were injured as a result of police brutality who are presently being treated at local clinics here.

Also a group of Iranians who were arrested along with the Iranian officials have been kept under detention and there has been no information concerning their whereabouts.

IRAN

DOCTORS URGED TO RETURN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] Iranian doctors living abroad have been called by the Medical Association of Iran to "return home and serve their fellow-countrymen."

The medical association also said that those doctors who returned to help their people "would not be debarred from returning to a country of their own choice whenever they wished."

The association's statement released yesterday in local Persian dailies expressed "gratitude to Ayatollah Montazeri for the guidance he offered the association and to the advise to doctors now resident abroad," but who were urgently required back in the country.

Montazeri had said that in view of the need in Iran for specialists in the medical field "you should come back to your Islamic home and fulfill your religious duties."

CSO: 4600/22

IRAN'S JEWISH INTELLECTUALS CONDEMN ZIONISTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Sep 82 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) - The racist Zionists who have no objective rather than serving international Imperialism, have so brutally massacred unyielding oppressed Palestinians that it even scared their great master, the criminal U.S., said a message from the Iranian Society for Jewish Intellectuals here Monday.

The crime, committed in Chatila and Sabra camps of Palestinian refugees, was the result of the plot of racist Zionists and Phalangists, and it would awaken silent youths, the message noted.

It called on all Jews from throughout the world to come to the scene and not to surrender to fabricated propaganda attempts, cutting off all their material and spiritual assistance for the Zionists.

Earlier the Iranian Jewish Students Organization condemned the brutal massacre of Palestinians by the Zionist forces in a statement issued Sunday.

The statement said that undoubtedly the participation of the Zionist regime in the mass-slaughter of more than 1,500 civilians was not something towards which all the monotheistic people including the Jews would not react.

In another part of the statement, the organization called on all the freedom-loving Jews of the world to once again, show their belief in the monotheistic values of Judaism by their united protest and denunciation of such inhuman acts

CSO: 4600/17

KHOEINIHA: COMBATANTS AWAIT IMAM'S ORDERS IN MECCA TO LIBERATE QODS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 21 Sep 82 pp 1, 4

[Text]

MECCA, Saudi Arabia (IRNA) Hojatoleslam Musavi Khomeini Sunday called on the Hajj pilgrims, especially Iranians to mourn (yesterday) on the occasion of the recent catastrophe in West Beirut, by decorating offices of Hajj teams with black cloth.

He said that the leader of millions of Moslems, Imam Khomeini could mobilize at least 500,000 combatants to be dispatched for the liberation of the occupied Palestine.

He was addressing a welcoming ceremony held for him here. The Iranian pilgrims were also present on the occasion. They were carrying portraits of

Imam Khomeini and chanting anti-West and anti-East slogans.

Khomeiniha, Imam's representative responsible for Iranian Hajj pilgrims, reiterated that if heads of Islamic countries revolted against the Zionist regime and cut the flow of their oil to the international

imperialism, world's Moslems would support them.

Khomeiniha urged the Saudi police to ask their government why they labelled pilgrims as "convicts" and that if shouting slogans against the Zionist regime and the U.S. was "blasphemy."

The gathering was surrounded by the Saudi police and security forces.

"We warned you not to gather in Fax to recognize the Zionist regime. You paid no attention and approved the fabricated recognition plan hastily and later saw the punishment for it. The usurper Zionist regime massacred people in West Beirut thus replying to your good services," Khomeiniha stressed.

Meanwhile, AP reports from Jeddah that Saudi Arabian Interior Minister Prince Nayef inspected Sunday Moslem holy places and warned that revolutionary-minded Iranian or other pilgrims would be deported immediately.

The prince made the warning at a ceremony in Mecca after touring Moslem pilgrimage sites, where approximately two million faithful Moslems arrived to perform Hajj.

Thousands of Iranian pilgrims, led by a representative of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Imam), have been accused by Saudi authorities of attempting to start riots on at least two occasions last week.

The Iranians were dispersed by Saudi security forces. Official statements said 21 have been deported.

"Our policy is to facilitate the right of pilgrimage to all Moslems, but certainly any one who tries to undermine security will be returned to where he came," Nayef said.

CSO: 4600/16

BRIEFS

BUSHEHR MARINE INDUSTRIES ORDERS--Following building of the first tugboat by the Bushehr Marine Industries, more than 48 orders worth millions of rials have been placed with the company for building of personnel carriers for the Iranian navy, said the Managing Director of the company, Jalil Khebreh, in an interview with IRNA here Monday. The first products of the company, which is the result of the labor of Iranian workers and experts, is a tugboat called Bostan, which is 56 feet long and 16 feet wide. It was built in a period of four months. The head of the company further added that the ships for which orders have been placed, would be similar to hovercraft which could land troops in shallow waters. The ship is in accordance with the standards and has been designed by the Iranian experts, he added. Speaking about the future plans of the company, he said that the company was in the process of building 14 tugboats and other kinds of ships and the plan for building 50 fishing boats, each with 40 tons of capacity, were underway. He further told IRNA that at present the company was doing the repair job of ships with 800 tons of capacity and in the future it would also repair ships with 20,000 tons of capacity. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 29 Sep 82 p 2]

CSO: 4600/23

MUSLIM OPPOSITION MOVEMENT SUPPORTS IRANIAN AGAINST REGIME

Capetown MUSLIM NEWS in English 3 Sep 82, pp 8-9

[Text]

'As far as the oppressed Muslim people of Iraq are concerned the recent drive by the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran into our land has given cause for great jubilation for we seek our own victory in the victory of the army of the Islamic Republic.'

This is how Abu Sami summed up the attitude of the masses in Iraq in the present conflict.

'We have suffered from the tyranny and oppression of the atheistic Ba'athist regime of Saddam and are thirsty for Revolution. We have drawn our inspiration from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and are, in fact looking towards the people of Iran for help.'

He added, however, that the Muslims in Iraq were not simply waiting for salvation from the outside: the Mujahideen in the country have been very active and recently a series of bomb blasts took place close to the Presidential Palace in Baghdad marking a new phase in the Islamic struggle. At the same time the masses have taken to the streets in major cities publicly demonstrating their opposition to the ruling clique.

This new phase in the struggle is the culmination of years of underground work by the Islamic movement in Iraq.

Established in the late fifties, The Movement of the Muslim People of Iraq tried to raise the level of awareness of the people, and to confront the new situation created by the British colonialists.

Abu Sami traces the history: 'When the British colonised the land which is now called Iraq, they put up new borders, gave the country a name — Iraq — and imposed a monarchy. This they did to change the character of the land. Before this Iraq was part of the Islamic state ruled by the Ottomans and was inhabited by Muslims from various backgrounds. There were Kurds, Arabs, Persians and other cultures and there was free inter-mixing. Even the different schools of thought, such as Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi' and Shia,

did not recognise any barriers. Because of British colonialism Iraq was given a nationalist Arab character.

'Although I speak Arabic, I don't consider myself an Arab. My attachment, and that of the Muslim people of Iraq, is to Islam. It is the enemies of Islam that introduced nationalism and sectarianism (Shia/Sunn.) into Iraq.

'So, it was up to the Islamic movement to face the issue of nationalism and sectarianism and to answer the question: "Are we Iraqis because Britain decided to call this land Iraq? Or are we Arabs because we speak the language? Or are we Muslims because we believe in Islam?"'

The other issue that faced the Muslims in Iraq was what method to adopt to assert their real identity.

Because of the suppression of any form of Islamic activity, the Movement of the Muslim People of Iraq organised itself into cells of five to ten members. One member in each cell maintained contact with the core of the leadership.

The Movement first concentrated on raising the level of awareness of the people, drawing attention to the injustices that existed in the country.

Within a very short period of time the Movement had spread to every part of the country, from the major cities to the remotest village. The widespread support the Movement gained was largely due to the fact that the leaders did not operate in a vacuum. They not only identified with the masses: they were FROM the masses!

Abu Sami says that everyone involved in the Islamic struggle in Iraq is aware of the dangers facing the committed worker, particularly if one bears in mind Saddam's record of brutality.

'Obviously, this purifies the movement. It makes it a very serious matter. It is not simply an adventure for enjoyment. Those who are part of the movement have very firm views about

changing society towards Islam.'

The greatest turning point in the methods adopted by the Movement of the Muslim People came with the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Abu Sami explains: 'After the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Muslim people in Iraq could now look towards a model and a leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. This gives us the inspiration and makes it clear to the Muslim people in Iraq that an Islamic state is not a matter of choice, or personal taste; rather all our efforts have to be committed towards that direction.'

He said that the Muslim people in Iraq saw an Islamic state as the only way to uproot the evil of Arab Nationalism which Saddam is promoting, and the seed of which was planted by the British.

'While Iraq is a land inhabited by Muslims, its constitution and the party ruling it at the moment declare plainly that the state must run on secular lines. The ruling party's philosophy is one of National Socialism.'

Abu Sami declared that the ruling Ba'athist Party is one of the greatest enemies of Islam in the Middle East.

The founder of the party, Michael Aflaq, is not only a Christian but he is from the Maronite Christians in Lebanon, who have a long record of enmity towards the Muslims. Aflaq descended from Paris to the Arab world and established his party. By using emotive slogans he deceived a lot of Muslims into supporting the party.

We know from Saddam's brutal suppression of Islam that the party is nothing but an enemy of Islam. Of course, after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Ba'athists found themselves in a very difficult position and were themselves faced with the Islamic trend. So we found Saddam appearing on television conducting his 'prayers' and kissing the Qur'an. Obviously, this did not deceive the Islamic movement in Iraq.

The Muslim people of Iraq judge Saddam by his real deeds. Saddam is the modern-day version of Stalin and Hitler in one. What he has in common with Stalin is his brutality and the fact that Stalin butchered his comrades when they disagreed with him. Saddam did the same in 1973, 1977 and 1979.

Saddam is also like Hitler in his racist ideas and practices. For example, the way he deported the Kurds because of their origin.

Abu Sami adds that with increased repression on the part of Saddam, the Movement of the Muslim People of Iraq has found it imperative to adopt a new strategy.

'So, the struggle now takes on a more militant line. With people having developed themselves by raising their personal awareness and consciousness, they are ready for martyrdom. And since the success of the Revolution in Iran, Saddam has taken severe measures against the Mujahideen and thousands have already been martyred. Of course, to Muslims martyrdom is not a tragedy. It is success. I have lost colleagues



in the armed struggle against Saddam but I am not sad for them; they are martyrs. I am sad for myself. Why is it that Allah has not chosen me for martyrdom? Is it because I am not fully conscious?

This is the spirit that invites the army of Iran to liberate the land of Iraq from the Ba'athist regime.

And those who have lost their lives in removing atheistic Ba'athism are not Iranians, invading a foreign land. They are martyrs, glorying in the fact that they have achieved the ultimate in answering the call of their fellow Muslims, all members of the One Ummah founded by our Leader Nabi Muhammad (SAW) more than 1400 years ago.



ARMORED CORPS COMMANDER REVIEWS BATTLE LESSONS, FUTURE MOVES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Aug 82 p 16

[Interview With Major General Moshe Bar-Kokhlva, Armored Corps Commander, by Ya'akov Ha'elyon; date and place not specified]

[Text] I have become accustomed to seeing him in the field. His face is covered with dust. Half of his body protrudes from the tank turret. His facial expression is one of a slight frown, and it is deceiving since it is only after a while that the soft interior behind the hard exterior is revealed. I saw him moving in war. In the lead position. He has never asked of his subordinates more than he has asked of himself. He commanded the first armored track vehicle when the Jordanians attempted to block the way to Eilat in 1949. In a battle of the few against the many, a battle which became a textbook lesson in the literature of the world's armies, he stood atop the first tank which broke through to the "dam position" in Abu 'Uwayqilah in the Sinai operation. It is because Moshe Bar-Kokhlva (Brill) believes in the power of the personal example. And this characteristic was also reflected in Israel's most difficult hour, when a force under his command stopped the Syrians who were but a footstep away from the Jordan, near the Yehudiyya junction.

He has served in the armored corps since its beginning, and in the folklore of the corps he is known as one whose troops "follow him in fire and water." Even those who were recruits under him 26 years ago still maintain contact with him. In the folklore of the armored corps there is also a verse which his troops composed, "Saul hath slain his thousands, and Moshe Brill his ten thousands." He once said of himself that his ties with the armored corps are like a "Catholic marriage." However, the one who married him in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel, his wife Nehma, says smilingly that she fears the day when he is released. There will be no escaping the towing of a tank into the yard of his home because without it his life would not be a life.

He is "Mr Armor."

He was in my time my company commander. I remind him what he did for me. The love of the homeland which he implanted in me. Also by the "feet method" [an expression connoting visits and excursions to various places and landmarks]. However, the main thing was that he had nurtured in me and my friends the feeling of our worth as fighters but also as human beings, burdened with responsibilities but possessed of rights.

The Most Precious Asset--The Fighter

He traveled a long way until he reached the top, when he was appointed as commander of the armored corps this February. He served in every possible position in the corps including advancing the combat doctrine which proved itself in Peace for Galilee. But despite the fact that only a few understand the tank as he does, he preferred to speak at his appointment ceremony about the person. "Our most precious and greatest asset is the fighter," he said, "we must instill in him loyalty to and love of the homeland, soldierly pride, professionalism in using the equipment of war, and also the preservation of his rights as a soldier and a person." The years have not changed, therefore, the man who has taken an active part in the seven wars of Israel and the small wars between them, if we do not also include his service in the Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi before them.

In his native land, Poland, he was educated in "Polish national honor" which became upon his immigration as a youth to Israel "Jewish national honor." Therefore, he has never concealed his nationalist views even though at one stage or another they were an impediment to his advancement. It is "Jewish honor" that made Bar Kokhva, the Maccabees, and the fighters of Masada his heroes. It is no accident that he changed his name to Bar-Kokhva. When he was awarded the Medal for Bravery many years ago, he said: "It is impossible to plan heroes, but it is possible to foster heroism." He did foster it. All the men of his company were awarded commendations in Operation Sinai.

I have always seen him in uniform and wearing a black beret in the field and on the battlefield. It was therefore a little strange to see him now during our conversation sitting quietly at home in a white shirt. He had stopped off at home for a rare short visit from his "second home" which is always located where his troops are. But the armored corps also fills his home. The many tank models, photographs, various souvenirs,--copper plaques or paintings--which his subordinates and superiors gave him as a memento. Which is his real family, the one at home or the one in the field? Apparently, it is impossible to distinguish between them. Example: his son's name is the nickname of his first company--Barak.

"The Tank Is King of the Hill"

I must confess that I was not nonchalant in talking with him. He shared in my sharpest and most memorable experiences. One of these was when I saw this physically formidable man crying like a child when as a result of erroneous intelligence reports, casualties were inflicted on Israeli fighters by mistake by a unit in which I was serving under his command. Therefore, I believe him when he says now that he prefers a tank, the mobility of which is somewhat limited, if this is the price one has to pay in order to prevent casualties among the troops.

In the seventies he published a technical article--he is a prolific writer of such articles--which was entitled "The Tank Is King of the Hill." Three years ago he conducted an extensive exercise designed to train the IDF in combat in hilly terrain by attempting to simulate possible future armor battles in the

Lebanese mountains. His acquaintances relate that he repeatedly argued at the time that the armor must be prepared for a situation in which it would have to operate in the most difficult terrain in Lebanon--that which is considered impossible for armor warfare. In his article "The Tank Is King of the Hill" and also by the exercise, he endeavored to prove that the impossible is possible.

[Question] And so, were we prepared for the war as it happened?

[Answer] In this war with the Syrians we were confronted with unprecedented situations. And I will explain why at once. However, among the reasons which permitted us to defeat them one can cite not only our superiority in force but also because our fighters succeeded in making better use of the characteristics of the tank than they did. As a result of proper training, we were superior to them in our ability to move tanks across difficult terrain. Thanks to this, our armored units surprised the Syrians by appearing in several vital areas. We hit them, therefore, from unexpected directions.

Syrian Power

In the battle with the Syrians it became evident that they had no chance of defeating our fighters in armor combat using pure armor. Therefore, they prepared two responses. First, an anti-aircraft defense on a scale and at a strength which had never been used on any front in the world in order to neutralize our air force's capability of freely attacking their ground forces, armor, and commandos. The second response was the addition of new components to their ground forces. They converted their mechanized infantry units to new APC's (MFT), each of which was equipped with an anti-tank missile launcher and an anti-tank gun and transported an infantry squad. The quantities of anti-tank weapons were enormous. For every 100 tanks there were 40 more Sagger launchers and 40 anti-tank guns. This is a very powerful force. There is no equal to such fire power of anti-tank weapons. Moreover, they sent into action the commandos who were equipped with short-range anti-tank weapons. And to this they added anti-tank helicopters as support for their tanks. Their artillery in this war was mobile, moving with the speed of the tank, while during the Yom Kippur War it was primarily towed.

We tried to circumvent the Syrians at the beginning of the war, but as became evident, we could not avoid confronting them on a broad scale. We overcame them also because our command was superior in mobile combat and entering combat during movement as occurred in most of our battles with them. We are also superior to them in a more rapid grasp of the situation and the exploitation of opportunities. Our crews are superior to the Syrian crews. They are more professional. Therefore, our gunners scored more and better hits. We also made maximum use of the inter-branch components, meaning cooperation between the armor and artillery, infantry, and engineers for example. I believe that a significant contribution to our success was the operation of large formations, the headquarters of which were in the area, and the advantage in this was that they had better control over what was happening than the Syrians. Their command was exercised from a very distant bunker where at times the information reaching them was fragmented and vague. In this war we reaped the fruit of this structure. It created a decisive advantage.

Do Not Underrate the Enemy

[Question] Various commanders in the IDF have told me that even though you have the reputation of being one who has confidence in the IDF's strength, you are continually cautioning about the possibility that it will be caught in a moment of weakness. Is it true that in January 1973 at a conference of commanders in which Golda Meir participated you warned about Syrian intentions and said the following: "If they begin to move, it will be difficult to stop them, and they are likely to cause us many casualties. In the Sinai there are areas for stopping an enemy. But in the Golan Heights the stopping will be difficult because of the absence of strategic depth, and therefore, they would likely be able to reach the Benot Ya'akov bridge within hours." Is it true that you said then that we are not adequately prepared for war? Is it true that for this reason you pressed for the movement of additional regular forces to the Golan Heights and that the plan was indeed implemented in May 1973 while we originally planned it toward the end of 1974?

General Bar-Kokhlva does not deny these statements which I have seen in writing. But he says: Now we must look to the future and draw conclusions. We had a difficult battle in the Bika' against the Syrians. It is true that we were victorious, but the Syrians did not collapse. They fought stubbornly. Even when most of the Syrian division was destroyed, it did not give up without a fight and fought a delaying action until it permitted the introduction of Syrian reserves in order to stabilize the front. I have never advocated underrating the enemy, especially not the Syrian soldier. We are dealing with fighters who put up their fists and who are ready to absorb losses. For example, even a company which had only three tanks left, the rest were destroyed by us, continued to fight. Their capability improved. Not only their armored personnel but also their commandos displayed commendable endurance. I believe that we have to prepare ourselves for the future, to prepare the proper responses which will permit us to cope with such an enemy.

[Question] Is this also your opinion of the PLO fighter whom the armored corps also encountered?

[Answer] Well, the PLO were shown in this war to be better trained, better equipped, and better protected against the attack of tank forces and the air force. We found that they are also strong in ideological terms, and some of them are ready to sacrifice themselves.

Armor Battle in a Built-up Area

[Question] Did this result in the first combat action by the armored corps in built-up areas?

[Answer] Not the first. We gained experience in the Six-Day War in Shekhem, Janin, and Qabatiyah, and a negative experience in the Yom Kippur War in the city of Suez. I always believed that the armored corps and the IDF had to be prepared for such a war in spite of the tendency to think that it could be avoided by circumventing towns or being satisfied with encirclement and siege, subduing from the outside with fire as was successfully done in Beirut. I

really believe that what is said in the Bible on this that one must avoid entering and fighting within a city but rather should subdue it from without is essentially correct. One should hope for this not only for humanitarian reasons but also because it makes military sense in order to avoid heavy casualties in personnel and equipment. However, in preparation for a possible war such as Peace for Galilee we had to prepare for armor fighting in a constructed area in which the enemy was dug in. There were objective hardships which made these exercises difficult. For example, the absence of built-up areas in which the training could take place. Nevertheless, the lessons from the previous wars were applied. The armored corps prepared itself for combat in a built-up area using two methods. It has been proven that you can destroy the enemy's poise if you operate in an unconventional manner. We employed two methods in combat in the constructed areas. First, breaking through rapidly and taking control of the objective while destroying the enemy en route. In cases where the tank was unable to break through, it was satisfied with providing support. We learned the lessons of the defeat in Suez. We took maximum advantage of inter-branch cooperation, what is called "battle teams," when all the forces supporting the armor move at the speed of the tank and each one contributes its share. We also have to draw conclusions from this war and to plan for the contingency that if we have to fight again in a constructed area, we will be faced with regular armies and in the constructed area there will be many tanks. Therefore, the importance of the attacking tank in such an area will also be inestimably great.

As Always and a Little More

[Question] You spoke about the Syrian fighter and the PLO fighter. Was the Israeli tanker different in this war than in previous wars?

[Answer] No. In terms of courage, readiness to go into battle and to participate in combat, and ability to improvise, the fighter in Peace for Galilee is identical to the fighters of Yom Kippur and the Six-Day War. However, in this war more was required of him. He had to operate a modern and much more complex tank and to fight against the enemy firepower which was immeasurably more intense than that which he used against us in the past. In this war we saw more cases in which the leading commanders fought stubbornly and persistently, many more than in the past, in which they would exchange a damaged tank for another tank and a second tank for a third tank. And what is more exciting is that more than in the past we saw wounded leaving hospitals in order to return to their units. I am not speaking about one or two cases. Such a phenomenon was evident in virtually all of the units. They felt an obligation to do their part. This feeling was also evident among the soldiers who were assigned to defend the Golan Heights. We had a difficult information problem there. They asked why they were not taking part in the war. One soldier said to me: "What's going on, commander, the war will be over and we will have done nothing?" And you ask yourself why he acts this way. Apparently, his natural inclination must cause him to be happy over the fact that he is not in combat, that he will return home safely.

You asked about disagreement over the objectives of the war, about debates. Well, the soldiers were not isolated. They read the newspapers and listened to

the radio. They heard comments against the war from influential people, even former commanders. Nevertheless, from conversations with them I learned that basically most of them believe that this was a justified defensive war. They understood that ultimately the army must protect the people. This is its mission. It cannot sit in its camps and permit rampant killing. In virtually every unit there are armored personnel who are residents of the Galilee panhandle and western Galilee. When one of them stood up and explained the way of life that was imposed on the residents of the Galilee, about the abandonment of settlements, about the fact that the terrorists were able to paralyze with one attack the entire area from Nahariyyah to Metulla, as they indeed did, the soldiers, who are intelligent persons, understood that it was impossible to continue this way. They were convinced that this is a justified war.

[Question] In an interview 17 years ago, you said that the will that drives you to go out into combat stems from your need for security and you added that this need is not abstract but concrete and personal. You think about the security of your family and know what would happen to your wife and children if you failed and the enemy was victorious. You said that you are aware of the absence of humanity among the enemy. In this war they accused us of inhumanity....

[Answer] Well, despite the claims that have been made in this connection, I am certain that the picture which showed an Israeli soldier giving a drink of water to a Syrian prisoner is that which characterizes the Israeli. Humanitarianism is deeply ingrained in Jewish education. The Israeli fighter is not cruel to his enemy. I can state unequivocally that our fighters and the IDF in general treated prisoners far above and beyond that required by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. In my conversations with Syrian and terrorist prisoners I found that they were aware of the humanitarianism of the Israelis. They told me that they knew that they would be treated decently if they were taken prisoner. And this is the way we have to continue to conduct ourselves. We must not train for war out of hatred. Eventually, peace will come, and therefore, our war must be conducted in such a way that will permit the building of a bridge to such a peace.

There Is Hope for Quiet in the Syrian Sector, But....

The terrorists are leaving Beirut, but it seems the war is not over. They are continuing to attack the IDF from the area in the sector under Syrian control.

There is indeed a problem regarding the regrouping of the terrorists in the Biqa'. This is the basis for the concept which seeks to create a different reality in Lebanon in order to prevent by political means the terrorists from continuing their activities. It is definitely possible to create in Lebanon a situation similar to that which prevails in the Golan Heights by compelling the Syrians to restrain the terrorists. I do not think that the Syrians are interested in another confrontation with us. Their air defense has been destroyed, and they have no response to our ability to continue to destroy it. The Israeli armor has proven its superiority. The possibility of Arab military support does not seem likely. The Iraqis are involved with Iran, the Jordanian army is in the process of reorganization, and the Egyptians are isolated and

tied to the Camp David agreement. There is reason to hope that the northern sector will be quiet, but we need patience and endurance and also understanding that such a process is not concluded in 1 or 2 weeks.

However, if the terrorists continue to attack our forces, in my opinion, we should not continue with the methods of the past but rather go out toward a general confrontation. Any war of attrition will hurt us, and in any case we can ultimately expect an explosion. This is not an adventurous and dangerous response. On the contrary, this approach is more balanced and conservative.

[Question] To the public the Merkava tank has become the "star" of the war. Did the other tanks also contribute what was expected of them?

[Answer] Well, the Merkava tank was very encouraging to us in terms of its capability and characteristics. However, when all is said and done, it represented only a minority among the tanks. The main successes were made possible thanks to our main battle tanks, the Patton and the Centurion. The Merkava tank excelled primarily because of its gun. You must bear in mind that while in the previous wars and at the present time our gun is unquestionably superior in comparison to the guns of the enemy tanks, this situation is now beginning to change. The Syrians are being equipped with outstanding guns in their tanks (T-72). The Jordanians have a modernistic gun, and the Egyptians are being equipped with the Patton 6G tank which has an outstanding contro system. The Arab armies are beginning to match and pass us. However, we must maintain our superiority at any cost. And indeed, the Merkava has the specifications to surpass the systems in the other armies. And of course, it has additional advantages. It can be used for transporting troops. It has proven itself in the extrication of wounded, and primarily in its survivability and its ability to enable the crew to survive when hit. I have always supported the idea of building the Merkava.

Every Tank Commander an Officer

However, we must pay attention not only to the improvement of the quality of our equipment but also to the improvement of the skill level of those who operate it. We have entered a period in which we are getting out of the race for increasing the quantities of our weapons systems. The minister of defense stated some time ago that from now on we must concentrate on quality. The Arabs are not doing this, they continue to equip themselves. Therefore, one of our responses must be the improvement of the quality of the tankers. Although we have outstanding tank commanders, they are not receiving all of the training which can be poured into them. We must create a component of command quality with which the Arab armor will be unable to cope even if it is equipped with the best tank. I am referring to the fact that every tank commander must be an officer. Therefore, the armored corps must be allocated the best of the IDF human resources. You will say that the other branches feel the same way, but more than the others, the tank and the tanker are the ones who are facing the most awesome firepower. He is the dominant factor in war. Today the tank commander is entrusted not only with a tank which costs \$1.5-2 million but also with very costly and complex systems which have been added to it. They make the tank a complex weapon which requires great skill. Moreover, in the armored corps, the officers are the first ones hit, and they are primarily the spearhead.

A unit in which all its commanders are officers can fill the vacancies created because of this, and therefore, it will always be able to maintain its momentum. Today a company which has lost two or three of its officers is in an extremely difficult condition. Increasing the skill level of the tank commanders will permit maximum use of the tank in developing movement fire. No Arab armor will be able to cope with such quality.

5830

CSO: 4423/224

GUSH EMUNIM VOICES VIEWS ON YEHIYA'S JOINING COALITION

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew No 46, 6 Aug 82 pp 2-3

[Text] We do not err in determining that the majority of residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, whether they belong to the Yehiya movement or not, affirmed that party's joining the coalition. It can even be said that those same forces which pushed the party (whose leaders in the past swore that they would never forgive Menahem Begin for the sin of withdrawing from the Sinai) into the coalition, were those forces which gave it support and coverage among that same community -- the settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza -- which constitute for it a moral barometer.

In the last elections for the Knesset, 95 percent of the votes of residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza were distributed among three parties -- Likud, Yehiya, and the NRP -- with each getting approximately one third. In the months which followed the elections, there was a coming together between Yehiya and the residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, especially following the joint struggle to save the Sinai. Now, with the decision of Yehiya to join the coalition, it seems that it is assured of the support of the majority of the community in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It is still important to note that this support is conditional, and must pass the test of deeds.

To the best of our judgement, the negotiations leading to Yehiya's joining the coalition were conducted along basic lines which were primarily of principle. In our opinion, the extent to which basic details were discussed regarding essential matters, especially settlement, was insufficient. Moreover, at meetings between representatives of the secretariat of the council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza and the negotiating committee of Yehiya, we saw that the most central members of the party did not have good control of the material, and they were ready to accept promises from the government which had already been made to us, the representatives of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, in the past, but which have not been kept and it is doubtful if they will be kept.

It is true that from the moment that the people of Yehiya were presented with material on Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (the council had assembled a lot of material on the legal test of the settlements; settlement matters, water, land, archaeological sites, national parks, roads, etc), they tried through their contacts with persons in the coalition, to reach real achievements. But our impression is that in the most important areas the agreement between the party and the coalition did not get into particulars sufficiently -- the setting of a schedule, the fixing of areas of responsibility, and the allocation of resources.

we attribute this to two primary reasons. The first and most basic reason which brought Tehiya into the coalition was the war in Lebanon. This approach, for which MK Geulah Kohen argued so forcefully, holds that the principal mission for now is to preserve the achievements of the peace in Galilee war. These achievements are subject to reduction because of external pressure, but also because of domestic defeatist activity. Therefore, the role of Tehiya is to support the government in order to enable it to extract the maximum territorial, political, and security benefit from the operation. The proponents of this approach do not scorn the importance of the achievements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, but as Geulah Kohen said, she would have joined the coalition even with no promises in that sphere.

Representatives of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza who met with the Tehiya people did not feel this way. According to our best judgment, this government has made commitments which it has signed -- particularly with foreign elements, but also with coalition partners here. The example -- whatever our opinion might be -- is the Aguda.

The agreement which was ultimately signed includes many and important sections in the area of settlement, as in other areas, but because of the aforementioned approach and the shortness of time (Tehiya representatives explained to us that they would join the coalition before the Knesset went on recess, even if they could not get into details, because during the recess a minister cannot enter the cabinet even if the Knesset is called for a special session) in which to do more basic "homework", essential matters which were not discussed in the agreement and many other matters for which no schedule was made or an appropriate budget set remained open.

It should be stated explicitly, that with all understanding for the claims of the prime minister, the finance minister, the housing minister (with whom we met during the course of negotiations) and others that the war changed the order of priorities, we cannot agree that massive construction of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is not a primary priority. On the contrary, the government hopes that by having broken the power of the PLO it will be possible to conduct discussions regarding the application of autonomy for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. If it is honest in its declarations that it will close off the option which will enable autonomy to be turned into an independent entity, then the only way to fulfill that commitment is immediate expansion of public construction in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the absorption of the thousands of families who are knocking on the gates of our settlements.

Unfortunately, most construction has ceased. We have said, and repeat that the Ministry of Construction and Housing, headed by a man of Likud, has in recent years realized the program of the Alignment. Instead of building Elon-Moreh, Shiloh, Hebron, and Kiryat Arba in depth, most resources have been allocated to Ma'ale-Adumim, Giv'at-Ze'ev, and the like on the western slopes of Samaria, along the Green Line, settlements of the suburbs of Jerusalem, the program for which had already been designed by the late Minister Avraham Ofer. Even in the aforementioned places there has been a complete freeze. The construction minister promised, perhaps under pressure of negotiations for the coalition, to ease up on the freeze and start "immediately" on building Hebron and other places. Experience has taught that one can be doubtful about such promises. In any event, the future will prove it.

We are hoping that the optimism of the Tehiya people will prove itself. Moreover, as a group of people who have come to contribute and not to receive, we do not reject out of hand the altruistic approach of MK Geulah Kohen, and of those who adopt her approach. Our problem is political; closing the options for autonomy a la Camp David, an approach which the Tehiya shares with us without reservation.

We, the residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, of all opinions and beliefs, greet with best wishes the joining of Tehiya with the coalition. But it is natural that since we are directly affected, we will follow very closely the actions and deeds of the party on its new road. We hope that with the aid of Tehiya, the government will be wise enough to carry out its plan for peace in the Galilee, for the most important geo-strategic changes in the Middle East, and for the strengthening of Israel in the region.

7075

CSO: 4423

SETTLERS COUNCIL GIVES POSITION ON AUTONOMY

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew No 45, 16 Jul 82 pp 4-6

[Text] The struggle to halt the withdrawal from Sinai began with the publication of the pamphlet "To Halt the Withdrawal from Sinai". We failed, because we began to resist too late.

Now, if we sit with folded hands, we may be too late in the fateful struggle for the patrimony of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.

On 1 July 82, Kol Yisrael broadcast the following statement from Minister Burg: "The results of the war will advance autonomy. The minister will initiate contacts with moderate leaders in the territories, since it has now been proven that the way of the PLO is a tragedy. It is a "very strong lesson" for the Arabs of the territories, because autonomy is one of the best and most important things, and the only way to maintain their interests."

The minister closed with these words: "The psychological result of 'peace in the Galilee' will not be slow in coming..." On 2 July 1982, YEDI'OT AHARONOT published the following statement by Minister David Levi:

"It is possible that negotiations on autonomy will now become more intensive, and perhaps there will be a joint American-European effort with some Arab countries to create a dynamic in the political sphere. When this happens, perhaps we will witness greater understanding between the government and the opposition, and perhaps even more..."

Apparently Minister David Levi is hoping for external pressure on affairs of the land of Israel (His word is 'dynamic'), and we do not have to guess about what he thinks understanding will be created between the government and the opposition; about autonomy, as the Alignment understands it.

perhaps all of this explains why, in this years program of the Housing Ministry Kiryat Arba, Ma'ale Adumim, and Giv'on were eliminated, and work is being concentrated in north Jerusalem.... perhaps this also explains why the housing minister is pursuing Ezer Weitzman to bring him back to a central position in the Likud.

perhaps this 'dynamic' for which Mr Levi long bears a message for us; it is not impossible that Kissinger will return to the arena, to serve as emissary for autonomy affairs for the new Secretary of State, Schultz.

what must we do? what can we do?

In this connection, the Council for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza composed a "program of action for emergency" of which parts are cited below.

The principal emphasis of the program is on the anarchic legal situation in which the Israeli government continues to hold the Jewish settlers of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

This issue is the key to the future of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Will our community enter an "era" of autonomy when its legal situation is as described below? The catastrophic result will be unavoidable. But if, before discussions are renewed, a strong legal status will be given immediately to the Jewish settlement, then this settlement will at least have a prospect of struggling for its existence, i.e. for the legitimate interests of the Jewish people in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district (of which no mention was made at Camp David).

On the other hand, the continued refusal of the government, in the face of the energetic demand to put an end to the legal anarchy in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, will serve as final proof that the moment of truth has arrived.

The program of Action for Emergency

1) Negotiations on autonomy. We must maintain a close followup -- both before negotiations are renewed and after, and even intervene in the negotiations, either from within or by means of persons and parties close to us, or from without.

The goal: to insure that the final obstacles to realizing "full" autonomy which will "replace" the civilian administration of the military administration will not be removed.

2) The legal position of Israelis -- both individually and as settlements -- in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. In this matter we must fight to realize the demands which we have repeatedly raised for a year.

3) projects. Subjects for an initiative, on a broad front, which will put an end to the current situation in which our settlements and the very idea of a Greater Land of Israel are subject to unceasing attacks which lack legitimacy, and the placing beyond limits everything which is necessary for psychological preparation for "evacuation".

part One: Negotiations on Autonomy

On 14 October 1978, Butros Ghali, in an interview in OCTOBER said: "Israel has lost its claim to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the Camp David agreements."

In principle, he is correct, since according to the text of the framework agreement, everything which will come under the authority of the autonomous administration will never revert to Israeli control. It should be understood that the technique of Camp David is, in all matters, in which Israel now has complete authority there will remain only the power of veto from the moment that those matters are given over to the autonomous administration. A veto power like that of Egypt, like that of Jordan, and no more.

Therefore, the decisive question is -- what is being ceded? On which issues is this step being taken from which there is no return?

On this issue, we find ourselves, already today, on the edge of the abyss.

At the end of October 1980, Minister Burg delivered in Washington to representatives of the U.S. and Egypt, with the knowledge of Menahem Begin, "an Israeli document. Only after heavy pressure was this document submitted for perusal to members of the Committee on Foreign and Security Affairs in Knesset, and it was taken back immediately after they examined it.

This document lists 14 functions which will be transferred to the Palestinian administration.

Only affairs of security, foreign affairs, and basic legislation will be kept out of the hands of the autonomous administration, and in matters of domestic security, it was promised that Israel would "collaborate" with the autonomous council.

In matters of land, the most disastrous concessions were made. Land was divided into three categories:

1. Lands owned by Arabs or in their possession will go to them.
2. The intermittent Jewish settlements will go to us. Land will also be set aside for the IDF.
3. Lands owned by the state. These will not be utilized except with the joint agreement of Israel and the council.

To the question of Mr. Savidor, Begin said that no map had yet been given to the Americans indicating each type of land. There on the spot, Mr. Arens, Ron, Dekel, and Drukman warned that "this could cause the absolute strangulation of Jewish settlements in the land of Israel." The prime minister's answer was: We want peace and good relations with the Arabs. We do not want to deprive them or steal anything from them. We want to live side by side with them. We must reject stealing land.

"An Israeli authority will be set up to manage Jewish lands."

(All of the above is taken from MA'ARIV, 30 October 1980 -- Yehoshua Bitzur.)

The 'hawkish' Mr. A mentioned above saw the 'strangulation of settlements', but they did not see the political-legal significance of taking 90 percent of the lands of Judea and Samaria and Gaza from Israel -- forever, by an international legal action. In general, it is worth listening well to the official formulations, which repeatedly emphasize that 'settlements will continue.' All of this is said in a connection from which it is clear that this (except for foreign affairs, security, and basic legislation) is all that will be left to the Jewish people in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. All of the rest (see details below) will be handed over to the Arabs. We have not learned, and have not taught, that this "remainder" means an end to settlements in the not distant future.

It should be noted that the battle over the map (which fortunately has not been issued) is fateful. For example, how much land will be left in the "joint" category where a freeze will be unpreventable?

no less fateful is the question of legislation; what is "basic legislation" and which "regulations" will the autonomy be permitted to legislate? Linowitz, in an interview with the JERUSALEM POST (30 April 82) says that the joint approach in negotiations was "to utilize all tools so that the independent administration would be given all authority to do everything necessary to execute the duties imposed upon it", and not to enter at all into the formulation of "legislation" (primary or secondary). It should be noted that this approach gives to the Palestinians, in fact, full legislative authority.

A question being discussed closely is whether it will be at all possible to build new Jewish settlements? Or, with the creation of a Palestinian administration, will there be a freeze on Jewish settlements in the areas of "the white border B", which means Jewish pockets frightfully small, surrounded by a Palestinian ocean?

Linowitz indicates in the aforementioned interview that negotiations have already reached the outlines of a possible formulation, according to which "settlements will not be built by the Israelis without the agreement of the Palestinians," and the Palestinians will not build without the agreement of the Israelis. In other words: an end to settlements.

We have no reason to doubt the credibility of Linowitz in what he says.

Additional questions

Will there be an end to the tourism development plan for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, including forestation and the establishment of a foundation for tourism, which has only just begun? According to Burg, this area is placed completely in the hands of the autonomy.

To whom will the land of absentees go? To the autonomy (which will settle them with returning absentees)? It should be noted that many settlements are located -- completely or partially -- on such lands.

Will the autonomy have broadcasting stations and television? And if so, will Israel supervise them?

Have they already been given authority over road communications, public works, roads, surveying and mapping, telecommunications, aviation, planning and construction, conservation, and electricity? All of these, at a regional level? What about airports? Who will oversee the materials in instruction books? Propaganda in schools? Will the autonomous authorities be permitted to end all imports from Israel and to import exclusively from enemy countries? Will they print stamps, and coin money? Will all of the Jewish archaeological sites (of which there are thousands) be excluded from the area of autonomy? Will there be supervision of state commerce of the autonomy? Will Israeli companies be considered "foreign" corporations in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (as is the case today)? What about recording of patents? Will natural resources (stone, oil drilling, Dead Sea resources, the whole question of the Dead Sea coast in light of the canal plan) be given over to them? Will nature preserves and national parks be in Arab hands? Who will control ports and trains (if there are any)? Who will handle road signs and safety on main roads? What about energy, the regional electrical grid, geology, seismology? Will these be given over to the exclusive administration of the Palestinians? Will Israel retain oversight of banks, insurance, and foreign exchange?

with regard to all of these matters, our duty includes, but is not limited to;

a. To establish a "Camp David information agency" in the Knesset, to keep the MK's informed about all of the details of the categories of autonomy, how each category can become a trap. A government which wants to convince "moderate" Arabs to sit at the negotiating table, which wants to show thanks to the U.S. for its support in Lebanon, could make several "imperceptible concessions" in the field, which could make the autonomy into an independent Palestinian state.

b. To establish a committee which will closely track every step of the autonomy discussions (if they actually occur), so that we will be able to sound the warning in time regarding any deviations.

c. To work within the NRP (which in the next elections will be interested in recapturing those of our community), to prevent significant concessions, this time regarding every specific detail, without being satisfied with "expression of good intentions." Every member of the party must be aware of Minister Burg's personal responsibility in this issue.

d. To work with Tahiya and Telam to get them to condition their cooperation with the government on assurances regarding the matters discussed above, and the like.

e. To provide the public with information regarding the dangers of autonomy (this is the most important task). This will involve explaining all of the practical details which we find alarming.

part Two: The Legal Status of Israeli Individuals and Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza

This is the year in which we are demanding a settlement of this issue, but in vain. The solution may come from one of two directions:

a. Imposing Israeli law on all Israelis in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, by means of Knesset legislation.

b. Imposing the substance of Israeli law on all Israelis, by means of decrees by the military administration. This way is the most "legitimate" in terms of Camp David. Nevertheless, the regime has been incapable of taking any step along these lines.

Either example has the goal of bringing the Jewish settlements and settlers to one standard, and a status of equality, with their Arab neighbors.

If the point of departure in the autonomy discussions will be: Jews -- lacking status as opposed to Arabs -- holding status, then we will have lost the negotiations at the very start.

With the prior expectation of this failure, we have been demanding for a full year:

a. Establishment of a system of Jewish courts in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (the miserable institution set up at Kiryat Arba has jurisdiction limited to municipal offenses).

b. The agreement of all of these courts to hear all civil and criminal matters according to Israeli law, just as Arab courts rule according to Jordanian law.

c. Exemption of Israelis from Jordanian law (in criminal matters, licensing, education, etc.).

d. Organization of the laws of personal status of Jews in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The laws today are anarchic. Also, if a rabbinic court is set up for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, its authority will be limited to matters of marriage and divorce. As for the rest, we have no law and no courts.

e. The establishment of business licensing, automobile licensing, professional licensing (e.g. physicians, accountants, lawyers), and educational system, labor bureau, registration of residents, etc., on a legal basis.

Today, the educational system in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is operating in opposition to Jordanian law and in violation of Israeli law. The registration of vehicles of residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is illegal — according to both Jordanian and Israeli law. The registration of residence on identity documents is against the law, as well as some of the activities of National Insurance, labor laws, work safety, etc.

In Judea, Samaria, and Gaza there is no possibility of recording joint tenancies, each Jew can marry as many wives as he wishes, and there are many other absurdities.

For some reason, this chaotic legal situation does not concern the legal counsel of the government, who is so concerned about every little transgression of the settlers.

f. In the quest for a solution to the problems of real estate, Israel has reached an impasse. Today, every purchase of lands from an Arab can be frustrated easily by an appeal to an Arab court, to which every Arab is automatically entitled. We have demanded, at the least, land registration bureau in Jewish cities in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, where a Jew can receive judgment in a Jewish land court (and vice versa; an Arab can receive judgment in an Arab land court). We have demanded arrangements within Arab registration bureaus which will prevent sabotage, delay and harassment in the recording of Jewish lands when the purchaser is an Arab "straw man".

At the moment, a number of restraining orders have been issued by the Arab court in Shechem, even though the Jewish side was not present, and many deals have been placed in jeopardy. If that is the case today, what will happen if an autonomy is established?

g. We have demanded continuity of Jewish municipal authority, and not merely control over isolated Jewish "islands" in which the lands are state owned, but rather, all planned areas should be included within the sphere of Jewish municipal jurisdiction.

Lack of response to this demand has already resulted in the city of Hebron taking control of all of the surrounding lands of Kiryat Arba, which are not within the sphere of municipal control. It "distributes" building permits, supplies water, and puts up power lines, and there is nothing we can salvage from the situation.

Also, illegal construction and the creation of faits accomplis in the field are occurring without interference because of the lack of authority of regional and local Hebrew councils -- even in their immediate environment.

Recently, another phenomenon has been discovered; the supreme planning council, which is supposed to protect the interests of Jewish planned areas (while we have no municipal control, as described above) in addition to the inefficiency and deficient role, has recently been operating according to the "wishes" of Mustafa Dudin. Razing permits of houses illegally constructed are cancelled in this way. If this is what happens today, what will occur in autonomy?

h. We have demanded that all Jewish archaeological sites be included in our municipal area, and their administration be given to us, and that the professional administration and oversight be taken away from the Arab autonomy.

On the other hand, we have no need or desire for Palestinian Arab and Islamic sites.

i. We have demanded repeal of the decree which determines entry into Judea, Samaria and Gaza according to an "entry permit", which makes Judea, Samaria, and Gaza a "closed region". The result of such a decree, and the extent to which it enables evacuation (i.e. expulsion) of Jews we have already seen in Yaffa. As long as such a decree continues in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the tool for expulsion awaits us around the corner, and worse than this; the status of the Jews in the land of Israel is that of foreigners.

j. We have demanded the evacuation of military camps from settlements which are short of land, such as Gadum, Shavei-Shomron, and Geth-Gil. It would not be difficult for the army to take other land for security purposes, and the civilian settlements are hampered by the "law of glon-moreh" and the decision of the government not to expropriate land for civilian purposes.

k. We have demanded widescale and budgeted construction in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. We have received many promises, but in fact, at least in Judea and Benjamin the situation is catastrophic. The Construction and Housing Minister does not even answer letters.

l. The Israeli government is about to concede the right to purchase the East Jerusalem Electric Company.

The least we should demand in exchange for this concession is the removal of all Jewish settlements, such as Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, from the area controlled by the company.

m. The prime minister has not yet transferred his office to East Jerusalem. Although the matter was first raised as an issue of principle, no consideration has been given to the location of his office. Now, he has promised, and promised again, and retreated, and the office stands empty. There is great significance to this retreat.

n. Regarding disorder in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, we have repeatedly demanded that the wrongdoers be removed. Much blood (Jewish and Arab) could have been saved if they had listened to us (and to similar advice from the security services) we must continue to struggle on this issue.

part Three: Projects

1) "Captivity of Sinai"

The articles of the organization and the content of proclamations were published in NEQUDA. Seven persons from Yamit have already signed up as founders, and there is no reason not to register the organization. The creation should be announced at a press conference (along with other relevant matters).

Purpose of the Organization: to give political content to the efforts of the "perpetuation". Not merely "perpetuation" (which is passive remembering), but Israeli irredentism which will maintain an ongoing Israeli threat to Egypt; if you do not keep the peace, there is someone who claims ownership to the Sinai, and only waits for the opportunity to return, this time forever.

This threat is an important political possession of Israel.

Immediate Activity: to closely monitor the "peace" and publicize any sign of its collapse or violation. The publication will be in the press, in a limited area, but constant, in the following style: "... for this you destroyed Yamit". Opportunities are not lacking; profanation of the Yamit synagogue, the tragedy of Rafiah, the refusal to return stolen vehicles, mines in Beer Sheva (apparently smuggled in from Sinai), Egyptian espionage in Israel on behalf of the PLO, by an intelligence officer who is a member of the team negotiating autonomy, Abdul Majid's speech at the UN comparing Israel to the Nazis, the definition of us by all spokesmen of the Egyptian government as aggressors, the struggle of Egypt against the disarming of the PLO, the attempt of Egypt to create a Palestinian government in exile, etc.

2) "Association to defend consumers of State media"

The frenzy of the television and radio is on an alarming increase. Provocative reports from the territories are broadcast immediately without analysis in a tendentious manner. The "black list" of anyone who disagrees with the Alignment, Shali, and the left is strictly imposed.

There is no possibility of fighting against this phenomenon which is occurring on the airwaves, day and night, except by institutionalizing war. There has already been an initiative in Rehovoth, and more than 10 persons have volunteered to participate in a "network of monitors". Hundreds of monitors could be organized in our community, and they could report every deviation, distortion, etc.

Such material collected could be organized and serve as cause for:

letters to the editors, filing complaints with the managing committee (on which those siding with the land of Israel have a majority, but no material), with the head of the authority (who favors our view), etc, appeals to the High Court in extreme cases, unceasing demonstrations in the field.

3) Legal Counsel to the Government

With the announcement by Prof. Zamir's side, that the legal counsel does not intend to prosecute Prof. Leibovitz, in spite of the fact that he clearly violated the law, the methodical discrimination in favor of the "peace now" people and their kind reached a high point.

We must open a public campaign (first -- an appeal to the Justice Minister, members of Knesset, etc, while giving appropriate publicity, including press conferences) on this issue. Ultimately we will cease to be the perpetually accused, and we will present the truth and the proper proportions.

We will also consider appeals to the High Court (in spite of the fact that the High Court almost never intervenes in the considerations of the legal counsel). But in a situation with no way out -- dozens of appeals, filed repeatedly, will shake the system which presently operates undisturbed -- against us.

For this purpose there will be a need for a careful collection of facts, and the formulation of appropriate complaints -- regarding both the illegal acts of our opponents as well as when our people are under groundless suspicion, especially in security incidents.

4) Using the Legal System Against Our Opposition

Presently, our silence in the face of attacks and witch hunts presents us as professional troublemakers. Let's not take lightly the experience of being equated with a negative image, which is what they did to the people of Yaffa when they turned an organized community proud and fighting into a personal struggle.

We should demand civil and criminal legal action for slander (intervention by the government legal counsel would be unnecessary) for each and every smear publication. For this we should allocate appropriate resources and manpower.

5) Know the Enemy

We should keep a close watch on the Arab press. There still appear in it criminal slander, without response. We should file complaints, and also find out who is the writer, the editor, the person responsible.

We should also study the leaders of the Arabs (the mayors and others) and keep files of all important information. We cannot live as "blind" people.

6) Propaganda to the Arabs

We are like mutes. The government's AL-ANSA does not express our opinions, nor does Arabic Kol Yisrael. We cannot tolerate our being depicted as murderers and troublemakers to the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, i.e. among our neighbors.

For example, a girl was killed in the Al-'Arub camp by a traveler in a civilian jeep who has never been identified. Immediately the rumor spread that "Kiryat Arba people" did it.

The media have reported that Kiryat Araba people killed a youth in Gani-Ma'im. It was not only in the Israeli scene that the incident was depicted as murder. The true facts (self defense in the face of mortal danger) should have been published in Israel, just as should have been done in the streets of Hebron and Gani-Ma'im.

7) Lectures to Soldiers and police

In educational series and at every opportunity for organized propaganda in the army and the police, invitations are extended to people like Leibowitz and their pa'il in inverse proportion to the support which they have in the public. On the other hand, there is a "black list" against persons having nationalist opinions. Instances are known of where police and army officers rebelled against speeches by pa'il.

We must work for a fair and proportionate balance in the invitations to lecturers, in order to prevent anti-motivation and brain washing from the left of soldiers and police. Of course, we are not asking for a unilateral presentation of issues which are the subject of dispute. We only want a fair balance.

8) Research, knowledge, Action

Arab tour guides malign the country to foreign tourists. No one tries to control this. We should send "tourists" to listen and record this talk.

The appeals committees in real estate matters remain a serious bottle neck, in which the process of developing and building settlements is tied up. We must follow these proceedings (denials, delays, lawyers' "exercises", etc) knowing that in the face of administrative deviations, it is permitted to file complaints with the president of the military courts.

Foreign consuls as well as foreign front organizations (the friends) are trying to undermine our position in Jerusalem and Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and they are trying to lay the foundation for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Most of these activities are illegal and/or breach the sovereignty of Israel. We must keep an eye on these activities and deal with them appropriately.

The Palestinian Information Office is operating in East Jerusalem under the management of Reimunda Jawil. What do we know about that activity?

Who is "Peace Now"? Who finances it? Who supports it, and with whom does it maintain contacts? The time has come to learn about all of these things.

9) The Role of Minister Burg as Chairman of the Autonomy Committee

We have seen in the past that this man has made dangerous concessions; and that his desire to "save the talks" is greater than his desire to save Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. So he made compromises and concessions in the talks held in Leeds, England. So his murderous expression on behalf of the Israeli concession of the "source of authority" (this alone was enough to establish Palestine).

It would be very desirable for the role of directing the autonomy discussions if they are renewed to pass to someone else who is not a proclaimed dove.

10) The Ministry of Education and Judea, Samaria, and Gaza

Within the framework of "100 years of settlement", the Ministry of Education is maintaining a national program of hikes and tours of settlements. Excluded from the program are settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. A complaint was made to the Minister of Education, and his aide sought to have it cut from the newspaper where it was published (MA'ARIV), and there was no further response.

even hikes by students in general, and not within the above mentioned framework, are not conducted by Minister Hammer in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, on the grounds of "security".

Beyond all of this, we should seek to prepare an organized program according to which every Israeli child will come to Hebron, Jericho, Beth-el, and Ai, and Shechem -- and learn that this is our patrimony. Today, the minister from the NRP is doing exactly the opposite, and is placing an iron curtain between the children of Israel and the land of Israel.

We should exert unceasing pressure, including within the NRP, as well as demonstrations and activities in the street in order to put an end to this excommunication.

11) The Housing Ministry

Complaints are multiplying, that in spite of his high sounding words of the Housing Minister, in fact the situation is quite different, at least in Judea.

In Kiryat Arba (where he was proclaimed an honorary citizen) his ministry went back on most of its promises, including the promise to develop Mt. Mamash and to rebuild the Jewish quarter. Caravans had to be brought in in order to increase the number of residents. Only three families were exposed to mortal danger.

It is also known that the Housing Ministry has stopped expansion of construction at Ma'ale Adumim, and has almost completely stopped construction at Gibeon. This year, almost the whole program of the Housing Ministry is limited to north Jerusalem.

The key to success in operations is decentralization. Every project should be placed under the supervision of a single person (a volunteer). He will receive from the coordinator background material, directions, a budget, and clerical assistance. In Sinai, we "discovered" a great number of strengths which had not yet found expression, especially because we did not know how to find channels of activity for them, or expression and leadership, and we did not distribute tasks.

part four: Internal Organization

1) The urgent lesson contained in all of the foregoing must be brought immediately to our public in all the settlements, a community involved in building its homes and broadening its base, nursing the wounds of Yom Kippur, and not alert to a danger absolutely identical, which already lurks at the door of the new house.

2) We must work to expand the primary forum -- the councils, and for the inclusion of the councils of Ma'ale Ephraim, Garnei Shimon, the Jordan Valley, and Elqana.

We must convene the council in order to enlist its members in the stated missions. We must visit all of the new settlements which have not yet elected representatives to the council.

3) We must strengthen and perfect the journal NEQUDA as a tool for crystallizing the camp and directing it in the struggle.

FUTURE OF WAR AGAINST PLO ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 82 p 10

[Article by Dr Efrayim Ahirom: "The War Against the PLO: A Look Ahead"]

[Text] The writer of this article is the head of the Economics Branch in the Center for Technological Predictions of Tel Aviv University and was formerly the head of the Economics Branch in the Headquarters of Judea and Samaria.

With the departure of the PLO from Beirut, it is still not possible to evaluate the action against them, but there is room for interim conclusions which can serve to guide our future policy.

There is no doubt that the objective of destroying the material infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon has been achieved. However, the main infrastructure for its activity, manpower, has been virtually unaffected. Especially unaffected has been the PLO's potential for future mobilization -- the masses of refugees in Lebanon and other places. Their command-leadership level has been virtually unaffected. The ones who have been killed, wounded, and taken prisoner have been soldiers from the ranks. The release of most of the thousands of prisoners in our hands is surely only a question of time. Thousands of terrorists remain in the meantime in Al Bqa' and northern Lebanon. However, the essential point is that the enormous reservoir for future mobilization still exists. Moreover, it must be estimated that the motivation of the masses of the Palestinian refugees to take revenge on Israel and to take real action against it has only increased. For the most part, this reservoir of potential conscriptees is composed today of persons who have been born or at least grew up outside the borders of Eretz Yisra'el [text omitted] alongside them. The trauma of 1948 is history, and their places of origin or the origin of their family such as Haifa, 'Akko, Jaffa, are only names. Now in the wake of the recent war they have lived this trauma, and the horror stories of the Zionist enemy which they were taught have become a reality for them. The bitterness, frustration, anger, and hostility which one would have expected to diminish from generation to generation have now been reinforced in the eyes of the new generation, and it must be estimated that they have been intensified.

This is to say that the primary infrastructure of the terrorists, an embittered, frustrated, and hostile manpower reserve, has not been destroyed, and its potential for activation has even increased.

The second objective of the war against the PLO was to take away its territorial base and in this way to make it impossible for it to attack us.

And indeed large masses of terrorists have been driven out of substantial areas of Lebanon and from the vicinity of the border with Israel. However, thousands of terrorists, as has been stated, still remain under Syrian protection in Al Biqa', in northern Lebanon, and dispersed in areas of southern Lebanon and Beirut where they are concealed in the area or among the population which sympathizes with or fears them. The Syrian army and some of the local population as well as the topography of Lebanon and its landscape which provide an ideal cover, in contrast to the areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, permit the not so small remnants of the PLO to organize into groups in order to wage guerrilla warfare.

While Israel in recent years has for the most part succeeded in preventing them from reaching their targets, we ourselves have now brought the targets, the IDF soldiers, to them. And so, virtually every day we hear about another mine incident or attack, about wounded and killed among our soldiers. These incidents are already not a part of the war in Lebanon; this is the beginning of a typical guerrilla war. As long as the IDF will remain in Lebanon, the prospects are that this type of war will continue. If or when the IDF withdraws, the question will arise as to which element will be able to prevent this activity from penetrating the territory of Israel. Will we carry out retaliatory actions against a friendly but weak Lebanese army or against international forces, the motivation of which to prevent such penetrations will necessarily be rather flimsy?

This means that we have apparently succeeded in eliminating a massive territorial base, but there is great doubt if we have destroyed the troublesome capability for attack from this base, and in contrast, we have limited our deterrent capability against these attacks. The prospects of our taking losses after the conclusion of the war in Lebanon are likely to be greater than before the war.

At the same time, we are finding out that the war has intensified the motivation for attacks abroad. After the scenes of our action in Lebanon which caused casualties, intentionally or unintentionally, among a large civilian population, the world's moral revulsion against attacks on Israeli civilians or Jews will also decrease.

The interim evaluation, therefore, is that the objective, if it was such, to destroy the PLO by military means has not been achieved.

It is possible that the war and its results will apparently permit political solutions. It is, however, very doubtful if these solutions will be implemented and if they will bring an end to the Palestinians' plotting against Israel and the hoped for peace and security. No autonomy, no territorial arrangement with Jordan, and not even an ephemeral Palestinian state will induce the masses of refugees to be reconciled with their sad situation. Even a state in the current areas of the military government will not provide an answer to the problem of the refugees in Lebanon and other places. It would only strengthen nationalist aspirations of the Arabs of Israel. It is even doubtful if this state would find a way to solve the problem of the refugee camps in its own area. It is also possible that out of a desire to maintain the motivation of the residents of the camps to return to their homes in Israel, the Palestinian state (or the autonomy) would maintain their deplorable condition in the camps. It must be acknowledged that from the viewpoint of the Palestinian national movement, its decision and that of most of the Arab countries to prevent the rehabilitation of the refugees was good thinking. The cruelty and inhumanity in this decision were undoubtedly the primary factor in the building of the Palestinian movement with all its militant manifestations, and it is that which has imposed a 35-year war on Israel (until now).

A Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip will not dampen the aspiration of large circles in the Palestinian national movement to spread out over the entire territory of the mandatory Eretz Yisra'el. Therefore, whoever believes that a positive response to the establishment of a Palestinian state will essentially solve the problem of the Palestinians' war against Israel as long as the current sad situation of the Palestinian diaspora remains intact is only deluding himself. A political solution can bring an end to the Palestinian movement's militancy against Israel only if it is based on the rehabilitation of the refugees or comes about simultaneously. Only the rehabilitation of the refugees will be able to guarantee that there will be a gradual decrease in the reservoir of Palestinians who are prepared to fight actively against Israel because they have nothing to lose.

We must be committed to the rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees also for our own sake because in the current war in Lebanon a significant part of our people has undergone a trauma -- a different trauma than that which we knew in the Yom Kippur War, a trauma of an identity crisis. The people have suddenly recognized that 35 years of war have brought a humane national movement to acts of cruelty which we did not imagine that we would carry out. Throughout our history we have known the horror of the cruelty of other nations whereas now we ourselves have become cruel and deaf to the suffering of others. It is true that such things were done also by the Russians to Budapest and its residents in 1956 and by the Iraqis to the cities of Iran and their residents. However is there anyone among us who is proud that we have likened

ourselves to this group? Israel now has the possibility of initiating the rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees who are in the camps, two-thirds of which are located in Lebanon, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Rehabilitation implies suitable housing, a decent livelihood, community infrastructure and services, and the prospect of social integration in the surrounding environment. The rehabilitation of these refugees will actually solve the major portion of the refugee problem. It is important for it to be the government of Israel which proposes and urges on international platforms, and especially within the framework of the autonomy negotiations, that priority consideration be given to the solution of the refugee problem -- not as a substitute for the political process but as an antecedent and for the purpose of assuring the success of this process. The temporary but urgent rehabilitation of the refugees in Lebanon who were casualties in the recent war can only be a first, albeit necessary, step in this process.

If the current government will not be prepared for some reason to take this initiative, the Alignment should adopt the initiative as an alternative policy because in the current political situation it seems that the rehabilitation of the refugees is likely to be the only objective-oriented policy around which a party, national, and international consensus can be crystalized.

It can be assumed that for such an initiative it will be possible to enlist the participation of international dignitaries such as Kissinger, McNamara, Harold Wilson, Mendes-France, and many others who will on their part be able to mobilize international institutions such as the World Bank, affluent people, and governments for the implementation of the initiative.

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MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST SYRIANS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 82 p 9

[Article by Matti Golan: "The Syrian Dilemma"]

[Text] On several occasions in recent weeks the minister of defense has repeated his formula for the solution of the problem of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. His basic position is that we must strive for the departure of the Syrians through diplomatic contacts. But what happens if these fail? Sharon says: I am opposed to the use of military force to compel them to leave Lebanon, but I will recommend that as long as the Syrians remain the Israeli presence in Lebanon should also continue.

There can be no dispute over the desire to solve this problem, like every other problem, by means which will not require the use of force. If diplomatic negotiations can bring about the return of the Syrian forces to their country, then this route is undoubtedly preferable to any alternative process.

The difficult problem is how should Israel act if and when it becomes evident that the political route is leading to a cul-de-sac. I believe that in his striving to find a solution to this problem, the minister of defense's inclinations have become confused.

Late Ignition

It would have been more logical had Sharon's reluctance to use military force, and primarily the extent of its use, been reflected in connection with the PLO more than with the current Syrian situation. I say this even though in both cases we are dealing with extremist and stubborn enemies who are unworthy of any consideration.

The reason for the difference between the two involves objective circumstantial conditions, in other words the location of the PLO in Lebanese cities and among the civilian population. This fact converted the war against terror to a bloody one involving thousands of innocent civilians. This reality caused a situation in which even after the objective of the departure of the terrorists from Lebanon was achieved, the victory was accompanied by moral regrets.

To these regrets was added the uncertainty if the end was worth the cost. First and foremost, of course, was the cost of our casualties. However, there was also the cost of the severe damage to the image of the state. Even though this is not a damage which can be quantified, there is no doubt that it exists and a time for retribution will come.

Of course, it was not possible to emerge without paying a price. Every end has a certain price. However, there is a burdensome feeling that it would have been possible to achieve the objective at a lower cost had Sharon agonized a little more before he gave the orders to bomb and shell Beirut.

This agonizing led Sharon to a late ignition, and in my opinion, a superfluous and damaging one. This is because all the arguments and reasons which justify such an agonizing in the case of the PLO do not exist in regard to the Syrian forces in Lebanon. The main reason is that these forces are located outside of civilian population centers. The bombing and shelling of them does not involve the destruction of property and the killing of civilians.

As such, it is possible to minimize casualties among our forces from such a confrontation. This is because the location of the Syrian forces outside of population centers removes the military limitations which existed in the case of the PLO. Israel has complete air superiority, and there is no reason to prevent our planes from dropping on the Syrian forces the necessary number of bombs until they agree to return to their country.

The cost will be minimal, perhaps nil, also in political-informational terms. It will be a war between armies. The casualties will not be women and children but soldiers. The Syrians will not be able to claim the image of homeless liberation fighters. World public opinion will not find it difficult to understand that the situation involves soldiers of an occupying army which refuses to leave Lebanon alone. It can be assumed with a reasonable degree of certainty that Washington, and perhaps even the countries of western Europe, will not go to any great length to defend the continuation of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. And if the Soviet Union has remained silent until today, if it does break its silence, it will only be to pay lip service.

To all of these reasons can be added the most important one, one which must serve as the basis for Israel's future actions: the guiding principle must be that the worst process of all is our extended presence in Lebanon.

In this matter the government should work in accordance with the simple customs of daily life. Each one of us likes to invite close friends to his home. However, it is well known that the degree of success of such a visit varies directly with its length. A short stay which does not impose on the guests and the hosts alike leaves a good taste behind. The longer the stay, tensions develop even among the closest of friends, and these lead eventually to arguments.

This fact of life is also appropriate for relations among peoples. Moreover, the Moslem majority in the host country cannot be considered to be sympathetic, to say the least. However, this is also true in regard to the Christian minority. There is no doubt that their joy was sincere when the IDF arrived in order to expel the Syrian and PLO forces. However, there are already signs that our continued presence in their country is causing feelings of discomfort among the Christians. Their sympathy for Israel has never stemmed from a love of Mordekhai but rather from a hatred of Haman. They hoped that Mordekhai would drive out the occupying Haman, but if the result will be that Mordekhai himself will become the occupier, then Mordekhai will only become a Haman.

The Military Option Remains

It is understood that there is another way to shorten the Israeli presence in Lebanon, and that is simply to get up and leave. Those who advocate this maintain that Israel has achieved enough by the expulsion of the terrorists and it need not aspire also to the removal of the Syrians. In any event, it should not tie the eviction of the Syrians to the continuation of the Israeli presence.

From all of these arguments, this one also has lost its relevance. The major departure from the objectives of the war was when the 40-km line was crossed and it was decided to move against Beirut. There was room to discuss the necessity and worthwhileness of such a significant departure.

Military and political actions must be determined not on the basis of the debates of the past but rather on the facts of the present. The objective situation now is that the heavy price in casualties and in political-informational damage has already been paid and that in relation to this price only half of the objective, the expulsion of the PLO, has been achieved. For an additional minimal cost it will be possible to achieve the other half of the objective, the expulsion of the Syrians.

We have here a combination of facts which complement each other. The vital Israeli interest is to leave Lebanon as soon as possible -- there is no justification to permit the Syrians to remain in Lebanon -- therefore the Israeli departure is conditional upon the Syrian departure. Conclusion: In order to shorten the Israeli stay in Lebanon, the Syrian stay must be shortened.

As was stated, the political route is preferable. In the case of the PLO there was reason to give this route an extended credit because of the objective conditions. Israel must set a target date for the departure of the Syrians which, if it is missed, will give the signal for the activation of the military operation in all its power and effectiveness.

PLANS FOR OVERSEAS STUDY PROGRAM DESCRIBED BY EDUCATION OFFICIAL

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 3 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by 'Abd-al-Latif 'Isa al-Qa'ud: "The Director Of the Department For Study Abroad In the Ministry of Education Tells AL-RA'Y: 'There Is a Plan To Send Outstanding Students to Complete Their Higher Education In Fields Of Specialization That Are Underrepresented In Kuwait; the Ministry Will Reexamine the Stipends Of Scholarship Recipients; Students Will Be Sent To Universities In Tunisia and West Germany For the First Time'"]

[Text] Mr 'Abdallah al-Sani', the director of the department for study abroad in the Ministry of Education, said that the ministry had prepared a plan for sending students to study abroad to increase Kuwait's skilled cadres in various fields.

This was announced in a discussion with AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM on the occasion of the end of the 1981-82 school year.

Mr al-Sani' said the following about the plan, which will be under the authority of the ministry in connection with its programs in the sciences and humanities, to send outstanding students abroad to complete their education in various fields of specialization.

One of the most important features of the plan for subsidized overseas study is that it will complement the fields of specialization already available at the University of Kuwait.

This means that the Ministry of Education will use its scholarship program to send students in fields of specialization that are not represented at the University of Kuwait, with the exception of engineering and medicine because the number of graduates the University of Kuwait Medical School can produce will not be sufficient for the future needs of the Ministry of Health. Therefore, in order to supply the nation with various cadres, including doctors, the Ministry of Education has devised a plan to send abroad as many students as possible in the fields of medicine and engineering. This year the announced plan includes human medicine, dentistry, paramedical skills such as denture construction and x-ray technology, as well as the branches of engineering not represented at the Kuwait University School of Engineering such as architecture, electronic engineering, industrial engineering and

and petroleum engineering. Two additional branches of engineering, marine engineering and sanitary engineering, have been added. The overseas study plan also includes sending agriculture students in order to develop livestock and plant resources, and veterinary students. These fields include both male and female students.

There are also fields for those who have obtained the general secondary school liberal arts diploma or the secondary school curricula system diploma, with specialization in industry or business, and for those who have obtained the secondary school diploma from a religious academy. These fields of specialization include most areas of the humanities, such as Islamic religious law, library science, archaeology, museum administration, French language, English language, postal affairs, physical education, technical education and information science. These are the most important articles of the plan.

A Plan For the Future

In response to a question about whether the Ministry of Education was studying a plan to raise the amount of financial aid provided by the ministry to students studying in the United States in view of the hardships suffered by students there because of the higher cost of living in some states than in others, he said: "From time to time the ministry reexamines the stipends of its students abroad in the United States and elsewhere. I believe that with the start of the coming school year there will be a review of the stipends of our students in the United States, France, England, Egypt and other countries."

Outstanding Students Sent Abroad To Study

In response to a question about why the Ministry of Education had decided to send outstanding students to study abroad in the Arab countries of Northwest Africa he said the following: "The ministry wanted very much to diversify the sources of education for its student missions, so it is sending students to Egypt. It is also opening new horizons and providing new universities for Kuwaiti students by sending them to Tunisia. For the first time in two years students were sent to West Germany. This year's plan also includes sending students to Sweden. I believe that diversifying the sources of foreign education for our students will pay off handsomely in the level achieved by the graduates and the level of education they receive in various fields from specific universities which have particularly good departments in those fields. We are anxious to diversify the sources of education for our students who study abroad in Egypt and in other countries.

The Technical Schools

In response to a question about how students of the technical schools would be evaluated for being included in the overseas study program, and whether there was a future plan to send a greater number of them to continue their university studies after they receive their vocational school diploma, he said, "No operation can be called greater or smaller. The basic purpose of the operation is for the ministry to encourage the leading graduates of the vocational schools, those who have received a grade of excellent or very good.

This can be no more than 10 percent of the number of students graduating in any single area of specialization. These are the students whom the ministry is eager to encourage and whom it will send."

An Educational Agreement

In reply to a question about whether there is a specific agreement between the Ministry of Education and the other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to send their employees to be educated abroad, he answered as follows: "The sending of employees of the various ministries, including employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for overseas study must be determined by the personnel office. But if the Ministry of Education is asked to arrange overseas studies for any employee after his ministry has agreed to it I believe that the Ministry of Education through its department of student missions will not hesitate to do so."

Female Kuwaiti Graduates

In response to a question about whether the ministry was preparing to send female Kuwaiti technical school or university graduates or ministerial employees to study abroad he said the following: "The ministry is very eager to place female students. The overseas study plan clearly provided for including female students only in missions sent to Egypt because there is housing for female students that is supervised by the Ministry of Education, and to France, because it also has housing under the supervision of the cultural attache. It is difficult to send female students to the United States. Nevertheless, we have female vocational school students studying in the United States and I believe things are proceeding smoothly and without difficulty so that female vocational school graduates will study in the United States considering that they are almost at the higher education level, that is, pre-university and post-secondary school. A proposal has been submitted and is now being studied. Specifically, arrangements have been made to receive all the female vocational school graduates at the University of Florida. Don't worry that they are in the United States. They will be concentrated in one state, Florida. I think it would be more useful for the ministry to give serious consideration to establishing housing for female students to be supervised by the authorized cultural office. Furthermore, the university situation does not vary in the nation's official sectors. Each year the ministry offers a specific plan for their acceptance by boards of examiners."

In response to a question about the possibility of sending a student to study abroad if he had worked for a number of years in the government sector, in a ministry, for example, without having to submit his resignation, he said the following: "Only students are eligible to be part of a student mission. In accordance with the provisions of the student missions law the applicant must be a full-time student, that is, he must be unemployed. If he is employed he must resign. He can request a study leave from his ministry at his own expense. Otherwise he is ineligible for a scholarship to study abroad."

An Agreement With the University of Florida

In response to a question about married technical school graduates who want to pursue their studies in the United States at a university other than the one to which the Ministry of Education sends its outstanding students, namely, the University of Florida, he answered as follows:

"We have an agreement with the University of Florida on evaluating technical school students and the university will compute the number of credits the student earned. Other states do not treat this matter in the same way."

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CSO: 4404/592

ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OF SOUTH VIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 133, 28 Aug-3 Sep 82, pp 43-44

[Article by Ra'uf Abu Zaki: "Israel is Turning Southern Lebanon into 'a New West Bank'"]

[Text] Any attempt at describing the effects of the continuing Israeli war in Lebanon and the possibility of the military occupation lasting for some time must start with a fundamental fact. Israel by necessity and by the dynamics of expansion and experience with colonization will aim at creating a new fait accompli on the land in all fields, especially the economy. Israel may encounter real difficulties in trying to impose a political fait accompli in view of the array of competitive forces in this area. However, it will work swiftly and quietly to destroy the economic role of Lebanon and carry out an operation of economic control and annexation, especially in the South. The fact is Lebanon did not face in any war or confrontation prior to last 6 June any economic challenge to its existence and role, that is to say, to the extent that it continued to exist as an entity and framework and to the extent that the neighboring Arab economies did not possess a superior element or power of expansion like that possessed by the Israeli economy. It is illusory to think the Israeli entry into Lebanon will be like the others, i.e., it will be no more than a military presence with its natural complications. The serious error into which some have fallen is an error whose consequences will also be serious.

One of the immediate or short-term objectives of Israel is to annex southern Lebanon economically and do away with the economic role that it plays in the Lebanese market so that it will become a kind of new West Bank to function as an agricultural region, source of manpower, and market for Israeli goods.

(1) As an agricultural region--Israel will entrust the South with the task of producing the agricultural products that it needs or will be able to market. This will result in direct intervention and control of agricultural production in the South. Evidence of this intervention can be seen in Israel's asking agricultural officials to furnish tobacco farms with seedlings and other necessities from Israel. This is an approach that can naturally be used in other fields.

(2) As a source of cheap manpower--Israel will make it possible for southerners to work on farms and in factories in its territories. A few days after the invasion started, Israeli broadcasts eagerly appealed to southern farmers,

especially those who could no longer gain their livelihood, to go to Israel where there were numerous opportunities to work for those who desired to do so. These announcements were repeated daily. It goes without saying that the political situation in the South will be favorable to Israel and will motivate a number of southerners to answer the appeals, not out of conviction naturally but because of the straitened circumstances under which they are living, especially after the return of many southerners to their villages and homes. It is a well-known fact that the South has a high population density at a time when the Lebanese economy is unable to absorb the excess farm laborers, especially if the economic suffocation continues due to the occupation. This at a time when the doors of emigration to the Gulf and elsewhere are virtually closed to unskilled workers.

Another Market

(3) As a market for Israeli products--the Israeli invasion of the South has a purpose rarely noticed, i.e., to cut the South off from the Bika', Beirut, and the North and make it into a free zone for Israel. Basically, the South is not an industrial region, it lives primarily on agriculture and government service. Moreover, the goods that it consumes usually come to it from the capital and the big cities where the Lebanese business sector is concentrated. Now, however, the separation of the South from Lebanon will enable Tel Aviv to transform it into a market for its products. If we then add the possibility of a steadily increasing number of agricultural and nonagricultural workers linked to the Israeli economy, the control operation becomes crystal clear. The Israeli authorities have in fact already begun to move their products to the South. They have also begun to give permits to the Lebanese so that they can travel by way of Lod Airport and on EL-AL at "incentive" prices.

This then is the first truth, namely, the goals of the Israeli occupation are not security in the narrow meaning of the word but strategic in the geopolitical sense. Hence the danger to the Lebanese economy.

There is a second truth relating to Lebanon, namely, the Lebanese economy, which endured more than 7 years of exhausting civil and foreign wars, lost much of its blood during these wars and used up most of its strength. It is now facing the modern Israeli state and industrial Israeli society behind weak defenses and has recently begun to break down, especially with the rapid drop in the exchange rate of the lira, erosion of productivity and infrastructure of the economy, disintegration of the state apparatus, inflation, and alarming increase in the public debt, which amounted in 1981 to more than 30 percent of the total national income.

It is difficult at present to come up with quantitative estimates of what the private sectors will receive, but some "regional" developments can be expected in the light of the new facts about the invasion:

--Deepening and worsening of the erosion of the economy and its fragmentation as a result of the cutting of communications and isolation of the areas of Lebanon from each other, shutdown of production, almost total paralysis of private and public investment activity because the individual investor is waiting for a

clarification of the situation and fate of the country and the various regions before he rushes to invest.

--Danger of Israeli economic competition. The possible flooding of Israeli goods into Lebanon may deal a mortal blow to some of the industries that have survived despite the events of the last 7 years. It is true that illicit trade practically killed some Lebanese industries because of poor security and use of illegal ports. However, the expected Israeli excesses will not be illicit trade alone but a "marketing operation in the shadow of the sword" and the possibilities of placing all kinds of real obstacles in front of other competing goods.

Foreign Air

--This will mean that Lebanon will become poor as a country and that the Lebanese will live less and less on what they produce and depend more and more on foreign financing either in the form of army outlays or remittances from workers abroad or aid and money. If we take Lebanese remittances, we will have to reduce to the minimum what is needed to support the workers' families, which will have a direct impact on the balance of payments and on economic activity in the country. If we accept aid, it will be in limited amounts from international sources because Arab aid will naturally not be given to a country under occupation and without a de facto government.

--The banks alone may be able to continue in view of all the experience in adapting that they possess. That was evident in the lack of abnormal withdrawals even in the shadow of the war and the siege and bombing of Beirut, in the continuing calm in the currency market, and in the relative stability of the lira despite the (unfavorable) circumstances. Nevertheless, the banks will soon face the problem of customers and establishments which were seriously hurt and lost their merchandise or business because of the war. This is equivalent to huge sums like enormous debts that cannot be collected, i.e., like losses or debts that must be paid in installments.

The third and final truth that must be noted here is that the Lebanese economy has become tied, more than at any other time, to the political existence of Lebanon as an entity and as a united state and that any move to break Lebanon up into (separate) entities will mean its immediate dissolution as an economy and system of government and its absorption into the neighboring economies.

This truth appears obvious now and almost needs no proof. Such a danger must be the prime incentive for all the Lebanese to cling to their unity as a people, as a country, and as a system of government and realize that the only political essence of Lebanon is the solid superstructure that protects the economy and gives it its internal market and preserves its system of government, which retains foreign confidence despite the years of destruction and deep tragedy. How can Lebanon continue as a market, as a unified model of production and consumption, and as a free system if it submits to partition or to any form of division that undermines the unity of the people and the efficiency of the central government, as is proposed in some plans?

Our colleague Ra'uf Abu Zaki has had long experience with Lebanese and Arab economic affairs. He is editor-in-chief of the periodical AL-IQTISAD WAL-A'MAL. He wrote this article specially for AL-MAJALLAH.

MOROCCAN GENERAL ECONOMIC FEDERATION RELEASES REPORT

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 20 Aug 82 pp 4-5

[Text] The following are extracts from the annual report of the Moroccan General Economic Federation (CGEM) pertaining to the difficulties the enterprises are experiencing.

"Apart from the drop in activity, the enterprises as a whole have had to deal with the widest variety of difficulties in their relations with an administration which continues to niggle, on the one hand, and on the other, with new increases in their costs because of the rise in the cost of production factors such as raw materials, energy, wages and financial costs, as well as the fiscal burden, which it can never be repeated too often, is increasingly discouraging the organized sectors.

And when I say 'business,' I mean production, investment, and on that basis, the creation of jobs and maintaining demand through the offering of decent wages--all those actions which we are continually keeping on an active basis, because we have faith in our calling as developers of economic and social progress.

It is true there are some who like to assign the epithet 'unscrupulous businessmen' to private entrepreneurs. This is an expression whose pejorative connotation will escape no one, and which in addition sustains confusion. I would say quite simply that if our business activities contribute to creating jobs and to raising the standard of living of our fellow citizens, then we accept the epithet.

In this connection, the Moroccan General Economic Federation has never abandoned its mission, which is that of a body devoted to the defense of the interests of its members, but also a full partner which intends to assume its responsibilities in the search for the ways and means making it possible to establish the base for the harmonious development of the country, within the framework of the liberal system which Morocco has made its social choice.

This is why we have never ceased to urge permanent cooperation with the public authorities, cooperation without which any diagnosis made of the national economy can only be partial, and as a result can never lead to the prescription of suitable remedies.

The Actions of the CGEM

"Thus I come to the actions of our confederation as such.

Without nurturing the slightest complacency, I would say that the few pages of this report would be insufficient to indicate fully all that our business owners' body has undertaken, both to resolve the difficulties encountered by the member enterprises and, the more important aspect, to contribute to the effort to develop the national economy.

The internal functioning of our confederation is such that all men of good will are called upon to contribute to the analysis of problems and the search for solutions to them. Parallel with this, all of our members are regularly and constantly kept informed of the most significant of these actions.

We have had to pursue our effort to sensitize the administration about the difficulties of all kinds facing economic operators and needlessly hindering their productive activities.

This sensitizing, it should be emphasized, is not being sought stealthily, but in the broad light of day, within the framework of that dialogue which is open and without reservation, and which we have always wanted with all of the partners.

Thus our monthly assemblies have become veritable tribunes for exchange and fruitful debate. In fact, this makes it possible, on the one hand, for the heads of enterprises to set forth their complaints and grievances directly to the public authorities involved, which are especially invited to attend on these occasions, and on the other, for the latter to explain their programs and their ways and means.

Our discussions are devoted to the most widely varied questions ranging from the need to strengthen the infrastructures, in particular in the maritime transport sector, within the framework of developing exports, to the need to guarantee supplies for the country under normal and healthy conditions, involving making the fiscal pressure on the production tools more flexible, protecting domestic industry and resolving the problems involved in relations with certain bodies such as the CNSS [National Committee for Social Solidarity] and the vocational training bureau.

Seeking greater efficiency, we have this year adopted new working structures for the establishment of groups for specific study within our various federations, parallel to and in coordination with our permanent bodies--the financial and fiscal commission.

It has thus been possible to develop thorough files and to make their contents known to the ministries involved. I will only mention four of them: that pertaining to the revision of the industrial investment code, that analyzing our foreign trade and giving concrete suggestions for effective promotion of our exports, that pertaining to price regulation, and finally, that analyzing the draft labor code in depth.

Moreover, the constructive dialogue between the CGEM and the administration was confirmed early in the year by a meeting with our sponsoring minister, who did us the honor of providing the inspiration for our monthly assembly in January, and at the end of the year, by the hearing the minister of finance gave the bureau, which paid a visit to inform him of the concerns of enterprise heads in connection with the new provisions contained in the draft finance law for the year 1982.

Our serious and objective analyses of the problems, and also our efficiency, have won us the right, I think I can say without false modesty, to be heard, consulted and respected.

This is why the CGEM is now a participant in the colloquy on economic and social development organized on the initiative of his majesty the king.

Our understanding of the problems is such that we were not taken by surprise when the time came to make our contribution to this vast work of analysis and contemplation. In other words, the idea of creating a dozen ad hoc commissions to study the most crucial national economic problems found full justification. The resulting report which the CGEM submitted provides the most objective evidence, for it was to serve and will further serve, I am convinced to support the work of this colloquy.

What needs to be specified in this connection is that through our contribution, it is not our purpose to usurp any authority which is not ours by dictating the economic policy to be pursued to our officials.

All of the suggestions we have formulated come from responsible businessmen who know that in a microeconomy, an enterprise experiencing difficulty must remedy its situation if it is not to abandon all.

However, I should stress that the CGEM cannot move forward and serve its members, in view of the limited financial resources available to it, except through the good will and the militant activity of the federations, commissions and associations which make it up."

An Encouraging Decade

"The mediocre results for the year 1981 should not cause us to lose sight of the achievements in the national economy during the last decade, despite multiple limitations.

Thus a simple backward look will show us that undeniable progress was achieved between 1971 and 1981:

The gross domestic product increased by nearly 60 percent;

The gross national product, which to some extent reflects national income, more than tripled;

Energy production more than doubled;

Mining production increased by nearly 50 percent, with an increase of almost 70 percent in phosphate extraction;

There was a 70 percent increase in added value for national industry, with almost total substitution of imports of manufactured products, and even a contribution to the export effort.

This development might have led to a substantial increase in the standard of living for our citizens had it not been for the population explosion, with a rate of increase estimated at 3.2 percent for the period between 1971 and 1982, such that the population is almost doubling every 20 years.

Thus, if one can take legitimate pride in the achievements made in all sectors in the past 10 years, indeed in a quarter of a century of national sovereignty, this should not cause us to lose sight of the path which remains to be covered along the way to economic and social development. The proudest of us cannot fail to feel some chagrin in comparing our country with some Mediterranean nations classified just yesterday among the developing countries. It is from this kind of comparison that we should draw our determination to build Morocco.

For due to the failure to halt population growth, the Moroccan economic equation can be summarized as follows: by the year 2000 we will need to nourish, clothe, house, care for--in short, provide a decent existence for--nearly 37 million souls. We will need to provide education for more than 20 million children, and to provide jobs for an active population of almost 11 million. To lose sight of this prospect would be proof of blindness in terms of administration. It would also mean ignoring the most elementary law of nature governing the successive relations among generations. Has it not been said that if we are today harvesting what our ancestors sowed for us in the past, we should today be planting what our children will harvest tomorrow?

This is an equation easy to set forth in theory, but not simple to resolve.

It demands in any case the courage to face things squarely: an agricultural sector still incapable of meeting the needs of the population and of retaining the rural workers in the countryside, and an industrial sector functioning at barely 60 percent capacity in the best of cases, and thus providing insufficient work for the successive waves of those seeking jobs appearing on the labor market every year, and for lack of work, forced to join the mass of the unemployed living from hand to mouth and creating the most anguishing problems for the local authorities.

Can it be said that I am exaggerating or revealing unjustified pessimism? Indeed, on a first reading of this report one is tempted to answer in the affirmative. But when one thinks about it, this is not at all the case. I have sought to be objective, if one can be that in speaking of his own country, to the extent that my realism and the responsibilities I have assumed here place me under obligation to reveal our weakness rather than keep silent about them.

What more could be said and written than has been concerning the natural and human resource our country contains, needing only to be exploited?

It is our established conviction at the CGEM that in order to get the economy moving, it is not enough simply to amass all the material and human prerequisites: operational infrastructures, sufficient financing resources and qualified and competent personnel. It is necessary above all to create an atmosphere favorable to development in general, and that of enterprises in particular, by developing confidence in the relations between the public authorities and the economic operators.

This applies to encouraging domestic undertakings, and it is even more applicable with regard to foreign investors. In order to develop, industry needs a consistent and clearly defined policy. Nothing is more discouraging and vexing to promoters than to have to undertake the most tedious procedures in order to invest, and then to realize when all is said and done that nothing has been accomplished, simply because the old texts lack clarity and leave the door open to the most varied interpretations, leading to disputes and maintaining a continuing atmosphere of suspicion.

When will we finally cease to take back with one hand the advantages provided by the other?

Heads of enterprises and their management personnel should not have to spend the majority of their time in endless traipsing between their offices and administrative departments to settle often minor matters. It goes without saying that this waste of time and energy works against the tasks, which are moreover worthier, which enterprise management imposes.

Is there any way to measure the time we have spent on the CGEM level in all sorts of procedures with various ministerial departments in an effort to make those in charge aware of the problems caused by this type of difficulty and the need to adapt the regulatory framework to economic workings.

The position of the CGEM in this regard, as we have outlined it in the report we distributed in connection with the colloquy, can be summarized as follows:

In general terms, it is necessary first of all to define the respective roles of the public, semipublic and private sectors as a function of their duties, their real potential and the resources available to them. The constant expansion of the public sector's field of action can no longer be justified when it vies dangerously with private undertakings. The orientation of public investments in an economy which claims to be liberal should proceed in a complementary direction, and indeed should serve to support the activities of the private sector.

On the fiscal and financial levels, it is necessary to attempt to establish a balance between consumption and savings on the one hand and the self-financing capacity of enterprises and taxes on the other. It is time to become aware of the hindrance to savings and thus to investment created by taxation in Morocco and by the volume of taxation, the complexity of the regulations and the gaps typical of the procedures in the sector, particularly where the procedures available to taxpayers for defending themselves are concerned.

EFFECTS OF FES SUMMIT ASSESSED

Paris AN-NAHAR REPORT & MEMO No 31, 20 Sep 82 p 6

[Text]

King Hassan is hoping that one result of the diplomatic kudos he won by successfully staging the recent Arab summit at Fez will be an increase in aid and soft loans from Arab states. Such assistance doubled last year to \$1 billion, although the official figures do not take into account Saudi Arabia's contributions to Morocco's defence budget in the form of direct payments to foreign suppliers. Morocco signed a loan agreement with the UAE last week, under which it will receive Dirhams 100 million (\$27 million) to help fund the Wadi el-Akhdar dam project in Marrakesh.

Declining export earnings have led to an increase in Morocco's trade deficit in the first quarter of this year to Dirhams 4.4 billion (\$715.7 million), compared with Dirhams 3.8 billion in the same period last year. The value of Moroccan phosphates exports has fallen with average prices dropping to a current level of around \$40 a tonne. The volume of phosphate rock exports has also slipped, partly because of the recession in Western Europe and partly because Third World customers are reducing imports as a result of their own balance of payments difficulties. During the first four months of 1982, phosphate rock export earnings fell by an estimated 6 per cent.

Last year, phosphates exports were worth more in Dirham terms than they were the previous year in spite of lower volumes because world prices rose from just over \$40 to \$48 per tonne. Given present conditions, the outlook is not bright for phosphates, which are Morocco's leading export earner. Nor do official efforts to find new outlets for other exports such as fruit, vegetables, leather and textile goods appear to have checked the growing trade deficit. Another burden on the Kingdom's finances is the large foreign debt, which totalled Dirhams 6.5 billion

last year. However, thanks to rain last winter which broke a two-year drought, Morocco will be spared the need to import large amounts of grain as it has done until this summer.

CSO: 4500/4

MINISTRY OF PLANNING ISSUES REPORT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 20 Sep 82 pp 6-7

[Text]

The years 1970-80 will go down as a period which saw development in Saudi Arabia move forward at an astonishing pace, as the government used its rocketing oil revenues to finance an ambitious programme to turn the Kingdom into a modern industrial state. Planning Minister Hisham Nazer recently submitted a report to King Fahd which charts the progress made during the country's first and second five-year development plans. And while it may be argued that development cannot be gauged solely in statistical terms, the data contained in the Planning Ministry report provides clear evidence of rapid economic growth.

Government revenues, derived largely from the oil sector, multiplied over 42 times, rising from SR 5 billion* in 1970 to SR 211 million in 1980, the report said. During the same period, government spending jumped from SR 6 billion to SR 186 billion. In 1980, government expenditure on projects amounted to SR 89 billion, compared to SR 2 billion in 1970, while SR 32 billion went on salaries and services, as against SR 2 billion at the start of the decade. Per capita income nearly doubled from SR 2,833 to SR 5,550 at constant 1969-70 prices, the report estimated.

Over the decade, crude oil prices climbed from \$1.80 per barrel to \$32 per barrel and Saudi output rose from 3.8 million b/d in 1970 to an average of 9.9 million b/d in 1980. New discoveries raised estimates of proven reserves to 167.5 billion barrels, or about one-quarter of global reserves. By 1980, Saudi Arabia had become the world's leading exporter of crude oil and the second largest producer, with a 16.6 per cent share in world output compared to 7.3 per cent in 1970. Since then, however, production has slipped to as little as 5.5 million b/d, which is below the level commonly regarded as necessary to finance current development plans.

GDP grew at an annual average of 10.7 per cent, from SR 17 billion to SR 49 billion, the report said. Despite a 13.8 per cent average annual growth rate achieved by the non-oil sector, from SR 7.5 billion to SR 22 billion, the hydrocarbons sector increased its preponderance, accounting for 91.6 per cent of GDP, compared to 84.7 per cent in 1970. Gas production rose from 20.6 billion cubic metres in 1970 to 53.5 billion cubic metres in 1980, while the quantity of natural gas utilised went up from 2.3 to 14.6 billion cubic metres. LPG output increased from 17 million to 96 million barrels, and that of gasoline, diesel and naphtha went up from 59 million to 112 million barrels. Production of fuel oil dropped from 127 million to 79 million barrels.

The main thrust of the first two development plans was towards the installation of basic infrastructure and the launching of a large-scale industrialisation programme. This was reflected in the fact that the construction sector grew by 26.8 per cent annually over the period, increasing its share in GDP from 9.4 to 19.5 per cent.

Energy production increased from 418 Megawatts to 7,038 Megawatts, while electric power output rose from 1.8 billion to 17.4 billion kilowatts. Water desalination capacity rose from 5.5 million US gallons per day to 47.2 million. By 1980, there was a total of 20,338 kilometres of asphalted roads, linking all the main towns in the country, compared to 8,031 kilometres at the start of the period. Air, rail and shipping traffic all grew substantially, the report said. Saudi ports handled 27.5 million tonnes in 1980, compared to 1.8 million tonnes in 1970, with Jeddah achieving a growth rate of 50.8 per cent, followed by

* \$1 = SR 3.4409

Dammam's King Abdul Aziz port with 35 per cent. By 1980, 320,000 telephone lines had been installed, together with switchboard capacity for 587,300 lines. The number of factories rose from 360 in 1970 to 2,134, the report noted. The fertiliser industry boosted output from 24,000 tonnes to 330,000 tonnes by the end of the decade. Cement production went up from 367,000 to 3 million tonnes.

The government spent large sums on agriculture, investing in costly irrigation schemes to make cultivation possible in desert areas. The report said that wheat production rose from 130,000 tonnes at the beginning of the decade to 158,000 tonnes by 1980 and citrus output increased from 240,000 to 441,000 tonnes. Chicken production went up from 7,000 to 140,000 tonnes and eggs from 5,000 to 41,000 tonnes.

Domestic capital assets registered an annual growth rate of 23.4 per cent, increasing from SR 2.6 billion to SR 16.6 billion between 1970 and 1980. The transport and equipment sectors increased their share of capital assets from 24 per cent to 45.3 per cent, a trend which the report attributed to the speed of economic development.

Saudi Arabia's exports grew by 38.7 per cent from SR 111 billion to SR 363 billion. At the same time, imports leapt from SR 37 billion to SR 100 billion, a rise of 47.5 per cent. Of these, transport equipment accounted for 38.3 per cent by 1980, compared to 31.1 per cent at the start of the decade, while the share of food imports fell from 31.6 per cent to 14 per cent.

The balance of payments surplus soared to SR 320 billion in 1973 when crude oil prices quadrupled, from a previous SR 82 billion. The surplus disappeared in 1978, but returned in 1980 following another round of oil price rises. The amount of currency in circulation rose from SR 1.5 billion to SR 25 billion. Deposits totalled SR 30.4 billion by 1980, compared to only SR 812 million ten years earlier. During the 1970s, inflation hit a peak of 34.6 per cent in 1975 but this had been brought down to 3.2 per cent by 1980. The report estimated the average inflation rate over the whole period at 16.5 per cent.

Turning to social services, the report said the number of hospitals rose from 47 to 69, clinics and

health centres from 530 to 890 and the number of beds from 7,615 to 11,968. By 1980, there were 3,800 doctors compared to 800 at the beginning of the decade, while the number of nurses had risen from 2,353 to 6,859.

The report describes progress made in the field of education as remarkable, noting that the number of schools and colleges rose from 3,000 to 11,000 — a rate of nearly two new schools every day. The number of enrolled children jumped from 545,000 in 1970 to 1.5 million ten years later, while the number of teachers increased from 23,000 to 78,000. The government plans to spend SR 122.5 billion on educational programmes during the present 1981-85 development plan, representing 16 per cent of total expenditure.

The importance of education was underlined by King Fahd in his first policy speech last July when he said his government wanted to "continue the propagation of knowledge at the rate it has been proceeding and then to raise the level of education so that the improvement in quality matches the growth in educational facilities." The King stressed the role of youth as "our strong right hand today and our planners of tomorrow," but warned that "they must not imitate the lost youth of the West and be carried by corrupt pleasures and lose themselves. They must not succumb to extremism for our religion is a tolerant one which does not accept extremism." According to the Saudi ruler, the next plan will concentrate on the development of Saudi manpower and the improvement of the environment. "Our goal," he continued, "will always be the fair distribution of income among our citizens so that every individual may benefit."

PIPELINE FOR CRUDE OIL EXPORT TO BE BUILT

Khartoum SUNA in English 14 Sep 82 pp 3-5

[Text] Khartoum, Sept. 14 (SUNA)--During his visit to the Energy and Mining Ministry here yesterday, President Nimeri [Nunayri] declared a decision of an immediate establishment of a pipeline from Sudan crude oil production areas to export points on the Red Sea shores.

He declared in a press statement the freezing of Kosti Refinery project at the time being and said that implementation priority would be given to the pipeline. Establishment of refineries inside the country would be considered later on, he added.

The decision was prompted by the recent increase in oil discoveries in the country and because it is easier and quicker to build a pipeline, Nimeri said.

In addition, its being cheaper, facilitates finding the necessary financing, he further said.

In this regard, Chevron expressed readiness to contribute towards seeking a financing loan for the pipeline project, the President said.

The President further announced that prospecting operations in the Unity field had confirmed a daily flow of 2800 barrels from Unity No. 9 well.

He said that a number of other wells were being drilled in the Unity field indicating that those wells production would be better than that of Unity 9.

The President praised the efforts of the Energy and Mining Ministry employees and their achievements in the different fields.

He confirmed that expertise of Sudanese cadres in the energy and mining spheres was tantamount to that of foreign experts.

He said that was an indication of Sudan's ability to realize her objectives.

The President said the change from the Kosti Refinery to the pipeline should not be interpreted as failure but should rather imply that "we want to reach the right decision."

He said that what he saw and heard during his visit to the Ministry was very encouraging and described his visit as fruitful saying that it would not be the last.

The President yesterday spent a whole working day at the Ministry of Energy and Mining where he met senior officials and inspected progress of work in the Ministry.

Energy and Mining Minister Sharif El Tuhami [Al-Tuhami] announced that final consultations regarding petroleum investment in the country took place during the visit and that the President heard an integrated report on the technical, legal, economic and financial aspects of the Sudan's future petroleum and investment policy.

He added that the Sudan Government and the Ministry of Energy and Mining agreed in this regard to give priority to export.

On the other hand, the President met with Directors of the Ministry's affiliate institutions, administrations and corporations and visited the operations room where he was briefed on data collection and filing in the fields of mining, petroleum resources, generated power and water resources, and in this regard he presented some advices and directions, SUNA learned.

Before the end of the visit the President held two closed meetings with the Minister and his aides and after that the Ministry employees presented him a model of a drilling machine operating with solar energy, SUNA learned.

CSO: 4500/2

THREE-YEAR ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN PROPOSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 286, 14 Aug 82 p 44

[Article: "Three-year Investment Program To Save the Sudanese Economy"]

[Text] The Sudanese economy has a new plan to halt its downward spin. It will last for 3 years and will have new priorities for all sectors. It is an ambitious project but is dependent on financing. The Sudan is holding bilateral talks on organizing an economic conference in Paris to explain its plan and spell out its requirements for financing.

The Sudanese economy has lately shown grave indications which warn of further breakdown. But the cabinet has taken up a medium-range plan to accomplish the following:

1. Rebuild the productive capabilities, of the Sudanese economy particularly in agriculture and industry.
2. Increase exports and make wider use of comparable substitutes for imports, to help broaden foreign trade and improve the balance of payments.
3. Broaden the participation of the private sector.
4. Speed up exploration for, and exploitation of, natural resources in the Sudan, particularly oil.
5. Increase the country's GNP and raise personal income.

The plan is a 3-year investment program which will be in effect from 1982 to 1985. It will consist of medium-range plans within the framework of the general economic plan which determines the size of public sector investments in accordance with the country's economic, social and political conditions, with the proviso that the 3-year investment program be reconsidered each year so as to cover the 3-year period. The main feature of this plan is its flexibility because it will allow economic activities and dynamics to be monitored, it will allow timely data and statistics to be obtained on which to base reevaluation of the plan, and it will allow the national economy to be balanced by sector and region.

Before examining the details of the new plan let us turn to the economic circumstances that preceded it. From 1976 to 1982 the rate of economic growth in the Sudan did not exceed 3 percent, and the ratio of government income to GNP fell from 17 percent in 1976-77 to 3 percent in 1981-82. The volume of imports rose along with the size of obligations to repay foreign loans negotiated under harsh conditions and for short terms. This raised the deficit in the balance of payments, which is estimated at 500 million Sudanese pounds a year.

The plan is an attempt to benefit from a thorough analysis of the economic policies that were applied in previous years and which included specific planning for fiscal reform, development and determination of public sector investments. Priorities were set for this plan based on pursuing the implementation of economically useful projects such as rebuilding and renovating the production sectors, particularly agriculture and industry; exploiting idle productive capabilities to increase exports; supporting basic construction projects; and speeding up exploitation of natural resources, particularly oil.

The plan has focused particularly on clearly defining its goals for strengthening each sector individually. These goals apply to the following sectors: agriculture, industry, energy, mining, transportation, communications and services. Some of the most prominent of the plan's goals are the following: completion of the programs to revitalize and renovate the White and Blue Nile projects, New Halfa, al-Jazirah and the al-Rabad agricultural project; refurbishing the sugar and textile projects; increasing electricity production; completing those projects that are still under implementation; widening the transportation and communications network to serve the production sectors; focusing on technical training to provide the production sectors with the skilled workers they need. In addition to concentrating on the various economic sectors the plan is particularly concerned with the country's geographic regions and has allocated about 245 million pounds for their development in the support of nutritional, service and educational projects to be implemented in the various regions.

If the plan proceeds according to its design on paper it is expected to produce a 4 percent annual growth in the GNP during its 3 years. Furthermore, the balance of payments is expected to improve. The concerned authorities are expected to determine the amount of assistance necessary to achieve a steady rate of growth, equilibrium and the ability to pay back the country's financial obligations. The originators of the plan expect that the total value of exports will increase from approximately 600 million Sudanese pounds in 1981-82 to about 972 million pounds in 1984-85. They also expect total expenditures on imports to fall from 1,467,000,000 in 1981-82 to 1,332,000,000 in 1984-85.

This 3-year investment program is expected to become a part of the development plan that was devised for the period from 1977 to 1983 which has faced some obstacles in its application. It will facilitate reevaluation of its investments on a more realistic basis, and with an understanding of local and international economic conditions.

We should now shed some light on the appropriations that the program has allocated for the various sectors before we discuss the methods for financing them. The proposed investments amounted to 1.9 billion Sudanese pounds for which a 15 percent annual rate of inflation was taken into account for prices in the local market and 10 percent for international prices. The program assumes that the local component consists of about 70 percent local resources and 30 percent foreign resources.

Priority in appropriations was given to several sectors as follows:

Agriculture: 526 million pounds; industry: 121 million; water: 76 million; transportation and communications: 547 million; services: 186 million; regional development: 245 million. The appropriations for the agricultural sector do not cover major public works projects such as building dams or digging canals, during the next 3 years, nor do the appropriations for the energy sector cover the oil utilization project or the construction of refineries.

Financing the program requires intensive activity abroad to obtain foreign assistance and loans to cover sums ranging from 500 to 700 million Sudanese pounds a year. The project's architects are to a great extent depending on the acceptance of the project's goals by financiers and investors. To this end the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has initiated contacts with governments and local and regional finance organizations and funds for consultation about the program and assistance in financing it. These contacts will culminate in an economic conference organized by the Sudan in Paris in the final quarter of the year to devise plans to finance this program.

9123
CSO: 4304/481

BETTER INVESTMENTS ALLOCATION EMPHASIZED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 419, 13 Sep 82 pp 46-47

[Article by S.E.: "Sixth Plan--for Greater Effectiveness of Investments"]

[Text] The development pattern adopted allocates for the Sixth Plan a grand investment total of D 8.2 billion, at current prices (as against D 4.539 billion during the Fifth Plan).

In the face of the financing constraints, the search for greater effectiveness of the investments will meet the imperatives of job-creation, acceleration of growth and better regional equilibrium.

A strengthening of directly productive investments as a proportion of total investments--62.3 percent as against 60.3 percent in the course of the Fifth Plan --as well as the increase, within that package, of the proportion of projects with high labor intensity--28 percent as against 21.2 percent during the last development plan--are the characteristics of this new investment structure.

Such a restructuring leads not only to a better return on investment but also to a lowering of the cost of job-creation. Nevertheless, great discipline in coping with the pressures of the infrastructural and social needs and in getting control of the costs, as well as great rigor in the choosing of the big capital-intensive projects, with considerable strengthening of the capacity for identification and fulfillment of highly labor-intensive projects (notably in the priority sectors), are all factors for success in this restructuring. The private sector will take on an important role during the Sixth Plan. Its part in overall investment will be 44 percent (as against 43 percent during the Fifth Plan). Its contribution will be, respectively, 50 percent (as against 40 percent during the Fifth Plan) in the productive projects and 87 percent (as against 83 percent during the Fifth Plan) for the productive projects with high labor intensity. As for the public sector, its share will be reduced from 57 percent (Fifth Plan) to 56 percent for the Sixth Plan, as a result of the limitation of investments under the heading of big capital-intensive projects, generally carried out by the public enterprises.

The allocation of the investments by sector underlines the importance assigned to the priority sectors: agriculture, manufacturing industries and tourism. Indeed, these last-named lend themselves better than do the others to the re-balancings required.

Investment in Agriculture

There will be a considerable increase in the package devoted to agriculture (D 1.55 billion and 18.9 percent of total investments, as against D 584 million and 12.9 percent during the Fifth Plan).

Nearly 40 percent of this total (D 620 million) will be reserved to investments in agricultural infrastructure, notably for completing the Mejerda-Cap Bon canal, the Joumine and Sidi Saad dams, the startup of the work on the Sejnane and Siliana dam, preparation of 300,000 ha in the slope basins dominating the dams of Sidi Saad, Zeroud and Sidi Salem, the planting of 105,000 ha in fruit trees (almonds, pistachios, apples, etc). Quite a big package will be devoted to development of drinking-water points for the scattered rural population. This package goes from D 11 million in the course of the Fifth Plan to D 110 million for the Sixth Plan. The rest--D 820 million and 53 percent of the total--will be for directly productive investments, notably for equipping of irrigated zones and development of stock-raising and fishing.

In this regard, a number of appropriate institutions, the agency for promotion of agricultural investments, the National Bank for Agricultural Development--once they get active, and in addition to the measures of encouragement and support for agricultural investment--constitute an important stimulus for private initiative.

Investment in the Manufacturing Industries

The package for the manufacturing industries will also be strengthened: D 1.6 billion as against D 816 million in the course of the Fifth Plan. The investment in this sector, effectively oriented, will have to respond simultaneously to the concerns of employment and decentralization, improvement of industrial integration and development of exports.

The activities offering more opportunities for small and medium-size projects with high labor intensity and meeting the balance-of-payments concerns will be favored in this package's allocations (for example, mechanical and electrical industries, textiles, the wood industries, plastics, and miscellaneous).

Within the framework of the big capital-intensive projects, one should note the setting-up of capacity for production of 400,000 tons of sugar, 2 million tons of cement, 100,000 tons of white cement, etc. A new tire unit, a new foundry, as well as an automobile-components unit, will also come into being. Investment under the heading of high-labor-intensity projects will represent 60 percent of the package allocated to the manufacturing industries, as against 53 percent during the Fifth Plan.

Investment in the Nonmanufacturing Industries

This sector includes the mines, energy, water, building construction and public works.

For the period of the Sixth Plan, the total for this sector is evaluated at D 1.69 billion as against D 1.022 billion in the preceding plan. The increase

between the two plans (D 668 million) is going primarily to the energy sector, to provide investments for development of hydrocarbons, building a new refinery, programs for building gas-distribution networks, etc.

Secondly, it is going to the mining sector, which has the task of making investments in the phosphate sector by the creation of new extraction centers at Oum Kecheb, Kef Eddour and Sra Ouertane, to raise production to nearly 6.8 million tons by 1986 (as against about 5 million tons in 1981).

Third and last, it is going to the drinking-water sector.

Investment in the Services and Community-Equipment Sector

The package devoted to this sector is evaluated at D 3.36 billion (41 percent of the total), as against D 2.117 billion (46.6 percent of the total) during the Fifth Plan.

This drop is explained essentially by the foreseeable evolution of, on the one hand, the investments in transport by pipeline (D 170 million during the Fifth Plan, D 15 million in the Sixth Plan), and on the other hand, the investments in housing, as a result of the option taken for increasing construction of social housing units. This option permits the construction of the same number of housing units (160,000) but with investments representing 12.2 percent of the total, as against 16.7 percent in the course of the Fifth Plan. The investments in transport and communications, not including pipelines, will be used for infrastructure, in the amount of D 510 million, and for acquisition of the means of transport necessary for the different transport modes, in the amount of D 575 million.

Tourism will undergo an important revival during the Sixth Plan, which reflects the priority assigned to this sector by the development strategy. The package planned for this sector is D 450 million (5.5 percent of total investments), as against D 117 million (2.6 percent of the total) during the Fifth Plan.

Of this total, D 35 million will go for development of tourist infrastructure and D 415 million will be for starting construction of 40,000 beds of accommodations.

Allocation of Investments by Sector

	Fifth Plan		Sixth Plan	
	millions of dinars	%	millions of dinars	%
Agriculture	584	12.9	1,550	18.9
Manufacturing industries	816	18.0	1,600	19.5
Nonmanufacturing industries	1,023	22.5	1,690	20.6
Services	1,700	37.5	2,605	31.8
- including tourism	(117)	(2.6)	(450)	(5.5)
Community equipment	415	9.1	755	9.2
	4,539	100.0	8,200	100.0

Finally, investment in community equipment will total D 755 million, or 9.2 percent of the investments, as for the Fifth Plan. It should be noted that under this heading, investment in education and training, as well as in health, will be strengthened.

On the other hand, investment in drainage facilities will be kept practically (in terms of 1980 prices) at the same investment level as achieved in the course of the Fifth Plan.

11267
CSO: 4519/7

PROSPECTS FOR EMIGRANT WORKERS EXAMINED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 82 p 5

[Text] As part of the seminar on Tunisian workers abroad, Abderraouf Daboussi presented a report on Tunisian emigration and its prospects.

The first part of his report was concerned with the quantitative side of that emigration.

In 1981, Tunisia had an emigrant worker population of about 415,000, or approximately 6.2 percent of its total population and 10 percent of its active population, which totals 160,000 (as published).

That emigrant population has maintained very solid economic and effective ties with family and relatives still in Tunisia. There is one emigrant for every two families in Tunisia.

France heads the list of host countries with 55 percent of the emigrant Tunisian population (228,500), followed by Libya (91,000 or 21 percent), Algeria (27,500 or 6.6 percent), and the FRG (19,600 or 4.7 percent).

Europe alone has taken in two-thirds of Tunisia's total emigrant population.

The Arab countries, which in general are recent host countries for Tunisian workers, are home to less than one-third of our workers abroad. And over one-fourth of those workers are in Libya. The size of that Tunisian colony is destined to grow even more, at least in absolute terms, despite the slowing of migratory movements and efforts by the traditional host countries to induce emigrant workers to go home.

Several factors are militating in favor of that increase:

1. Population growth within our colony abroad.
2. The uniting of families as the most important element in the integration policies of the host countries.
3. Recourse to emigration as a means of solving the employment problem in Tunisia.

The two first-named factors concern the European countries, while the third is peculiar to the Arab countries. As far as the European countries are concerned, and despite the measures adopted since 1973 (deportation of those without papers, strict control over the uniting of families, encouragements to return home, and so on), the Tunisian population abroad is destined to grow as a result of population growth.

Within Tunisia, the Sixth Development Plan calls for the creation of 300,000 jobs, whereas the demand is on the order of 324,000. The surplus is destined to be absorbed through emigration so as to protect the equilibrium between supply and demand and the equilibrium on the Tunisian job market.

Emigration will therefore necessarily continue as one element of the country's employment policy.

Considering the difficulties which have hampered that emigration over the past decade, it has been decided to concentrate on the Arab countries and particularly those on the Persian Gulf. Following visits by numerous Tunisian delegations, several agreements relative to manpower have been signed with Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

Situation of Tunisian Colony

The economic and political crisis being experienced by certain countries has stimulated the Tunisian Government to redouble its efforts to increase protection for the Tunisian colony in Europe and safeguard that colony's rights. For that purpose, there have been numerous negotiations--notably with France, Luxembourg, Austria, the FRG, and Italy--aimed at improving the living conditions of Tunisians abroad.

As far as the Arab countries are concerned, the Tunisian Government has started negotiations with Libya to strengthen the priority enjoyed by Tunisian workers. For example, an agreement was signed for the establishment of an employment office under the control of the Tunisian consulates in Tripoli and Benghazi. It is responsible for gathering job requests from Tunisians. The Tripoli government has also pledged to rehire Tunisian workers who have been laid off.

In the other Arab countries, priority has been given to skilled manpower so as to contribute to the development of those countries. The first experiment with Iraq made it possible to hire about 1,000 Tunisian workers there, and more workers will soon be going to that brother country. The departure of this last group was delayed due to the spread of fighting in the Gulf Region.

The same policy has been pursued in our relations with the other countries on the Gulf.

Prospects for Tunisian Emigration

The prospects do not point to an increase in emigration by Tunisian workers to European countries. For that reason, the government's policy is aimed chiefly

at improving the security of our fellow citizens in Europe and developing social action to benefit their children.

As regards Tunisians living in the Arab countries, the government will devote itself to guaranteeing them their rights and insuring that they benefit from the same rights as those enjoyed by the host country's nationals.

11798

CSO: 4519/296

CENTRAL BANK'S REPORT FOR 1981 REVIEWED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 82 p 5

[Text] The Central Bank of Tunisia [BCT] has just published its annual report for 1981.

Following an introduction by Moncef Belkhoja, governor of the BCT, the report devotes a chapter to international business conditions. The economic situation in foreign countries, trade and the balance of payments, the gold market, the exchange market, and the world market for raw materials are all dealt with in that chapter.

The second part of the report is concerned with the Tunisian economy, which is presented sector by sector.

"During 1981, the last year of the fifth 5-year plan, the GDP at market prices rose in real terms by 6.5 percent, a rate slightly above the average of 6.3 percent recorded for the period of the plan. Expressed in current terms, the GNP rose by 14.6 percent to nearly 4.1 billion dinars, or about 621 dinars per capita, compared to 556 dinars in 1980."

The report adds that with the exception of mines and energy, which declined by 7.5 percent--notably because the production capacity for refined fuel and gas was fully utilized--all economic activities developed favorably.

Agriculture

The recovery that began in agriculture in 1980 following 3 years of stagnation or even decline was strengthened in 1981. The added value for this sector rose by 7.8 percent in real terms thanks to quite good harvests of cereals, olives, and citrus fruit.

Manufacturing and Services

The added value from manufacturing increased, although at a slightly slower rate than in 1980 (12 percent, compared to 13.4 percent in 1980). Decentralization affected only the textile, chemical, and building materials industries.

On the other hand, agricultural and food industries, the engineering and electrical industries, and the wood industry progressed at a clearly faster rate than the year before.

For services as a whole, added value was up considerably: 7.6 percent, compared to 5.6 percent in 1980.

Moreover, the growth experienced by investments in 1981 did not fail to have favorable effects on employment, which also benefited from a series of incentive measures provided under the promotional program aimed at increasing job opportunities, particularly for the benefit of young people.

The report adds that in the area of trade and payments, the increased deficit in current operations as a result of the worsening imbalance in trade was more than offset by net capital inflows in the form of direct investments, portfolio investments, and loans.

The final result was that for the fourth year in a row, the balance of payments showed a substantial surplus: on the order of 45.5 million dinars, compared to 28.6 million in 1980.

11798

CSO: 4519/296

TUNISIA

PHOSPHATE, PETROLEUM CENTER TO BE LOCATED IN SKHIRA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Aug 82 p 4

[Text] Minister of Finance and Plan Mansour Moalla and Minister of National Economy Abdelaziz Lasram announced Thursday, during a visit paid to the Skhira district, that the government plans to establish a major industrial center in Skhira based on the exploitation of phosphate and petroleum.

The two ministers, accompanied by the governor and the secretary general of the Sfax Coordination Committee, visited the site selected and studied the plan for the development of the vast industrial zone which is to be created near the oil port of Skhira. They recommended that a lot of at least 350 hectares be reserved for the industrial units which will subsequently cluster around a phosphoric acid and fertilizers plant which the Phosphoric Acid and Fertilizer Manufacturing Company (SIAPE) plans to build in Skhira during the next 5-year period. Another industrial unit will be built in the course of the Seventh Plan by the SIAPE in the Skhira region to produce fertilizers. The Skhira industrial zone will also include an oil refinery.

The choice of Skhira as the site of the planned new industrial center was made on the basis of the existence of an excellent basic infrastructure, including the oil port, along with the geographic proximity of the oilfields and phosphate deposits in the southern part of Tunisia, the Minister of National Economy said.

In the course of the meeting with local officials, Mansour Moalla noted the interest evidenced by the president of the republic and the state in developing the various sectors of the national economy and interregional balance.

The minister of finance and plan announced in this connection that 26 million dinars will be allocated in the next 4 years for the strengthening of the basic infrastructure and the development of jobs and production in the rural zones of the Sfax governorate. He expressed the hope that one of the country's banks will establish a branch in Skhira so as to contribute to the financing of small craft dimension projects within the district.

Mr. Moalla explained that it was decided to create a large industrial center in Skhira modeled on that in Gabes. He stressed that centers for industrial diffusion are to be developed in Zarzis, Sra-Guertane and other regions of the country as well, providing the best proof of the continuity of the process of industrial decentralization.

He pointed out that the creation and success of the Gabes industrial center provide the best stimulus for the establishment of other industrial centers throughout the entire country.

Solar Energy Program

Adelaziz Lasram, for his part, explained that the future industrial installations in Skhira will operate on a complementary basis with those in Sfax, Gabes and Zarzis, making it possible to exploit, in addition to phosphate, the layers of gas and oil recently discovered near Skhira.

The minister explained that the phosphoric acid and fertilizer plant which will be built in Skhira will pollute neither the atmosphere nor the sea, and that the gypsum refuse will be stored and subsequently reused by other industries.

The governor of Sfax and the secretary general of the Mahres Coordination Committee, as well as Bechar M'heddabi, a member of the Central Committee of the party, voiced the gratitude felt by the citizens of Skhira to the chief of state and the government for their interest in the development of the region.

Messrs Moalla and Lasram then visited a solar home built by the Saharan Pipeline Transportation Company (TRAPSA), which uses solar energy for air conditioning, heating and the hot water supply.

The TRAPSA had earlier begun to utilize solar energy along its gas pipelines through the Sahara, instead of the traditional storage batteries, to supply energy for certain apparatus.

In this connection, the minister of national economy noted that there is a cooperative program involving Tunisia and ELF (Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France)-Aquitaine in the solar energy sector for supplying certain population centers in the Sahara. He also said that the STEG (Tunisian Gas and Electric company) plans to build a complex with 1,000 housing units utilizing solar energy for its employees.

5157
CSO: 4519/269

STUDY REPORTS LIMITED ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 17 Sep 82 p 3

[Text]

ABU DHABI (EN) The role of the UAE women in the development of their country is "very limited" and their contribution in production is almost nil, a study by a university teacher has revealed.

The study conducted by Dr Khalid Al Hamad of the UAE University at Al Ain has criticised the national women's failure to participate in the country's public life to the UAE's "poor female population".

To prove his point, Dr Al Hamad points out in his study that out of about 14,000 female workers in the UAE in 1980 only about 1,240 were nationals. (The total working force in the country was estimated at 432,000 in that year).

This means that only 0.3 per cent of the female working community were nationals. The 1980 figure is less than that of 1975 when national women constituted about 11.2 per cent of female workers.

Female workers in this country are mainly involved in education, clerical jobs and domestic service. Teaching amounts 24.7 per cent of the women workers, office work about 19.8 per cent and domestic service about 21.6 per cent.

According to the study, women constitute only about 10 per cent of the population in the UAE. (110 females for every 100 males). This is very low figure compared to the situation in other Gulf countries. A 1975 study says that for every 100 women there were 112.4 men in Bahrain, 120.5 in Qatar, 152.2 in Saudi Arabia and 103.4 in Oman.

A slow female population in this

country is only one aspect of the problem. Dr Al Hamad points out "national women in the UAE and other Gulf states are differently placed in the social structure of their respective societies which have their own habits, customs and values. These customs and values have jeopardised the movement of women into the new society."

Unlike their counterparts in other Arab countries, women in the Gulf including the UAE have not only failed to contribute to the economic development process, but have also failed to play the role they are expected to play in social development. Within the family, national women have abandoned their role to domestic servants who take care of the house and the children.

Being already thin, overpopulated and suffering from low efficiency, the UAE and the neighbouring states are in desperate need to utilise the untapped national working force including females.

At present the female working force is 0.3 per cent and is not expected to exceed 1.4 per cent even by 1995, says Dr Al Hamad, who believes that the most important step toward the utilisation of the national women should begin at home.

Before women in this country are expected to contribute in public life, they should take care of their families first.

The national women must first learn how to take care of her own home by herself. She must gradually get rid of the domestic servants. Dr Al Hamad concluded.

POSSIBILITY OF NEW STOCK EXCHANGE DISCUSSED

London ARAB BANKING & FINANCE in English No 2, Jul 82 p 26

[Text]

The success of the Kuwaiti stock exchange has prompted other Gulf states to consider setting up their own local markets. The UAE seems the most likely venue for the Gulf's second official stock market, but although local investors are eager to start putting the government is proceeding with more caution.

Two International Finance Corporation staff are currently helping on a preliminary study for submission to the UAE government, which will then decide whether to proceed with a full feasibility study. Summarising the government's moves, one foreign banker commented: "They're not exactly being over-the-hill in the market."

Some foreign bankers are sceptical about the likelihood of a local market until the Kuwaiti stock exchange has "settled down". Yet given the success of the Kuwaiti market it is perhaps no surprise that private investors in the UAE want one of their own.

Abdul Fathman Bukhatir, a Sharjah-based businessman with international property, banking and finance interests, is bullish about the prospects for a market. "A stock exchange has to be established somewhere in the UAE where one can trade shares. There are banks, non-financial companies and the like which are now being traded on the streets. The market is being made by certain individuals and this is where the ordinary man suffers because he doesn't know exactly what the price should be and what demand is."

Bukhatir is bullish that any new

market should not deal with Gulf shares. "One should think of having a UAE stock exchange to deal with UAE stocks only," he told ABF, adding that he was not critical of Kuwait and its stock market.

Bukhatir's equity holdings are not restricted to UAE companies: he is on the board of three Gulf companies, in which he has "considerable stakes." His company is also "quite active in the Kuwait stock exchange." Bukhatir says that "through Gulf Consolidated & Services Industries we have just made a major property acquisition in Singapore."

However, UAE government officials still have their doubts about a local stock market. One British banker who recently discussed the idea with UAE Central Bank governor Abdul Malik al-Hamir says he found Al Hamir lukewarm to the idea of a local stock market. A downturn in the Kuwait market could make the idea more attractive, but, until such time, the UAE government is unlikely to make any dramatic decisions.

If a UAE market is established Bukhatir will undoubtedly become an active participant. His company, Sharjah-based Bukhatir Investments, has total assets of \$350 million. Bukhatir is chairman of National Bank of Sharjah, in which he holds an undisclosed number of shares, and is also vice chairman of Bank of Sharjah, in which he has a 6.66 share.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DAS ISLAND HOSPITAL NEARING COMPLETION

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 17 Sep 82 p 3

[Text]

A NEW medical centre is fast nearing completion on Das Island, as part of the development of Al Sharq area, where a new mosque has also been built.

According to Adma News, the staff magazine of Adma-Opco, the single-storey building of the medical centre is being constructed at an ideal sea-side location on the eastern side of the island, adjacent to the company's main office. It occupies an area of 2,000 square metres, twice as big as that of the main hospital on the island.

The fully self-contained centre will have 24 beds distributed among five wards each of four-bed capacity, and another four single-bed wards. It will have everything needed for patients' comfort, including automated beds and

multi-function bed-head rails.

"Serious cases requiring specialised or surgical treatment will continue to be sent to hospitals on the mainland," the report quoted Dr David Howell, resident medical officer, as saying.

Work on the project started two years ago and is expected to be over in a few months time.

The new centre will have its own pathological laboratory, an X-ray room, treatment rooms, a pharmacy and a dental clinic. Other facilities include a lecture room, sterilisation unit, kitchen, stores and an emergency stand-by generator.

The new facility was planned, the report said, because the old hospital, which had been built more than 20 years ago, had been experiencing difficulties in meeting the present-day requirements of the island.

CSO: 4400/14

ABU DHABI TO REFINE 20 PERCENT OF ITS CRUDE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Sep 82 p 3

[Text]

WITH the Ruweis and the Ummul Nar refineries reaching their peak production soon, Abu Dhabi is expected to refine 20 per cent of its crude oil output.

The Ummul Nar refinery is expected to reach a daily capacity production of 75,000 barrels by the middle of next year. Ruweis is also likely to reach its maximum production of 120,000 barrels a day in the near future.

This was declared by Mr Hassan Salmaan, director of the transport and industrialisation department of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, in a statement to the company's magazine.

The Adnoc official also said the prestigious Ruweis power plant and its desalination unit would become operational by the middle of next year. The desalination unit would supply water to the entire industrial township of Ruweis.

The 300-hundred-million dollar hydrocracker plant, being installed by an Italian company, is also likely to go into operation soon. The sophisticated unit would convert heavy hydrocarbons into light hydrocarbons. The agreement for its installation was signed last June by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed, Abu Dhabi Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Region

and chairman of Adnoc.

Mr Salmaan stated that the Ruweis plant would also provide fuel gas to the Abu Dhabi power stations, which would run their gas turbines on the by-product.

Among other important projects to be executed by the company are the installation of advanced telecommunications equipment linking the company's operational units with its headquarters.

Another important project is the laying of a 30-inch-diameter, 130-kilometre long pipeline that will carry natural gas to the fertilizer plant. The gas will undergo the 'treating process' at the refinery before its transmission.

Mr Salmaan said another 16-inch pipeline would be laid to carry gas to the Beni Yas power station. The transport and industrialisation department will also carry out necessary repairs on the 18-inch oil pipeline connecting the Bab offshore with the Ummul Nar refinery.

The Adnoc official stated that a new pipeline, with a diameter of 24 inches, will be laid between Ummul Nar and the Abu Dhabi power station, which will run its gas turbines on this gas supply.

Mr Salmaan also said that his department is responsible for ensuring an adequate supply of spare parts for the machinery involved in these projects. Both men and machinery have to be insured, he pointed out.

CSO: 4400/14

TRADE WITH ARAB WORLD RISES

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 13 Sep 82 p 3

[Article by Ahmed Hassan]

[Text]

TRADE between the UAE and the Arab world showed a marked improvement during the last three years of the last decade.

Arab exports to the UAE, which accounted for only 4.8 per cent of the total imports of the UAE, rose to an appreciable 10.4 per cent by the end of 1980.

According to a study carried out by the Federation of the Chamber of Commerce in conjunction with the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab exports to the UAE, which were valued at about Dh 0.9 billion in 1978 rose to nearly Dh 3 billion in 1980.

Correspondingly, world exports to the UAE in 1978 were worth nearly Dh 20 billion. The volume of these exports increased to nearly Dh 30 billion in 1980. These figures also take into account the re-export trade of the country.

Bahrain was the largest exporter to the UAE in the Arab world accounting for nearly Dh 1.5 billion worth of

goods. The two Yemens were also among the exporters to the UAE. The volume of trade between the UAE and South Yemen, particularly, has increased substantially during the 1978-80.

Exports from the neighbouring states of Kuwait and Qatar were nearly equal with both accounting for more than Dh 180 million. Libya, which exported goods worth nearly Dh 9.3 million in 1978, exported only 35,000 worth of goods in 1980.

Trade with Djibouti seems to have suffered most during the last three years of the last decade. The newly independent Arab African state which earlier exported Dh 3.3 million worth of goods to the UAE, did not export anything during 1980. In 1979, trade with Djibouti accounted for just Dh 8,000.

Trade with Somalia also suffered a setback, in the context of Somalia's exports to the UAE. UAE which imported Dh 13.5 million worth of goods from Somalia in 1978, imported just under half a million dirhams

worth of goods from that country in 1980. Both the Iraq-Iraq conflict and the Somalia-Ethiopia war had its impact on the volume of trade in the UAE and also accounted for changes in the traditional trade patterns.

The trade with Lebanon was, however, stable despite the civil war in that country. The UAE imported Dh 181 million worth of goods from Lebanon during 1978, while in 1980 the figure showed a slight fall to Dh 176 million.

On the contrary, trade with the north African Arab state of Tunis showed a remarkable improvement. Tunisian exports to the UAE which accounted for a mere Dh 124,000 during 1978 reached Dh 2.6 million in 1980.

The UAE's imports from Egypt also showed a slight increase during the same period. The UAE, which broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1978 after the late President Sadat's visit to Israel, imported Dh 18 million worth of goods from Egypt in 1978. Egyptian exports to the UAE rose to nearly Dh 23 million worth of goods in 1980.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

NEW HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION--About 70 percent of the construction work has been completed at the new hospital in Khor Fakkan. The hospital is being built in Yarmouk. It has a facility for 100 beds and includes all medical sections. The hospital is expected to be operational by the middle of next year. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 14 Sep 82 p 3]

DISASTER RELIEF--The higher relief committee held its first meeting at the headquarters of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Dubai yesterday under the chairmanship of Mr Saif Al Jarwan, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. Mr Mohamed Isa Al Suwaidi, undersecretary of the ministry and deputy head of the committee, said later that the committee reviewed about 200 cases of compensation to people affected by the rains and floods during last March. The committee approved compensation for them at rates ranging between 50 percent and 80 percent of the actual loss. He said that the minister had urged the members of the committee to exert more effort to complete the work quickly as it had a bearing on nationals affected by a disaster. The committee will hold its next meeting on Saturday and will review a number of other cases. The meeting was attended by Shaikh Hasher Al Maktoum, director-general of Civil Defence, representing the Ministry of Interior, Mr Abdulla Hamad Abdul Aziz, director of the central agricultural region, representing the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and Mr Khamis Ahmed Sweidan, head of the estate division, representing the Ministry of Finance and Industry. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Sep 82 p 3]

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